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Abstract 
This thesis is my attempt to establish a foundation, based on the philosophy of Objectivism as 
it was developed and elaborated by the Russian-American novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand, 
for the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. After contextualizing and 
explicating Rand’s philosophy, I make the case that, propaedeutic to the construction of a new 
aesthetics of cinema, it is incumbent upon film scholars to refute the irrational and immoral 
philosophical premises that have long been destroying the philosophy of art in general and the 
discipline of film studies in particular. Due to the troubling combination of its contemporaneity, 
extremism, and considerable influence, I focus initially on the philosophical school of 
poststructuralism – which I contend has, since the 1960s, served as the default philosophical 
foundation for film scholars – before ultimately moving on to refute what I call the Kantian 
aesthetic tradition, of which I demonstrate poststructuralism is a deadly symptom. Upon 
clearing away this philosophical debris, I set about arguing for the probative value of an 
Objectivist aesthetics of cinema by reigniting long-dormant debates about the validity of 
interpretation and the role of evaluation in film criticism. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate 
the value of an aesthetic orientation which I term aesthetic perfectionism, for it is my contention 
that perfectionism – which has recently emerged at the heart of key developments in film 
studies through the work of Stanley Cavell, which I argue motivated Rand’s philosophical 
enterprise, and which I argue should motivate the philosophical enterprises of all scholars who 
strive to do justice to all that the cinema has to offer – is the key to unlocking an Aesthetics of 
Life capable of transforming the discipline of film studies. 
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Preface 
“Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the 
thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts” (Wittgenstein [1921] 2001: 3). 
These are the words that open the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the first and only book 
published by the German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein during his lifetime. As I thought 
about what I could say in the first Preface that I have ever had occasion to write, I found 
Wittgenstein’s words ringing in my ears. Given both the ideas that I express in this thesis and 
the manner in which I express them, understanding (to say nothing of agreement) is something 
that I suspect will be hard to come by. To describe myself as a disagreeable thinker would be 
an understatement. My embattled – though, fortunately for me, not (yet) embittered –
supervisor, Paul Bowman, once described me as truculent. I liked that description, and, as my 
scholarship has become more and more polemical, I have worn it as a badge of honor.  
Of course, polemics are not to everybody’s liking. Indeed, many have argued that polemics 
defeat the purpose of academic inquiry and thus have no place in – or are even anathema to –
proper scholarship (Foucault [1984] 1997; Mouffe 1999; Giroux 2000; Brown 2001; Bowman 
2003, 2007). Ruminating on this issue, the American philosopher Stanley Cavell posited that 
the place that one thinks polemics have in philosophy – or should have, if they should have a 
place at all – is not so much a point of disagreement regarding the practice of philosophy as it 
is a “variance” in scholars’ conceptions of “the role of moral judgment” in philosophy (Cavell 
1995: 204). Inspired initially by the mercilessly trenchant polemics of the British film and 
cultural critic Andrew Britton, whose blistering tour de force “The Ideology of Screen” (Britton 
1979) still stands in my estimation as the single most impressive piece of film scholarship ever 
written, it has been the work of the Russian-American novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand that 
has demonstrated most clearly to me the value of polemical philosophy in its ability to strip 
away the superfluities, the obfuscations, and the inanities and lay bare the fundamental issues, 
both intellectual and moral, with which philosophers are confronted upon taking up the mantle 
of a thinker. The irony is that, by devoting myself to a thesis on the philosophy of Ayn Rand, 
I almost do not even need to preface my work with a consideration of the place of polemics in 
philosophy, because, regardless of how scholars feel about polemics the very mention of 
Rand’s name is apt to draw polemical fire from virtually every corner of the academy.
x 
On an episode of the political talk show The Rubin Report, in which Dave Rubin had on as his 
guest Yaron Brook, the present Chairman of the Board at the Ayn Rand Institute, Rubin 
remarked how “just by saying ‘Ayn Rand,’ a certain percentage of people go bonkers” (Rubin 
in Rubin and Brook 2016). Expressing a similar sentiment, the American political commentator 
Ben Shapiro sardonically observed that, in any given university course, the chances are that, if 
you want to do well in the course, “citing Ayn Rand probably [will not be] the best strategy” 
(Shapiro 2013: 30). Given this intellectual climate, it was the opposite of a surprise when, 
nearing the completion of this thesis, I came across a call for papers for a conference that is to 
take place at the University of Reading in the fall of 2018 entitled “Ayn Rand from the Left.” 
The conference organizer, Neil Cocks, mentions in the call for papers, in the absence of 
anything even resembling an argument, that Rand’s work is “clearly” so “irredeemable” – not 
to mention “so vulgar, so confused, so…silly” – that even holding a conference to criticize her 
appears to transgress academic propriety (Cocks 2017).  
These sentiments typify what might be called the “reception” of Rand in academia, though I 
think “repression” would be more accurate. It is no secret that academia has in the 21st Century 
degenerated into a far-Left echo chamber – if not into a full-on cult (cf. Boghossian and Lindsay 
2018) – something that public intellectuals Left, Right, and Center like Brook, Shapiro, Sir 
Roger Scruton, Jordan Peterson, Gad Saad, Sam Harris, Camille Paglia, Bret Weinstein, Steven 
Pinker, and Jonathan Haidt, to name only a few, are fighting to change. And yet, in the vitriolic 
responses with which the mere mention of Ayn Rand is invariably met, I find the same thing 
that Cavell found with respect to what he diagnosed as the longstanding academic repression 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson: That “it does not follow from [Rand’s] institutionalized silencing 
that [she] failed to raise the call for philosophy”; on the contrary, “the fact of [her] call’s 
repression would be the sign that it has been heard” (Cavell 1995: 210). Thus, I would say that 
my principal aim in this thesis is to try to pave the way for a (more) reasonable reception of 
Rand’s philosophy. I have found in her work ideas and insights that are more probing, 
provocative, and promising than I have found anywhere else, and it would be an absolute 
disgrace if the minds best-suited to inherit her philosophy failed to at least consider, if not 
realize, its promise. 
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Now, to preface my work in such grandiose terms may make it seem like I wrote this thesis on 
a soapbox. This brings me back to Wittgenstein’s prefatory remarks. In his preface to the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein said that his purpose in writing it would be achieved “if it gave pleasure 
to one person who read and understood it” (Wittgenstein [1921] 2001: 3). That is an 
understandable, even sympathetic, purpose. But it was not my purpose. To quote the creed of 
the protagonists in Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged: “I swear – by my life and my love of it – that 
I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine” (Rand 1957: 
1069). I aimed at doing different things at different points in this thesis – among them, paving 
the way for a (more) reasonable reception of Rand’s philosophy, documenting and criticizing 
the history of film studies, and highlighting potentially fruitful avenues for the future of film 
studies – and a number of those aims were taken in consideration of other scholars and of the 
scholarly community more broadly. But my driving purpose was very simple: I wanted to 
honestly understand and express myself.  
This thesis was written by me and for me. I have been trying, each and every day, to better 
understand and consistently improve upon the person – and, following from that, the scholar 
– that I am and can potentially become. This philosophy of life, manifest in the life and work 
of Ayn Rand, is what I discuss in this thesis as the philosophy of perfectionism. It is not a 
philosophy for everybody. It is unendingly challenging and, for some, unbearably painful. 
But its satisfactions and rewards are well-worth the effort. My proof for that claim is this 
thesis. It has been a challenging and painful journey of self-discovery, a journey over the 
course of which I have learned more about myself and about the world in which I live than I 
could have possibly imagined when I initially started writing it, yet I would not trade a single 
painful blow taken or a single challenge overcome. From this perspective, I need to slightly 
tweak Wittgenstein’s opening words from the Tractatus for my purposes: Perhaps this thesis 
will be understood only by people who have themselves already had the thoughts that are 
expressed in it, or at least similar thoughts – and who are strong enough to live up to them.
Art is the fuel and the spark plug of a man’s soul; its task is to set a soul on fire and never let 
it go out. The task of providing that fire with a motor and a direction belongs to philosophy.
– Ayn Rand ([1969] 1975: 145) 
1 
Introduction – Towards an Objectivist Aesthetics of Cinema 
It is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but 
not of being unable to defend himself with rational speech, when the use of rational speech … can confer 
the greatest of benefits … Before some audiences, not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will 
make it easy for what we say to produce conviction … [Here] we must be able to employ persuasion, just 
as deduction can be employed, on opposite sides of a question – not in order that we may in practice employ 
it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly 
what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. 
– Aristotle (350 BCEf: 4622-4623) 
In response to questions regarding one’s reasons for practicing a martial art, one of the most 
common answers given is self-defense, the desire to equip oneself with the tools necessary to live 
confidently in the world ready for whatever physical attack may come. By contrast, in response to 
questions regarding one’s reasons for practicing philosophy, self-defense is rarely given as an 
answer. The precedent for philosophy-as-self-defense is the work of Aristotle, for whom 
philosophical argument was precisely a form of combat.1 In more recent history, the most 
prominent practitioner of philosophy-as-self-defense has been the Russian-American novelist and 
philosopher Ayn Rand. In her fiction writing, most notably in The Fountainhead (1943) and Atlas 
Shrugged (1957), but more extensively in her later non-fiction writing, Rand developed a 
philosophical system which she called Objectivism. Following Aristotle, Objectivism was 
intended by Rand to serve as a form of self-defense, as a means to equip oneself with the tools 
necessary to live confidently in the world ready for whatever intellectual attack may come.  
In an address given, fittingly enough, at West Point to the graduating class of 1974, Rand 
maintained that one must study even philosophical ideas that seem to be “blatantly false,” to “make 
no sense,” and to “bear no relation to real life,” for if one fails to understand such ideas then one 
is “vulnerable to the worst among them” (Rand 1974a: 7-8). Connecting philosophy to military 
combat, Rand elaborated:  
1 For examples of his propensity for combat metaphors, see Aristotle (350 BCEb: 566; 350 BCEc: 1654; 350 BCEf: 
4680, 4697). 
2 
In [the military], you know the importance of keeping track of the enemy’s weapons, strategy, and 
tactics – and of being prepared to counter them. The same is true in philosophy: You have to 
understand the enemy’s ideas and be prepared to refute them, you have to know his basic arguments 
and be able to blast them (Rand 1974a: 7-8). 
Following the philosophical precedents set by Aristotle and Rand, I intend in this thesis to use the 
principles of Objectivism as a means of self-defense against the prevailing philosophical 
tendencies of academic engagements with the cinema. Throughout the history of film studies, 
scholars have frequently stepped onto the philosophical battlefield ill-equipped for combat, and, 
as I will argue at length in this thesis, this has led scholars to countenance a wide variety of 
irrational and immoral ideas deleterious not only to the art of film but to the very concept of art.2
More recently, as part of the “film-philosophy” movement, scholars have sought to recalibrate the 
discipline of film studies and provide it with a solid philosophical anchor.3 This is a welcome 
development for film studies. However, so long as the unexamined philosophical premises that 
have plagued the discipline since its inception remain operative and unchallenged, film studies 
will be unable to make any meaningful progress in this direction.4 Thus, prior to any attempts to 
make ground in the realm of film criticism, I will work here in this Introduction and continue in 
the next two chapters to clear away the most substantial philosophical debris in order to establish 
a foundation for the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema.  
2 For genealogies and critiques of these ideas and the forms they have taken in film studies, see the work of Robin 
Wood (2002, 2006), Andrew Britton (2009), William Cadbury and Leland Poague (1982), Noël Carroll (1982, 1983, 
1988a, 1988b, 1996), David Bordwell (1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1996a, 1996b), and D.N. Rodowick ([1988] 1994, 
1991).  
3 Film-philosophy is still in the process of establishing itself as a viable alternative to film studies orthodoxy. For the 
probative value of film-philosophy, see, beyond the individual contributions to the groundbreaking Film-Philosophy
journal and the work of such philosophical heralds as Stanley Cavell ([1971] 1979, 1981a, 1996, 2004, 2005b) and 
Carroll (1988a, 1988b, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010), the work of contemporary scholars 
such as Rodowick (1997, 2001, 2007, 2015), Stephen Mulhall ([2001] 2008), Daniel Frampton (2006), David Sorfa 
(2006a, 2006b, 2016, 2018), Thomas E. Wartenberg (2007), Daniel Shaw (2008, 2012, 2017), Berys Gaut (2010), 
Robert Sinnerbrink (2011, 2015), Daniel Morgan (2011, 2012), Robert Pippin (2012, 2013, 2017), and Daniel 
Yacavone (2015). Additionally, for my own take on film-philosophy beyond the scope of this thesis, see Barrowman 
(2018a). 
4 Observing that “film studies has recently declared itself in need of reconception,” Cavell expressed his hope that 
“part of this reconception will take the form of a wish to understand how it got to its present form” (Cavell 2004: 319). 
From this perspective, this thesis is my attempt to aid in the understanding of how film studies got to its present form 
on the one hand and to suggest the new form that it should take on the other. 
3 
Objectivism served, for Rand, as a comprehensive view of existence, what she liked to call “a 
philosophy for living on Earth” (Rand 1974a: 10). Rand broke Objectivism down into five major 
branches, and I will discuss all five in turn: (1) Metaphysics, (2) Epistemology, (3) Ethics, (4) 
Politics, and (5) Aesthetics.  
(1) Metaphysics 
Objectivism is built on what Rand designates axiomatic concepts. An axiom, as she explains, is “a 
statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that 
knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses 
to identify it or not.” Furthermore, an axiom “defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to 
accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it” (Rand 1957: 1040). The axiom at the 
heart of Objectivism is existence exists, the propositional form of which is A is A. The axiomatic 
concepts that result from this axiom are existence, identity, and consciousness; they follow from 
the axiom and its two corollaries: First, that something exists which one perceives, and, second, 
that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which 
exists. To simplify: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification (Rand 1957: 1016).  
Existence, identity, and consciousness are thus, Rand affirms, the “irreducible primaries” implied 
in all human activity: 
From the first ray of light you perceive at the start of your life to the widest erudition you might 
acquire at its end, whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the 
axioms remain the same: That it exists and that you know it (Rand 1957: 1016). 
This common-sense metaphysics quite conspicuously flies in the face of most of what has been 
offered by modern philosophers.5 However, the fact that Rand’s views were fundamentally 
5 Having invoked the notion of common sense, I am reminded of the pithy dictum of the Roman philosopher Anicius 
Manlius Severinus Boëthius: “There are certain common conceptions of the mind which are self-evident only to the 
wise” (Boëthius cited by Johannes Caterus in Descartes 1984: 70). Interestingly, among her fellow 20th Century 
philosophers, Rand’s closest philosophical allies are Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein. For both Husserl and 
Wittgenstein, ideas akin to “existence exists” anchor their philosophical projects. In Husserl’s case, consider his 
emphasis on what he calls “original self-evidence,” that which is “behind” all axioms (Husserl [1939] 1970: 365); in 
Wittgenstein’s case, meanwhile, consider his claim that we do not assume that “existence exists” but that, more 
4 
antithetical to much of what constitutes modern philosophy was precisely what impelled her to 
articulate her ideas and provide justification for a metaphysical perspective which does not merely 
acknowledge the primacy of an objective reality but which also acknowledges the ability of human 
beings to acquire knowledge of objective reality. The sides in this philosophical battle, in Rand’s 
terminology, are that of reason, which is the province of logic and which alone provides the means 
of acquiring knowledge of the world, versus mysticism, which is the province of whim and which 
thus represents a rejection of logic and, as a consequence, cannot provide the means of acquiring 
knowledge of the world.6
From the Objectivist perspective, there are two fundamental questions – “What do I know?” and 
“How do I know?” – that undergird every human thought and action. Far from providing the 
backdrop for philosophy, however, Rand laments and explores the calamitous consequences of the 
fact that the efforts of most philosophers through the ages have consisted of “attempts to escape 
one or the other of the two fundamental questions”:
Men have been taught either that knowledge is impossible (skepticism) or that it is available without 
effort (mysticism). These two positions appear to be antagonists but are, in fact, two variants on 
the same theme, two sides of the same fraudulent coin … Philosophically, the mystic is usually an 
exponent of the intrinsic (revealed) school of epistemology; the skeptic is usually an advocate of 
epistemological subjectivism. But, psychologically, the mystic is a subjectivist who uses 
intrinsicism as a means to claim the primacy of his consciousness over that of others [while] the 
skeptic is a disillusioned intrinsicist who, having failed to find automatic supernatural guidance, 
seeks a substitute in the collective subjectivism of others (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 79). 
In Rand’s estimation, the fundamental mistake of mysticism is the tendency to “start in 
midstream”; that is, rather than starting with the primacy of existence, it is the primacy of 
consciousness that serves as the first principle. To start from the primacy of consciousness, 
accurately, “in the entire system of our language-games, it belongs to the foundations … [as that which] forms the 
basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 52e). I will return to these salient 
connections between Rand, Husserl, and Wittgenstein in Chapter 1.  
6 For her most salient rehearsals of the battle between reason and mysticism, see Rand (1957; 1960; [1966-1967] 
1990). 
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however, is to countenance a contradiction, for a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is 
a contradiction in terms. “You can become aware of the fact that you are conscious,” Rand 
maintains, “only after you have become conscious of something – and in fact long after”; it is only 
after one is conscious of the world that one is able to “identify the fact that it is some function in 
[the] mind that is performing this process of awareness” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 246).7
In the form of his famous formulation “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes [1637] 2003: 23), René 
Descartes is responsible for placing the primacy of consciousness in the position of first principle 
in modern philosophy.8 Immanuel Kant, meanwhile, revived the mysticism of Platonic philosophy 
and, by secularizing ancient dogmas, provided mysticism with a new lease on life.9 Furthermore, 
adding insult to injury, Kant also injected into philosophy a pernicious fatalism. In the first line in 
the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant alleges that the “fate” of reason 
is to be “burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems 
by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity 
7 For her most sustained considerations of the primacy of existence, see Rand (1957, [1966-1967] 1990). For insightful 
subsequent commentaries on the Objectivist metaphysics, see Leonard Peikoff (1982, 1991), David Kelley ([1990] 
2000), Chris Matthew Sciabarra ([1995] 2013), Allan Gotthelf (2000), Roger E. Bissell (2007, 2008, 2014, 2015, 
2018), Harry Binswanger (2014), and Jason G. Rheins (2016).  
8 The primacy of consciousness is an example of a fallacy that Harry Binswanger refers to as the fallacy of pure self-
reference (Binswanger 2014: 248-251). However, it warrants mentioning that, even though Descartes was mistaken 
to place the primacy of consciousness in the position of first principle, this is not to say that the Objectivist axiom 
“existence exists” was absent from his philosophical system. In response to Marin Mersenne – who, after reading 
Descartes’ Meditations, had suggested that he “set out [his] entire argument in geometrical fashion, starting from a 
number of definitions, postulates, and axioms” (Mersenne 1641: 92) – Descartes defended his decision to proceed, as 
it were, philosophically rather than geometrically; however, he obliged Mersenne and listed ten definitions, seven 
postulates, and ten “axioms or common notions” (Descartes 1641b: 116). Significantly included is the “common 
notion” that “existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing” (Descartes 1641b: 117). Though 
attempting to bring Cartesian philosophy in line with Objectivism is beyond the scope of this thesis, I think that it is 
safe to say that Descartes simply found the notion that “existence exists” so common that to have made it the first 
principle would have seemed to him redundant. As he remarked in a letter to Claude Clerselier, the axiomatic status 
of existence “appears so evident to the understanding that we cannot but believe it, even though this may be the first 
time in our life that we have thought of it” (Descartes 1646: 271).
9 To clarify, rather than framing the philosophical critiques that comprise this thesis as critiques of the Platonic 
philosophical tradition, I am framing them as critiques of the Kantian philosophical tradition. My reasoning is twofold. 
First, as I mentioned, the Kantian tradition is the secularization of Platonic mysticism, so, essentially, to critique the 
Kantian tradition is to critique the Platonic tradition (Peikoff 1967). Second, I share with Yaron Brook the sense that, 
given how early in the attempts of human beings to come to terms with the world and our place in it Plato initiated his 
philosophical enterprise, it is more sensible and more pressing to critique the modern philosophy of Kant than the 
ancient philosophy of Plato (Brook in Rubin and Brook 2017). Thus, while there is a certain amount of truth to the 
claim that the history of philosophy is a battle between Plato and Aristotle, for the purposes of this thesis, I am framing 
the battle as one between Kant and Rand.   
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of human reason” (Kant 1781: 99). In other words, Kant is not only starting in midstream and 
elevating the primacy of consciousness to first principle, he is alleging that it is our fate as human 
beings (the only species forced, apparently by some variant of Descartes’ evil demon, to toil away 
in a Sisyphean quest for understanding) to drown in the waters of knowledge, with reason serving 
not as an instrument of survival but rather as an agent of death.10
Kant’s fatalism corroborates the claim stated in no uncertain terms by D.N. Rodowick that 
skepticism is “death dealing” (Rodowick 2015: 201). In fact, by the time he published the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s skepticism had only intensified. Based on his 
postulation in the preface to the second edition – that “if, after many preliminaries and preparations 
are made, a science gets stuck as soon as it approaches its end, or if, in order to reach this end, it 
must often go back and set out on a new path; or likewise if it proves impossible for the different 
co-workers to achieve unanimity as to the way in which they should pursue their common aim; 
then we may be sure that such a study is merely groping about” (Kant 1787: 106) – Kant’s 
“Copernican Revolution” can be understood as an attempt on his part to alleviate his fear that 
metaphysics was not just such a “groping about” but, worse yet, “a groping among mere concepts” 
(Kant 1787: 110, my emphasis).  
In order to avoid the difficulties of (and the potential for failure in) human cognition, Kant’s 
“solution” to metaphysics is stated in the following famous passage, which, for my purposes in 
elucidating Objectivism, may serve as the exemplary instance of starting in midstream with the 
primacy of consciousness:  
10 The fatalism evident in Kant’s picture of the human experience is an example of what Rand describes as the 
malevolent universe premise (Rand 1948a: 199). As I indicated, the roots of the malevolent universe premise can be 
found in Descartes’ evil demon argument. However, Kant clearly missed the part where Descartes rejected this entire 
line of thinking: “Here is the objection of objections and the epitome of the entire doctrine held by those ‘people of 
great intelligence’ [among the ranks of whom Kant was soon to join]. All the things that we can understand and 
conceive are [allegedly] only imaginings and fictions of our mind which cannot have any subsistence. And it follows 
from this that nothing that we can in any way understand, conceive, or imagine should be accepted as true; in other 
words, we must entirely close the door to reason and content ourselves with being monkeys or parrots rather than men 
if we are to deserve a place among these great minds. For, if the things we can conceive must be regarded as false 
merely because we can conceive them, all that is left is for us to be obliged to accept as true only things which we do 
not conceive. We shall have to construct our doctrines out of these things, imitating others without knowing why, like 
monkeys, and uttering words whose sense we do not in any way understand, like parrots” (Descartes 1646: 275). 
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Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts 
to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, 
on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence, let us once try whether we do not get farther with 
the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which 
would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to 
establish something about objects before they are given to us (Kant 1787: 110).11
The truth of skepticism, then, as Stanley Cavell has persuasively argued, is that, inasmuch as “what
skepticism questions or denies my knowledge of is the world of objects I inhabit, is the world” 
(Cavell 1979: 448), the desire of skeptics to know with certainty the existence of the world 
paradoxically gives ground to “a sense of powerlessness” in the face of “the precariousness and 
arbitrariness of existence, the utter contingency in the fact that things are as they are” (Cavell 1979: 
236). On this picture, a more accurate name for skepticism presents itself: Fear. Through the act, 
motivated by fear, of sealing off from human knowledge the world in its awe-inspiring immediacy 
and intractability, skeptics create in its place a world that they fancy as subject to their whims. The 
skeptic’s experience of trying to prove that existence exists, moreover, is “one of trying to establish 
an absolutely firm connection with that world-object from that sealed position,” a self-defeating 
task undertaken “as though, deprived of the ordinary forms of life in which that connection is, and 
is alone, secured, [the skeptic] is trying to establish it in his immediate consciousness, then and 
there” (Cavell 1979: 238). Rand adds color to the picture painted by Cavell of the fear that drives 
skepticism in the following manner: 
Every form of causeless self-doubt, every feeling of inferiority and secret unworthiness, is, in fact, 
man’s hidden dread of his inability to deal with existence. But the greater his terror, the more 
fiercely he clings to the murderous doctrines that choke him … He will fake, evade, blank out; he 
will cheat himself of reality, of existence, of happiness, of mind; and he will ultimately cheat 
himself of self-esteem by struggling to preserve its illusion rather than to risk discovering its lack 
11 Influential in promulgating this pernicious philosophical tradition in post-Kantian philosophy was Friedrich 
Nietzsche. Consider the following (profoundly Kantian) retort from Beyond Good and Evil with respect to what 
Nietzsche disdainfully regards as “the superstitions of the logicians” (Nietzsche [1886] 2003: 47): “Whoever feels 
able to answer [any] metaphysical questions … will find a philosopher today ready with a smile and two question 
marks: ‘My dear sir,’ the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, ‘it is improbable you are not mistaken, but 
why do you want the truth at all?’” (Nietzsche [1886] 2003: 45-46; see also Nietzsche [1883-1888] 1967, esp. 268-
269). 
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… A [skeptic] is a man who surrendered his mind at its first encounter with the minds of others. 
Somewhere in the distant reaches of his childhood, when his own understanding of reality clashed 
with the assertions of others, with their arbitrary orders and contradictory demands, he gave in to 
so craven a fear of independence that he renounced his rational faculty … [That is why,] when you 
listen to a [skeptic’s] harangue on the impotence of the human mind and begin to doubt your
consciousness, not his, when you permit your precariously semi-rational state to be shaken by any 
assertion and decide it is safer to trust his superior certainty and knowledge, the joke is on both of 
you. Your sanction is the only source of certainty he has. The supernatural power that a [skeptic] 
dreads, the unknowable spirit he worships, the consciousness he considers omnipotent, is yours
(Rand 1957: 1044, 1057). 
 (2) Epistemology 
At this point, it might be objected that Rand’s “refutation” of skepticism merely begs the question, 
for the question at which all such refutations hit bedrock is: “How do I know?”12 This is precisely 
an epistemological issue, and it is the issue to which Rand devoted the bulk of her energy in 
formulating Objectivism. The task facing human beings, Rand observes, is to bring existence and 
existents “into the realm of the humanly knowable,” a task which she notes requires “the most 
rigorous compliance with objective rules and facts if the end product is to be knowledge” (Rand 
[1966-1967] 1990: 8). The basis of the Objectivist epistemology is the metaphysical axiom 
“existence exists,” and for anything to qualify as knowledge, it must proceed from the axiomatic 
concepts existence, identity, and consciousness. The job of philosophy is not, Rand clarifies, to 
determine what exists; that, she maintains, is the province of the various branches of science. The 
job of philosophy, rather, is to determine what has to be true of everything that does exist; that, 
she maintains, is the starting point from which all inquiries must proceed if the end result is to 
qualify as knowledge.13 And what has to be true of everything that exists is that it must have an 
12 Rand takes most (but significantly not all) of her cues in response to this question from Aristotle (350 BCEa, 350 
BCEd). For her own thoughts on her Aristotelian influence, see Rand (1948b: 393-394; 1961a: 17-19; 1963a). For her 
thoughts on her deviations from Aristotle, see Rand ([1966-1967] 1990: 52-54, [1958] 2000: 21-22). For insightful 
subsequent examinations of Rand’s Aristotelianism, see Peikoff (1982, 1991), Kelley ([1990] 2000), Gotthelf (2000), 
Roderick T. Long (2000), Darrin Walsh (2002), Bissell (2007, 2008, 2014, 2015), Rheins (2016), and Gregory 
Salmieri (2016b). 
13 To note another congeniality with Wittgenstein, consider Rand’s perspective on philosophical investigations in light 
of Wittgenstein’s famous formulation: “[Philosophy] takes its rise not from an interest in the facts of nature … but 
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identity, that A must be A.14 The form that this realization takes in consciousness is outlined by 
Rand as follows: “Something exists of which I am conscious; I must discover its identity” (Rand 
[1966-1967] 1990: 59).15 From this realization, one proceeds on the basis of the activities of 
differentiation and integration (in accordance with the Law of Identity) which are the cognitive 
processes by which human beings bring existence and existents into the realm of the knowable. 
This is the practice of concept formation, a practice the cultivation of which is the essence of 
epistemology: 
Since man’s knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man’s knowledge 
depends on the validity of concepts … [However,] since consciousness is a specific faculty … its 
range is limited. It cannot perceive everything at once; since awareness, on all levels, requires an 
active process, it cannot do everything at once. Whether the units with which one deals are percepts 
or concepts, the range of what man can hold in the focus of his conscious awareness at any given 
moment is limited. The essence, therefore, of man’s incomparable cognitive power is the ability to 
reduce a vast amount of information to a minimal number of units – which is the task performed 
by his conceptual faculty (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 1, 63). 
If conceptualization, on Rand’s terms, is “a method of expanding man’s consciousness by reducing 
the number of its content’s units – a systematic means to an unlimited integration of cognitive 
data” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 64), then there must be a discernible logic according to which the 
method functions. For Rand, the “epistemological razor” according to which the method of 
conceptualization functions is as follows: “Concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity –
the corollary of which is: Nor are they to be integrated in disregard of necessity” (Rand [1966-
from an urge to understand the basis, or essence, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to 
hunt out new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of [philosophical investigation] that we do not seek to learn anything 
new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view … We feel as if we had to penetrate 
phenomena. Our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 
‘possibilities’ of phenomena … [towards that which] we know when no one asks us but no longer know when we are 
supposed to give an account of it … [towards that which] we need to remind ourselves of (Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 
42 [§89-§90]).  
14 Since denying that A must be A implies that A is something else (i.e. something else), it constitutes a logical fallacy 
which Rand designates the fallacy of the stolen concept, or, less formally, concept stealing (Rand [1966-1967] 1990), 
on which I will elaborate presently. 
15 The Objectivist model of conceptualization explicated here by Rand takes as its point of departure Aristotle’s 
contention, presaging the Law of Identity, that “we cannot grasp what it is to be something without grasping the fact 
that it is; for it is impossible to know what a thing is if we are ignorant of whether it is” (Aristotle 350 BCEa: 348).
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1967] 1990: 72). To elucidate the specifics of her understanding of concepts and their function in 
cognition, Rand considers two potential obstacles to conceptualization as a means of underscoring 
the usefulness of the aforementioned razor in overcoming such obstacles: First, the existence of a 
black swan and the “problem” it poses to the classification of existents as “swans,” and, second, 
the existence of a Martian with a rational mind but a spider body and the “problem” it poses to the 
classification of existents as “humans”: 
In the case of black swans, it is objectively mandatory to classify them as “swans” because virtually 
all of their characteristics are similar to the characteristics of white swans, the difference of color 
[being] of no cognitive significance (concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity). In the 
case of the rational spider from Mars (if such a creature were possible), the differences between 
him and man would be so great that the study of one would scarcely apply to the other and, 
therefore, the formation of a new concept to designate the Martians would be objectively mandatory 
(concepts are not to be integrated in disregard of necessity) (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 73). 
Much like Rand’s common-sense metaphysics, this common-sense epistemology – predicated as 
it is on the Law of Identity and affirming as it does the efficacy of human consciousness in 
perceiving the objective, external world – also flies in the face of much of modern philosophy, 
which is distinct for the profundity of its conceptual nihilism justified with reference to an extreme 
and untenable linguistic relativism. Conceptual nihilists, insofar as they deny the possibility of 
acquiring knowledge of the objective, external world (if they do not also deny the existence of an 
objective, external world), provide further proof of the truth of skepticism, for they produce the 
situation they seek to overcome and thus condemn themselves to perpetual disappointment.16 As 
Rand frames this self-defeating “logic”: 
Do you cry that you find no answers? By what means did you hope to find them? You reject your 
tool of perception – your mind – then complain that the universe is a mystery. You discard your 
key, then wail that all doors are locked against you. You start out in pursuit of the irrational, then 
damn existence for making no sense (Rand 1957: 1054). 
16 Beyond his general notion of the truth of skepticism, Cavell clarifies the ubiquity of disappointment in the life of 
the skeptic with reference to the state he describes under the heading of “living one’s skepticism” (Cavell 1979: 437-
458; see also Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 38-43 [§81-§90] and Rodowick 2015: 198-203). I will return to the notion of 
living one’s skepticism in Chapter 1 in relation to Jacques Derrida and the practice of deconstruction.
11 
To make matters worse, the “solution” flaunted by conceptual nihilists to this (il)logical loop is a 
logical fallacy designated by Rand as the fallacy of the stolen concept, or, less formally, concept 
stealing. This fallacy consists of denying the primacy of a putatively invalid concept and then 
asserting the primacy of a derivative concept. She elaborates on the “logic” of concept stealing as 
follows: 
[Concept stealers] proclaim that there are no entities, that nothing exists but motion, and blank out 
the fact that motion presupposes the thing which moves, that without the concept of entity there 
can be no such concept as motion … they proclaim that there is no Law of Identity, that nothing 
exists but change, and blank out the fact that change presupposes the concept of what changes, 
from what and to what, that without the Law of Identity no such concept as change is possible … 
they seek to seize power over all of existence while denying that existence exists. “We know that 
we know nothing,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are claiming knowledge. “There are 
no absolutes,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are uttering an absolute. “You cannot 
prove that you exist or that you’re conscious,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that proof 
presupposes existence, consciousness, and a complex chain of knowledge: The existence of 
something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to 
distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproven (Rand 1957: 1039-1040).  
The “crucially important” fact that one must grasp with respect to concepts is the fact that concepts 
are open-ended classifications – that is to say, they include the discovered and the yet-to-be-
discovered characteristics of existence/existents (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 66). Ironically, it is 
precisely in grasping this fact that conceptual nihilists err:  
“When can we claim that we know what a concept stands for?” they clamor … [a question which] 
implies the unadmitted presupposition that concepts are not a cognitive device of man’s type of 
consciousness, but a repository of closed, out-of-context omniscience – and that concepts refer, not 
to the existence of the external world, but to the frozen, arrested state of knowledge inside any 
given consciousness at any given moment. On such a premise, every advance of knowledge is a 
setback, a demonstration of man’s ignorance … Like a spoiled, disillusioned child who had 
expected predigested capsules of automatic knowledge, [a conceptual nihilist] stamps his foot at 
reality and cries that context, integration, mental effort, and first-hand inquiry are too much to 
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expect of him, that he rejects so demanding a method of cognition, and that he will manufacture 
his own “constructs” from now on (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 67-68). 
The ubiquity and the deleteriousness of skepticism lend credence to Rodowick’s contention that 
“to restore belief in this world, to turn us away from the interiority, anonymity, and even solipsism 
of skepticism toward a shared existence with the world,” is the most pressing challenge currently 
facing philosophy (Rodowick 2015: 227). Cavell, for his part, saw this challenge as consisting of 
releasing the world – or, as he refers to it in his more Thoreauvian moments, “nature” – from 
“private holds”:
[Philosophy] reasserts that, however we may choose to parcel or not to parcel nature among 
ourselves, nature is held – we are held by it – only in common. Its declaration of my absence and 
of nature’s survival of me puts me in mind of origins, and shows me that I am astray. It faces me, 
draws my limits, and discovers my scale; it fronts me, with whatever wall at my back, and gives 
me horizon and gravity. It reasserts that, in whatever locale I find myself, I am to locate myself. It 
speaks of terror but suggests elation … [and] the [gambit] of this romanticism … is that we can 
still be moved to move, that we are free, if we will, to step upon our transport, that nature’s absence 
– or its presence merely to sentiment or mood – is only the history of our turnings from it, in 
distraction or denial (Cavell [1971] 1979: 114).17
This challenge of releasing the world from our private holds is what galvanizes Rand’s appeal to 
objectivity in the practice of concept formation. To explain why mysticism in general and 
skepticism in particular are such powerful forces in philosophical thinking, she emphasizes the 
destructive consequences of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy.18 According to intrinsicism, the 
referents of concepts are held to be intrinsic, i.e. as universals inherent in existents and entirely 
unrelated to consciousness, “to be perceived by man directly, like any other kind of concrete 
existents, but perceived by some non-sensory or extra-sensory means” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 
53). According to subjectivism, meanwhile, the referents of concepts are held to be subjective, i.e. 
17 Cavell’s rejection in this passage of the pathological insistence on the privacy/solipsism of subjectivity has its roots 
in the “private language argument” as rehearsed by Wittgenstein ([1949] 1967: 88-105 [§242-§322]; Cavell 1979: 
329-496). 
18 For a lucid and compelling extension of Rand’s rejection of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy for the purpose of 
rejecting on related grounds the correlative analytic/synthetic dichotomy, see Peikoff (1967). 
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as products of consciousness and entirely unrelated to existence, “mere ‘names’ or notions 
arbitrarily assigned to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the ground of vague, inexplicable 
resemblances” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 53). The former attempts, in effect, to establish the 
primacy of existence by dispensing with consciousness – that is to say, “by converting concepts 
into concrete existents and reducing consciousness to the perceptual level, to the automatic 
function of grasping percepts,” while the latter attempts, in effect, to establish the primacy of 
consciousness by dispensing with existence – that is to say, “by denying the status of existents even 
to concretes and converting concepts into conglomerates of fantasy, constructed out of the debris 
of other, lesser fantasies, such as words without referents or incantations of sounds corresponding 
to nothing in an unknowable reality” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 53).19
Neither intrinsicism nor subjectivism, Rand laments, regards concepts as objective, as neither 
revealed nor invented, but rather, produced objectively by consciousness in acknowledgement of 
the external world – or, as Rand further clarifies, “as the products of a cognitive method of 
classification whose processes must be performed by man but whose content is dictated by reality” 
(Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 54). It is as if, Rand goes on to observe, conceptual nihilists are “still in 
the stage of transition which characterizes a child in the process of learning to speak – a child who 
is using his conceptual faculty but has not developed it sufficiently to be able to examine it self-
consciously and discover that what he is using is reason” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 54). Conceptual 
nihilists of either persuasion, intrinsicism or subjectivism, seek to replace the objective with the 
arbitrary; yet, as Rand unequivocally avers, “there is no room for the arbitrary in any activity of 
man, least of all in his method of cognition” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 82).20
19 Centuries before the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and the regrettable widespread acceptance of such relativistic (and 
allegedly “progressive”) thinking in philosophical circles (cf. Chomsky [1988] and Pinker [1995] among many others), 
Descartes confessed that he was confounded by such thinking: “[The process of concept formation] is not a linking of 
names but of the things that are signified by the names, and I am surprised that the opposite view should occur to 
anyone. Who doubts that a Frenchman and a German can reason about the same things despite the fact that the words 
that they think of are completely different? And surely the philosopher refutes his own position when he talks of the 
arbitrary conventions that we have laid down concerning the meaning of words. For, if he admits that the words signify 
something, why will he not allow that our reasoning deals with this something which is signified rather than merely 
with the words?” (Descartes 1641c: 126).
20 For more extensive considerations of Objectivist epistemology, see Peikoff (1967, 1991), Kelley ([1990] 2000), 
Sciabarra ([1995] 2013), Long (2000), Neil K. Goodell (2007), Bissell (2007, 2008, 2014, 2015, 2018), Binswanger 
(2014), Rheins (2016), Salmieri (2016b), and Arnold Baise (2017). 
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(3) Ethics 
As a consequence of a metaphysics acknowledging objective reality and an epistemology 
affirming the efficacious rational faculty of human beings in possession of a volitional 
consciousness, the Objectivist ethics is centered on the concept of value. However, Rand notes 
that the concept of value is not a primary. On the contrary, as she elaborates: 
[Value] presupposes an answer to the question: Of value to whom and for what? It presupposes an 
entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative. Where no alternative exists, 
no goals and no values are possible (Rand 1961a: 10).   
Thus, inasmuch as ethics presupposes epistemology, so value presupposes volition. All human 
beings possess a volitional consciousness – indeed, this is precisely what distinguishes human 
beings from all other living beings – but Rand emphasizes the fact that the exercise of one’s 
consciousness is significantly a choice, and a moral choice, at that: 
Man’s consciousness shares with animals the first two stages of its development: Sensations and 
perceptions. But it is the third state, conceptions, that makes him man. Sensations are integrated 
into perceptions automatically, by the brain of a man or of an animal. But to integrate perceptions 
into conceptions by a process of abstraction is a feat that man alone has the power to perform – and 
he has to perform it by choice. The process [of concept formation] … is a process of reason, of 
thought; it is not automatic nor instinctive nor involuntary nor infallible. Man has to initiate it, to 
sustain it, and to bear responsibility for its results (Rand 1961a: 11). 
Noticeable in this passage is the premium Rand places on thinking. Morality, on Rand’s terms, is 
defined not by actions, but rather, with respect to the rule of fundamentality (Rand [1966-1967] 
1990: 45-46), by the thinking that determines what action is taken and for what purpose. Since 
thinking “is not a mechanical process” and since “connections of logic are not made by instinct,” 
the question “to be or not to be” is, more pointedly, the question “to think or not to think” (Rand 
1957: 1012).21 Hence, to the extent to which humans value their lives, they must reverse Descartes’ 
21 For an assiduous and challenging critique of several presuppositions of the Objectivist conception of volition, see 
Goodell (2007). In what follows, I am proceeding with this critique firmly in mind so as to avoid the pitfalls astutely 
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“costly historical error” and declare I am, therefore I’ll think (Rand 1957: 1058). It is only after 
this declaration that a living being may embrace its status as a human being: 
The day when [Man] grasps that matter has no volition is the day when he grasps that he has – and 
this is his birth as a human being … The day when he grasps that he is not a passive recipient of 
the sensations of any given moment, that his senses do not provide him with automatic knowledge 
in separate snatches independent of context but only with the material of knowledge which his mind 
must learn to integrate – the day when he grasps that his senses cannot deceive him … [and] that 
the evidence they give him is an absolute but [that] his mind must learn to understand it, his mind 
must discover the nature, the causes, the full context of his sensory material, his mind must identify 
the things he perceives – that is the day of his birth as a thinker (Rand 1957: 1041).22
Rand’s conception of morality, premised on a volitional consciousness able and willing to 
acknowledge and think its way through objective reality, logically supersedes what have 
historically been the most frequently promulgated moralities – that of the supernatural and that of 
the social – and institutes a new morality of the individual: 
For centuries, the battle of morality was fought between those who claimed your life belongs to 
God and those who claimed that it belongs to your neighbors – between those who preached that 
the good is self-sacrifice for the sake of ghosts in Heaven and those who preached that the good is 
self-sacrifice for the sake of incompetents on Earth. And no one came to say that your life belongs 
to you and that the good is to live it … You have been taught that morality is a code of behavior 
imposed on you by whim, the whim of a supernatural power or the whim of society, to serve God’s 
purpose or your neighbor’s welfare, to please an authority beyond the grave or else next door – but 
not to serve your life or pleasure. Your pleasure, you have been taught, is to be found in immorality; 
brought to light therein. Additionally, I am proceeding on the basis of the more recent work of Bissell (2007, 2015), 
Binswanger (2014), and Rheins (2016), all three of whom go a long way in clarifying/correcting some of the aspects 
of Objectivism challenged by Goodell.  
22 This Randian shift from the subjective/internal to the objective/external is likewise emphasized by Cavell: “Instead 
of ‘Cogito ergo sum,’ [Descartes] should simply have said ‘Sum’ and gone from there” (Cavell 1979: 101). 
Furthermore, with respect to volition (and presaging the ethical dimension of rationality similar to Rand), Cavell adds 
that, metaphysically, existence precedes consciousness, but epistemologically, humans must acknowledge existence: 
“I am a being who to exist [as a human being] must say I exist, or must acknowledge my existence – claim it, stake it, 
enact it … [however,] the proof only works in the moment of its giving, for what I prove is the existence only of a 
creature who can enact its existence … not one who at all times does in fact enact it” (Cavell 1984: 109). 
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your interests would be best served by evil; and any moral code must be designed not for you, but 
against you (Rand 1957: 1011-1012). 
Against what she terms the “Morality of Death,” which she demonstrates is predicated on the 
denunciation of the rational faculty of human consciousness, Rand posits a “Morality of Life” the 
source of which is “the independent mind that recognizes no authority higher than its own” (Rand 
1957: 1030). This independent mind, however, is not prescribed an arbitrary list of rules it must 
follow nor is its moral functioning automatically guaranteed. Rather, a Morality of Life is 
determined by each individual’s values – and, as the designation indicates, the supreme value in a 
Morality of Life is life itself: 
Man’s mind is his basic tool of survival. Life is given to him, survival is not. His body is given to 
him, its sustenance is not. His mind is given to him, its content is not. To remain alive, he must act, 
and, before he can act, he must know the nature and purpose of his action. He cannot obtain his 
food without a knowledge of food and of the way to obtain it. He cannot dig a ditch – or build a 
cyclotron – without a knowledge of his aim and of the means to achieve it. To remain alive, he 
must think. But to think is an act of choice … Man has been called a rational being, but rationality 
is a matter of choice – and the alternative nature offers him is: Rational being or suicidal animal. 
Man has to be man – by choice; he has to hold his life as a value – by choice; [and] he has to learn 
to sustain it – by choice … A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. 
He needs a code of values to guide his actions (Rand 1957: 1012-1013). 
Of note here is where Rand places the emphasis on her declarations of musts: On the ifs that 
precede them. Human beings must exercise their volition, they must hold rationality as the ultimate 
standard for all thought and action, they must obey nature and acknowledge objective reality…if, 
that is, they value their lives, if they aspire to happiness or, in Aristotelian terminology, 
Eudaimonia.23 In Objectivism, there are no commandments in morality for the simple reason that 
“a ‘moral commandment’ is a contradiction in terms”; the moral is “the chosen, not the forced; the 
understood, not the obeyed” (Rand 1957: 1018). By the same token, Objectivism is not a club with 
23 For more extensive treatments of the Aristotelian pursuit of happiness, particularly if/how it relates to the Objectivist 
ethics, see Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen (1984, 1991), Jack Wheeler (1984), Sciabarra ([1995] 
2013: 240-243), Gotthelf (2000), Walsh (2002), Tara Smith (2006), and Peter Saint-Andre (2009). 
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which to beat people over the head. The purpose of the Objectivist ethics is not to provide a basis 
for punishing those who choose not to pursue happiness towards the end of beating them into 
submission; rather, the purpose is to provide a guide for those who do choose to pursue happiness: 
We do not tell – we show. We do not claim – we prove. It is not your obedience that we seek to 
win, but your rational conviction. You have seen all the elements of our secret. The conclusion is 
now yours to draw – we can help you to name it, but not to accept it – the sight, the knowledge, 
and the acceptance must be yours (Rand 1957: 735). 
On this premise, there remain in the absence of commandments only choices, and insofar as a 
choice, as Rand outlined, can only stem from competing alternatives, then, again with respect to 
the rule of fundamentality: 
There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe – existence or nonexistence – and it 
pertains to a single class of entities – to living organisms. The existence of matter is unconditional, 
the existence of life is not … [The] particular distinction [of human beings] from all other living 
species is the necessity to act in the face of alternatives by the means of volitional choice … Man 
must obtain his knowledge and choose his actions by a process of thinking, which nature will not 
force him to perform (Rand 1957: 1012-1013). 
The basis of the Objectivist ethics, then, is one’s value of one’s life. Defining the concept of value
as that which one acts to gain and/or keep, Rand defines the concept of virtue as the action by 
which one gains and/or keeps what one values (Rand 1957: 1012). On the terms established by the 
Objectivist ethics, an ethical life is thus one which places a premium on the virtue of selfishness 
(Rand 1964). The concept of selfishness, in Objectivist terms, pertains to the principle that each 
individual, to the extent to which he values his life and is devoted to the pursuit of happiness, 
“must act for his own rational self-interest,” which is to say he “must always be the beneficiary of 
his action.” Rand’s emphasis on rationality here is to indicate that the Objectivist ethics is not, as 
she states in no uncertain terms, a justification for hedonism: Against those to whom she 
disparagingly refers as “Nietzschean egoists” for whom “any action, regardless of its nature, is 
good if it is intended for one’s own benefit,” Rand underscores the fact that, according to the 
Objectivist ethics, “just as the satisfaction of the irrational desires of others is not a criterion of 
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moral value, neither is the satisfaction of one’s own irrational desires.” Morality, she concludes, 
“is not a contest of whims” (Rand 1961b: 10).24
At this point, having asserted the virtue of selfishness as a key component of the Objectivist ethics, 
Rand seems to have reached an impasse, for how can selfishness be defined objectively? The source 
of confusion on this point, in Rand’s estimation, is twofold: First, the conception of happiness 
according to which the satisfaction of one’s irrational whims and desires is all that is required for 
its achievement is, in Objectivist terms, a short-range view of happiness that corrupts the concept 
inasmuch as it is predicated on a devaluation of humans and the value of human life (Rand 1957: 
1062); second, this already-compromised conception of happiness is erroneously elevated from 
being the purpose of morality to the standard of morality (Rand 1962b: 48).25
The standard of morality, according to Objectivism, is life as the supreme human value. In order 
to qualify as a human being, one must value one’s life and take the necessary (rational) steps in 
order to preserve it. However, while a baseline value for continued existence is a prerequisite for 
humanity, it is not the height to which a human can aspire. On the contrary, Rand is concerned not 
merely with continued existence, but, more pointedly, with what she describes as “the highest 
potentiality of [one’s] own existence” (Rand 1957: 768); she considers a life lived to the fullest as 
being “a straight line of motion from goal to farther goal, each leading to the next and to a single
growing sum” (Rand 1957: 609), as being more than merely fleeting, short-range satisfactions of 
greed, hunger, lust, etc., on the premise that the ends justify the means. The value of survival is 
that which constitutes the human; the value of perfection, meanwhile, is that which constitutes the 
hero.26
24 For more extensive considerations of Rand avec Nietzsche, see John B. Ridpath (1986a, 1986b), Stephen R.C. Hicks 
(2000), and the “Symposium on Friedrich Nietzsche & Ayn Rand” in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Volume 10 
Number 2 (2009). 
25 For a more scientifically-minded polemic against the erroneous elevation of happiness in the field of psychology, 
as well as the moral implications thereof, see Jordan Peterson (2011). 
26 As Gotthelf and Salmieri explain, the two “hallmarks of Objectivism” are the benevolent universe premise – i.e. 
“the idea that the universe is hospitable to human achievement such that a person who lives morally can expect to live 
happily” (Salmieri 2016a: 15) – and the heroic view of man – i.e. “not just the belief that human beings have the 
potential to achieve a heroic stature ... [but] regarding this potential as what is important about oneself” (Gotthelf and 
Salmieri 2016: 460). For her own elucidation of these hallmarks, see Rand ([1943] 2007, 1957, [1969] 1975, 1973a, 
1973d, 1981). 
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The concept of moral perfectionism will be a signal concept in this thesis.27 On Rand’s terms, the 
absence of a rational morality in the life of a human being leads, as I mentioned, to the degeneration 
of the very concept of the “human”:
“It’s only human,” you cry in defense of any depravity, reaching the stage of self-abasement where 
you seek to make the concept “human” mean the weakling, the fool, the rotter, the liar, the failure, 
the coward, the fraud, and to exile from the human race the hero, the thinker, the producer, the 
inventor, the strong, the purposeful, the pure – as if “to feel” were human, but to think were not, as 
if to fail were human, but to succeed were not, as if corruption were human, but virtue were not –
as if the premise of death were proper to man, but the premise of life were not (Rand 1957: 1050). 
A rational morality, contrary to the above conception of the human, is predicated on a conception 
of the human as heroic rather than depraved and with life as the standard of morality rather than 
death: 
Existence is not a negation of negatives. Evil, not value, is an absence and a negation, evil is 
impotent and has no power but that which we let it extort from us … Joy is not “the absence of 
pain,” intelligence is not “the absence of stupidity,” light is not “the absence of darkness,” an entity 
is not “the absence of a nonentity.” Building is not done by abstaining from demolition … It is not 
death that we wish to avoid, but life that we wish to live (Rand 1957: 1024). 
The ability to put this morality into practice is attained by virtue of rational action. Indeed, as Rand 
makes clear, a rational process is a moral process:28
27 Indeed, I will argue in Chapter 2 for an aesthetic orientation which I term aesthetic perfectionism. I will leave a full 
explication of perfectionism until then. For the moment, I would simply like to clarify that my conception of moral 
perfectionism is derived principally from Rand’s formulations. However, since Rand’s philosophical writings were 
limited and since, in what she did write, she did not explicitly develop the concept of moral perfectionism, I will 
supplement her formulations with the more recent work of Cavell ([1972] 1981, 1979, 1989, 1990, 2003, 2004). 
28 Along very similar lines, Cavell has argued that morality “is not a separate realm or a separate branch” of reason, 
that, on the contrary, “each assertion is a moral act (intrusive or not, magnanimous or not, heartfelt or not, kind or 
cutting, faithful or treacherous, promising cheer or chagrin, acknowledging or denying)” (Cavell 1990: xxix, my 
emphasis). 
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You may make an error at any step of it, with nothing to protect you but your own severity, or you 
may try to cheat, to fake the evidence and evade the effort of the quest – but if devotion to truth is 
the hallmark of morality, then there is no greater, nobler, more heroic form of devotion than the act 
of a man who assumes the responsibility of thinking … In the name of the values that keep you 
alive, do not let your vision of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those 
who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that man’s proper estate is an upright 
posture, an intransigent mind, and a step that travels unlimited roads. Do not let your fire go out, 
spark by irreplaceable spark, in the hopeless swamps of the approximate, the not-quite, the not-yet, 
the not-at-all. Do not let the hero in your soul perish, in lonely frustration for the life you deserved, 
but have never been able to reach. Check your road and the nature of your battle. The world you 
desired can be won, it exists, it is real, it is possible, it’s yours (Rand 1957: 1017, 1069).
This heroic human being is not, as Rand herself acknowledges, a statistical majority (which is 
precisely why the concept “hero” is applicable); nevertheless, this heroic human being is, she 
maintains, “applicable to and achievable by all men” (Rand [1969] 1975: 119), it represents “the 
best within us.”29 This is the perspective from which Rand makes the argument that moral 
perfection is “an unbreached rationality – not the degree of your intelligence, but the full and 
relentless use of your mind, not the extent of your knowledge, but the acceptance of reason as an 
absolute” (Rand 1957: 1059).30
(4) Politics 
Recalling Rand’s earlier informal designation of her philosophy of Objectivism as “a philosophy 
for living on Earth,” what has been conspicuously omitted in my remarks up to this point regarding 
the individual human being in relation to objective reality and his pursuit of perfection on the basis 
29 The phrase “the best within us” is a motif that runs through (or, more accurately, fuels) Atlas Shrugged (1957: 6, 
483, 1069, 1166), a motif so important to Rand that she even chose to title the last chapter of Atlas Shrugged “In the 
Name of the Best Within Us” (Rand 1957: 1147-1168). In addition to representing the core of the Objectivist ethics, 
this motif also serves as a bridge between Rand’s Aristotelian perfectionism and Cavell’s Emersonian perfectionism, 
for “the best within us” can be likened to Emerson’s formulation (which runs through/fuels Cavell’s philosophy) of 
the “unattained but attainable self” (Emerson 1841a: 125).
30 In a similar vein, Descartes once remarked that “the most absurd and grotesque” impulse people have “is to want to 
make judgments which do not correspond to [their] perception of things” (Descartes 1646: 273).
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of a rational morality is the presence in reality of other human beings.31 I hope it is clear from my 
(admittedly abridged) explication of Objectivism up to this point that there is a logical progression 
from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics. These three branches, taken together, provide the 
foundation for the remaining two derivative branches of politics and aesthetics. As Rand writes of 
politics (and this is equally applicable to aesthetics): 
[Objectivism] does not regard politics as a separate or primary goal, that is, as a goal that can be 
achieved without a wider ideological context. Politics is based on three other philosophical 
disciplines: Metaphysics, epistemology and ethics – on a theory of man’s nature and of man’s
relationship to existence. It is only on such a base that one can formulate a consistent political 
theory and achieve it in practice … [Thus,] Objectivism advocates certain political principles … as 
the consequence and the ultimate practical application of its fundamental philosophical principles 
(Rand 1962a: 1).  
Even though Objectivism has, on the whole, been neglected by scholars across the humanities, 
Rand’s views on politics have received more attention than any other aspect of her thinking 
(although, without an accompanying consideration of the metaphysical-epistemological-ethical 
foundation from which her political ideas derived, it is no surprise that the grounds for/implications 
of her ideas are still virtually unknown to commentators).32 Given this fact – and the fact that it is 
the formulation of an Objectivist aesthetics to which I am building and not an Objectivist politics
– I will keep my remarks on Rand’s political theory comparatively brief, focusing only on the 
fundamental philosophical premises emanating from metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics as 
31 In the extant Objectivist literature, Sciabarra ([1995] 2013: 215-358) has done the most conscientious and nuanced 
work vis-à-vis articulating and elaborating on a politics of the individual in line with the Objectivist ethics. Beyond 
the specifically Objectivist (and specifically secular) terms of this thesis, for a provocative discussion of the 
relationship between the individual and the collective that significantly bears on any efforts, Objectivist or otherwise, 
to promulgate a philosophy (and, by extension, a politics) of individualism, see the exchange between Jordan Peterson 
and Ben Shapiro (Rubin, Peterson, and Shapiro 2018). 
32 Rand’s political commentaries are vast and varied. For her most sustained considerations of capitalism in particular, 
see Rand (1957, 1961a, 1964, [1966] 1970). Very little varies, however, in the hysterical ad hominem attacks on 
Rand’s political philosophy. See, for examples of the low level at which discussions of the Objectivist politics are 
often pitched, Whittaker Chambers (1957), Gore Vidal (1961), Joel Rosenbloom (1961), Honor Tracy (1966), Lance 
Klafta (1993), Jonathan Chait (2009), Sam Anderson (2009), Andrew Corsello (2009), Geoffrey James (2011), David 
Sirota (2013), Joseph Breslin (2014), Slavoj Žižek (2014), and Denise Cummins (2016a, 2016b). For the rare examples 
that indicate the potential for discussion at higher levels, see Roy A. Childs, Jr. (1969), Norman P. Barry (1987), and 
Mark Skousen (2007). 
22 
they pertain to aesthetics – in particular, on her championing of capitalism as opposed to 
Marxism/communism. 
Capitalism, for Rand, represents the ideal system because it “demands the best of every man – his 
rationality – and rewards him accordingly,” and insofar as it is premised on freedom, it “leaves 
every man free to choose the work he likes, to specialize in it, to trade his product for the products 
of others, and to go as far on the road of achievement as his ability and ambition will carry him” 
(Rand 1961b: 20). Rand’s position on capitalism, then, is not an arbitrary choice, but rather, a 
logical consequence of: (1) Metaphysics, insofar as the terms of objective reality are such that the 
value of a human being’s work is likewise to be determined objectively rather than decided 
arbitrarily (be it by the whims of another individual, such as a dictator, or of a collective, such as 
society); (2) Epistemology, insofar as the objective determinations of a human being’s work are 
made by rational individuals in possession of a volitional consciousness; and (3) Ethics, insofar as 
the objective determinations of a human being’s work made by rational individuals in possession 
of a volitional consciousness are made for the sake of each individual’s rational self-interest and 
with each individual benefiting in some measure in relation to his pursuit of happiness and moral 
perfection.  
The problem, to her mind, is that these consequences have never been explicitly embraced. She 
ardently defends capitalism insofar as it is premised on a rational morality in acknowledgement of 
objective reality and the freedom of human beings to pursue their own happiness, but she considers 
it an unknown ideal precisely to the extent to which human beings remain ignorant or insolent 
regarding its sociopolitical (and thus its metaphysical-epistemological-ethical) ideality. If a social 
system is truly to represent the rational interests of individuals, then it must, Rand argues, be built 
on a solid ethical foundation. To exemplify the ethical foundation of capitalism, Rand identifies 
the trader as “the moral symbol of respect for human beings”:
[Those] who live by values, not by loot, are traders, both in matter and in spirit. A trader is a man 
who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved. A trader does not ask to be paid 
for his failures, nor does he ask to be loved for his flaws. A trader does not squander his body as 
fodder or his soul as alms. Just as he does not give his work except in trade for material values, so 
he does not give the values of his spirit – his love, his friendship, his esteem – except in payment 
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and in trade for human virtues, in payment for his own selfish pleasure, which he receives from 
[those] he can respect (Rand 1957: 1022). 
The emphasis on respect in relation to the freedom of trade prefigures the non-initiation of physical 
force (NIPF principle), which goes together with capitalism and which maintains that “force and 
mind are opposites” and that “morality ends where a gun begins”:
To force a man to drop his own mind and to accept your will as a substitute – with a gun in place 
of a syllogism, with terror in place of proof, and death as the final argument – is to attempt to exist 
in defiance of reality. Reality demands of man that he act for his own rational interest; your gun 
demands of him that he act against it. Reality threatens man with death if he does not act on his 
rational judgment; you threaten him with death if he does (Rand 1957: 1023). 
Observe that objectivity here in the NIPF principle is a means of dissolving contradictions. The 
answer to the question of why the use of force is wrong is because it deprives a human being of 
his right to think and act according to his own judgment, with right being determined objectively: 
Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival. If man is to live 
on Earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to 
work for his values and to keep the product of his work … [and] any group, any gang, any nation 
that attempts to negate man’s rights is wrong (Rand 1957: 1061). 
It is on the basis of these logical connections between metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and 
politics that Rand is able to demonstrate the fact that “a country’s political system is based on its 
code of morality” (Rand 1957: 1061), and it is precisely this connection that impels Rand to 
demolish, in the name of capitalism, the false dichotomy of sacrifice according to which one must 
either sacrifice oneself to others or sacrifice others to oneself, adherence to either of which can 
only logically result in – and actually has only resulted in – destruction and, ultimately, death. 
Perhaps the most famous of Rand’s crusades is her crusade against altruism, which her ethical 
conception of the virtue of selfishness – and its political corollary of the virtue of capitalism – was 
meant to oppose. Altruism, on Rand’s terms, is defined as “the placing of others above self, of 
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their interests above one’s own” (Rand 1961a: 30). Rand’s rejection of sacrifice in favor of 
selfishness and of altruism in favor of capitalism constitutes the ethical/political nexus of 
Objectivism – and this is precisely the most frequently misunderstood aspect of Objectivism (and 
thus the most frequently targeted aspect for criticism) despite the lengths to which she went to 
clarify the exact terms of her position: 
There are only two fundamental questions (or two aspects of the same question) that determine the 
nature of any social system: “Does a social system recognize individual rights?” and “Does a social 
system ban physical force from human relationships?” The answer to the second question is the 
practical implementation of the answer to the first. Is man a sovereign individual who owns his 
person, his mind, his life, his work and its products – or is he the property of the tribe (the state, the 
society, the collective) that may dispose of him in any way it pleases, that may dictate his 
convictions, prescribe the course of his life, control his work and expropriate his products? Does 
man have the right to exist for his own sake – or is he born in bondage, as an indentured servant 
who must keep buying his life by serving the tribe but can never acquire it free and clear? … The 
basic issue is only: Is man free? In mankind’s history, capitalism is the only system that answers: 
Yes (Rand [1966] 1970: 18). 
This emphasis on capitalism places Rand firmly on the opposite side – metaphysically, 
epistemologically, ethically, and politically – of Marxism.33 Indeed, she identifies Karl Marx as 
“the most consistent translator of the altruist morality into practical action and political theory,” 
advocating a society “where all would be sacrificed to all, starting with the immediate immolation 
of the able, the intelligent, the successful, and the wealthy” (Rand 1961a: 31). Capitalism, by 
contrast, rejects – and on moral grounds – any form of sacrifice insofar as the philosophical 
premise subtending the altruist morality is that a human being does not have a right to exist for his 
own sake. The dangerous consequence of altruism is thus the erosion of both rationality and 
morality, while the dangerous consequence of building a political system on the basis of such an 
irrational philosophical premise is the erosion of freedom:  
33 Though not framed as a battle between Rand and Marx, for an illuminating discussion of the extremes of Marxist 
economics on the one hand and what has been referred to as “anarcho-capitalism” on the other – and the strikingly 
similar pitfalls of both vis-à-vis their failures to understand human nature – see Jordan Peterson and Bret Weinstein 
(2017). 
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You decided that you had a right to your wages, but we had no right to our profits; that you did not 
want us to deal with your mind, but to deal, instead, with your gun … You did not care to compete 
in terms of intelligence – you are now competing in terms of brutality. You did not care to allow 
rewards to be won by successful production – you are now running a race in which rewards are 
won by successful plunder. You called it selfish and cruel that men should trade value for value –
you have now established an unselfish society where they trade extortion for extortion. Your system 
is a legal civil war, where men gang up on one another and struggle for possession of the law, which 
they use as a club over rivals [until] another gang wrests it from their clutch and clubs them with it 
in their turn, all of them clamoring protestations of service to an unnamed public’s unspecified 
good (Rand 1957: 1065).34
As I will demonstrate in Chapter 1, the consequences of this type of altruistic/collectivist thinking 
have devastated not only the realms of ethics and politics, but aesthetics, as well. 
(5) Aesthetics 
This brings me, at last, to aesthetics, the final philosophical realm in Objectivism. If politics is the 
realm of Rand’s thinking that has received the most consideration from contemporary scholars, 
aesthetics is the realm that has received the least.35 There is perhaps a correlation between the 
sparseness of scholarship on Rand’s aesthetic writings and the sparseness of Rand’s writings 
themselves. Stephen Cox characterizes Rand’s philosophical musings on aesthetics as less than a 
true aesthetic system and more on the level of gathering the conceptual building materials 
necessary for sustained aesthetic inquiry; in The Art of Fiction ([1958] 2000), a collection of 
lectures transcribed, collated, and published posthumously, and The Romantic Manifesto ([1969] 
34 For the horrifying consequences of such altruistic/collectivist thinking, see Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn ([1973] 2002) 
and Christopher R. Browning ([1992] 2013). Though it seems to have been forgotten, it is important to remember that, 
as Cavell once put it, “high philosophy can be used to cover low practice” (Cavell 1995: 195; see also Rey Chow 
[1995a] and Peterson [1999, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2017e]). 
35 Not only has Rand’s work on aesthetics received very little scholarly consideration even from Objectivists, what 
little it has received has been limited almost exclusively to the pages of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. Beyond the 
work of Peikoff (1991), Sciabarra ([1995] 2013), and Gotthelf (2000), all of whom seem to discuss aesthetics solely 
for the sake of comprehensiveness, the only substantial writing on Rand’s aesthetics has been the work of Louis Torres 
and Michelle Marder Kamhi (2000a). This lacuna has only recently been addressed, first in the “Aesthetics 
Symposium” in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Volume 2 Number 2 (2001), which essentially served as a series of 
responses to Torres and Kamhi’s work, and subsequently in the promising work of Kirsti Minsaas (2000, 2004, 2005), 
Stephen Cox (2000, 2004), and Bissell (2002, 2004).  
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1975), a collection of essays edited together and published by Rand herself, Rand is concerned 
with inventorying the conceptual material she considers vital in aesthetic inquiry, some of which 
she “organized and began to shape” but most of which she “simply checked off on her inventory 
list” (Cox 2004: 67). In a similar vein, Leonard Peikoff views Rand’s aesthetic inventory as 
providing “merely a lead to some broad aesthetic principles [that] would have to be applied 
specifically to the major arts” (Peikoff 1991: 447).
This thesis can therefore be characterized as an attempt on my part to apply some of Rand’s broad 
aesthetic principles to the art of film. To this end, I will perlustrate both Rand’s aesthetic corpus 
as well as the work of subsequent Objectivist scholars in an effort to identify the conceptual 
building materials most conducive to an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. Additionally, where the 
sparseness of Rand’s aesthetic inquiries was matched only by the scope, exploring as she did 
subjects as varied as the ontology of art, the mechanics of literature, and the vicissitudes of 
aesthetic experience, for my purposes, I will focus primarily on issues of aesthetic experience, and, 
even more specifically, on issues of aesthetic judgment. At various points throughout this thesis, 
particularly in Chapter 2, I will have occasion to consider in greater detail Rand’s aesthetic 
arguments. In what remains of this Introduction, I will limit myself to merely staking out the main 
philosophical problem areas propaedeutic to the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics of 
cinema. 
As a first step towards an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema, it is instructive to consider the first step 
Rand took when she turned to the philosophical realm of aesthetics. For Rand, the question “What 
is art?” follows from the question “What does art do?” That is to say, for Rand, art is understood 
functionally.36 What art does, in Rand’s estimation, is bring human concepts to the perceptual level 
of consciousness in order that they may be grasped directly. Thus, on Rand’s functional account, 
36 Curiously, Rand exegetes cannot seem to agree on this issue. Torres and Kamhi, for example, maintain not only that 
Rand’s definition of art is not a functional definition (2000a), but, moreover, that a functional definition is not a 
definition simpliciter (2000b). Lester Hunt, for his part, perpetuates this misunderstanding by stating in no uncertain 
terms that “Rand does not define art in terms of its function” (Hunt 2001: 261). By contrast, John Enright (2001) and 
Bissell (2004) both argue not only that a functional definition of art is exactly what Rand provides, but, moreover, that 
a functional definition of art (combined with accounts of the ways the various arts function) is a necessary component 
of any philosophy of art. In this thesis, I am operating from the latter perspective.  
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art is a concretization of metaphysics; an artist, as conceived by Rand, selectively recreates reality 
according to his values: 
By a selective recreation, art isolates and integrates those aspects of reality which represent man’s 
fundamental view of himself and of existence. Out of the countless number of concretes – of single, 
disorganized, and (seemingly) contradictory attributes, actions, and entities – an artist isolates the 
things which he regards as metaphysically essential and integrates them into a single new concrete 
that represents an embodied abstraction (Rand [1969] 1975: 8). 
On Rand’s account, art is a concretization of metaphysics achieved by a selective recreation of 
reality for the purpose of bringing human concepts to the perceptual level for direct apprehension 
and sustained contemplation. Since “man lives by reshaping his physical background to serve his 
purpose,” and since “he must first define and then create his values,” he needs “a concretized 
projection of these values, an image in whose likeness he will reshape the world and himself. Art 
gives him that image; it gives him the experience of seeing the full, immediate, concrete reality of 
his distant goals” (Rand [1969] 1975: 28). This, Rand believed, should be the “crux” of an 
Objectivist aesthetics, and, in this thesis, it will likewise serve as the crux of my proposed 
Objectivist aesthetics of cinema.  
Contemporary Objectivists have gone in a number of different directions in their efforts to apply 
various Objectivist tenets to the major arts (Torres and Kamhi 2000a; Minsaas 2000, 2005; 
Riggenbach 2001; Bissell 2004; Kamhi 2014), but, while their work has been of crucial importance 
in elaborating the Objectivist aesthetics, a number of longstanding, fundamental aesthetic issues 
remain unresolved. For instance, given the centrality in Objectivism of the concept of objectivity, 
in what sense, if any, can aesthetic judgment be characterized as objective? As I will discuss in 
Chapter 2, that aesthetic judgments are subjective is and has been an article of faith throughout the 
philosophy of art for centuries. Rand was never comfortable accepting the dogma of aesthetic 
subjectivism; however, she was never able to formulate a coherent alternative, and it is my 
contention that the source of the problem was Rand’s own uncertainty and conceptual opacity.
One of the most significant “aesthetic principles” put forth by Rand (derived, as I will argue, from 
a dubious epistemological surmise) is that “emotions are not tools of cognition” (Rand [1969] 
28 
1975: 32).37 This aesthetic principle is epistemologically justified via the distinction Rand makes 
between a sense of life and a philosophy of life: 
Long before he is old enough to grasp such a concept as metaphysics, man makes choices, forms 
value-judgments, experiences emotions, and acquires a certain implicit view of life. Every choice 
and value-judgment implies some estimate of himself and of the world around him – most 
particularly, of his capacity to deal with the world. He may draw conscious conclusions, which may 
be true or false; or he may remain mentally passive and merely react to events (i.e. merely feel). 
Whatever the case may be, his subconscious mechanism sums up his psychological activities, 
integrating his conclusions, reactions, or evasions into an emotional sum that establishes a habitual 
pattern and becomes his automatic response to the world around him. What began as a series of 
single, discrete conclusions (or evasions) about his own particular problems becomes a generalized 
feeling about existence, an implicit metaphysics with the compelling motivational power of a 
constant, basic emotion – an emotion which is part of all his other emotions and underlies all his 
experiences. This is a sense of life (Rand [1969] 1975: 15). 
A sense of life represents a man’s early value-integrations, which remain in a fluid, plastic, easily 
amendable state, while he gathers knowledge to reach full conceptual control and thus to drive his 
inner mechanism. A full conceptual control means a consciously directed process of cognitive 
integration, which means: a conscious philosophy of life … The transition from guidance by a sense 
of life to guidance by a conscious philosophy takes many forms. For the rare exception, the fully 
rational child, it is a natural, absorbing, if difficult, process – the process of validating and, if 
necessary, correcting in conceptual terms what he had merely sensed about the nature of man’s 
existence, thus transforming a wordless feeling into clearly verbalized knowledge, and laying a 
firm foundation, an intellectual roadbed, for the course of his life. The result is a fully integrated 
personality, a man whose mind and emotions are in harmony, whose sense of life matches his 
conscious convictions (Rand [1969] 1975: 18-19). 
This is a powerful and subtle distinction, yet, as far as I can see, nowhere in this distinction is the 
conclusion that “emotions are not tools of cognition” warranted. If anything, insofar as this is a 
developmental path that culminates in the “harmonizing” of reason and emotion, Rand seems to 
be proving the opposite of what she is trying to prove, that emotions not only are tools of cognition, 
37 For additional examples of this fallacy in operation, see Rand (1961a: 46; 1961b: 20; 1974a: 6). 
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but valuable tools, at that. However, due to a latent (and, given her vehement Aristotelianism, 
surprising) Platonism, Rand seems to harbor an unwarranted suspicion of emotions.38 In the 
Platonic account, emotions oppose cognition, they hinder reason; and, in relation to art, this is 
disconcerting since humans create and respond to art emotionally. If emotions are inherently 
irrational and in opposition to reason, and if art is created and experienced emotionally, then the 
production and reception of art necessarily begins – and, disconcertingly, can potentially remain –
on irrational ground. According to this premise, the task facing the artist/critic is the Herculean 
task of wresting art from the irrational.39
The Platonic account rehearsed above precludes the acknowledgment of the fact noted by Noël 
Carroll that “reason is an ineliminable constituent of the emotions” (Carroll 1997: 219).40 On this 
account, contra Plato, emotions are made-up of at least two component parts: First, “a cognitive
component, such as a belief or a thought about some person, place, or thing, real or imagined,” 
and, second, “a feeling component (a bodily change and/or a phenomenological experience), 
where, additionally, the feeling state has been caused by the relevant cognitive state, such as a 
belief or a belief-like state” (Carroll 1997: 221). According to this cognitive theory of the emotions, 
emotions are not irrational, ex nihilo occurrences, but rather, are directed; as Jenefer Robinson 
puts it (explicitly linking emotions to cognition and, moreover, linking them in a hierarchical 
relationship where cognition precedes emotion), “if I respond emotionally … then my body alerts 
me to my conception of the situation and registers it as personally significant to me” (Robinson 
1995: 65).  
38 Sciabarra usefully contextualizes Rand’s tendency to perhaps protest too much vis-à-vis emotions with respect to 
the Russian backdrop against which she initially set out to transcend the false reason/emotion dichotomy. As he notes: 
“[Rand’s] first reflections on the nature of emotion [took] place within the context of [her] condemnation … [of] 
Russian religious philosophy, [which,] like much of Russian culture, had rejected the ‘Western’ emphasis on reason 
as an absolute … Rand’s insistence on the centrality of reason is [thus] in many ways an outgrowth of her antipathy 
toward such mysticism … For Rand, anything that even hinted at a devaluation of the rational faculty was to be 
rejected and criticized” (Sciabarra [1995] 2013: 170).
39 This account is inspired by the discussion and refutation of the Platonic picture of emotions in Carroll (1997: 218-
225). 
40 A fact, incidentally, that is supported by research in the fields of neuroscience and psychology. See, for 
corroboration, Antonio Damasio ([1994] 2006, 1995, 1996), Peterson (1999: 48-61), and Jonathan Haidt (2006: 11-
13).  
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On the basis of this hierarchical relationship, Carroll appropriately foregrounds the “attention-
guiding function” of emotions (Carroll 1997: 224), the relevance of which for Objectivism has 
often been missed by contemporary exegetes, even when prominent Objectivists like Nathaniel 
Branden (or, more astonishingly, Rand herself) offered formulations to the contrary. Branden, for 
example, a psychologist closely associated with Rand in the 1950s and 1960s, came to a similar 
conclusion as the one arrived at by Robinson decades earlier when he described an emotion as “the 
psychosomatic form in which man experiences his estimate of the beneficial or harmful 
relationship of some aspect of reality to him” (Branden 1969: 67). Rand, meanwhile, underneath 
her anti-emotion bluster, strived to articulate a coherent view of the positive relationship between 
the emotions and cognition expressed in the following formulation: 
The basic process of a man’s life goes like this: His thinking determines his desires; his desires 
determine his actions. (Thinking, of course, is present all along the line, at every step and stage.) 
… This is the basic pattern, or “circle,” of man’s life on Earth: From the spirit (thought) through 
the material activity (production) to the satisfaction of his spiritual desires (emotions). (He must 
eat in order to think but he must think in order to eat. And he must think first) (Rand [1946] 1992: 
3). 
For as infrequently as remarks such as those quoted above have been integrated into contemporary 
Objectivist scholarship, they have not gone completely unnoticed. Marsha Familaro Enright, for 
instance, astutely avers that it is an epistemological task of Objectivism “to learn how to [most 
effectively] use the access to our subconscious through our emotions” (Enright 2002: 61). Roger 
E. Bissell, meanwhile, acknowledges, in a spirit similar to Enright’s, that:
Reason and emotion, while distinguishable, are not mutually exclusive from one another. They are 
concomitant, necessarily connected aspects of a cognitive-evaluative experience. One has a 
thought, one evaluates the object of that thought, and one experiences an emotion about that thing 
as a response to the evaluation (Bissell 2009: 346). 
Thus, it is clear that, for all of her protestations, Rand never sought to establish a dichotomy
between (rational) cognition and (irrational) emotions, but rather, a relation between (rational) 
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cognition and (rational) emotions (Rand [1969] 1975: 142; Sciabarra [1995] 2013: 167-188).41
From this perspective, then, rather than viewing emotions and cognition as perpetual enemies 
engaged in an eternal struggle for control over the constitutively divided subject, it is possible to 
view them as inextricably linked in a manner essential to human survival and flourishing. 
Moreover, the complexity of the relationship between emotions and cognition, rather than 
invariably suffering reduction, can here be acknowledged: On the one hand, it is possible under 
certain conditions for reason to direct the emotions in a relation where the former is not only an 
ineliminable force in but the driving force of the emotions; on the other hand, it is possible under 
certain circumstances for emotions to serve as a check on reason in a relation where the former 
impels the recalibration of the latter.42
The consequences on aesthetics of Rand’s tendency to equivocate on the relationship between the 
emotions and cognition are discernible across her considerations of the processes of artistic 
production and reception. Stemming from her distinction between a sense of life (i.e. an emotional 
response to the world) and a philosophy of life (i.e. a cognitive response to the world), Rand argues 
that “it is the artist’s sense of life that controls and integrates his work, directing the innumerable 
choices he has to make, from the choice of subject to the subtlest details of style,” while it is 
similarly the critic’s sense of life that controls and integrates the response to an artist’s work “by 
a complex yet automatic reaction of acceptance and approval, or rejection and condemnation” 
(Rand [1969] 1975: 25). By arguing that it is an artist’s sense of life that directs his creative actions, 
Rand could be interpreted as arguing that the emotions are what guide the artist in the act of 
41 As Sciabarra elaborates: [People] may unwittingly adopt defense techniques that numb their awareness of 
unacceptable or painful impulses, feelings, [and] ideas … As they mature, they may genuinely seek to dissolve their 
unarticulated guilt, fear, anger, and internal conflicts. But such [psychological] repression cannot be merely 
commanded out of existence … In such cases, [people] must first practice the art of ‘owning’ [their] emotions, of 
bringing the aspects of [their] inner experience into full awareness. Whereas lifelong evasion and repression engender 
cognitive disintegration, the removal of obstacles to the experience of one’s emotions reignites the mind’s integrative 
processes” (Sciabarra [1995] 2013: 185; see also Branden [1971] 1978).
42 As framed by Peterson, emotion “provides us with an initial guide when we don’t know what we are doing” while 
reason “allows us to construct and maintain our ordered environments and keep chaos – and affect – in check” 
(Peterson 1999: 48-49). This is what Haidt refers to as the “two-way street” between reason and emotion (Haidt 2006: 
31). The previously cited passage from Rand exemplifies the process by which reason can be said in certain 
circumstances to direct the emotions. For an exemplification of the process by which emotions can be said in certain 
circumstances to serve as a check on reason, consider another motif from Atlas Shrugged: The maxim “check your 
premises” (Rand 1957: 199, 331, 378, 489, 618, 737). I note also the congeniality of the Objectivist notion of checking
one’s premises with respect to the Wittgensteinian notion of “assembling reminders” (Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 42 
[§89], 50 [§127]; see also Cavell 1979: 460-463 and Rodowick 2015: 60-61, 203).    
32 
production (and which, at the same time, guide the critic in the act of reception), which is to say 
that artists (and critics) are “always-already” in the grip of irrationality. This, again, would lead to 
Platonism. However, if her remarks are interpreted against the backdrop of the revised picture of 
the emotions previously proffered, then her pictures of the processes of artistic production and 
reception gain in complexity and acuity. In one of her lectures on fiction writing, Rand articulated 
a concept she referred to as a “screen of vision” which speaks to a far more complex picture of the 
process of artistic production: 
Your conscious mind is a very limited “screen of vision”; at any one moment, it can hold only so
much. For instance, if you are now concentrating on my words, then you are not thinking about 
your values, family, or past experiences. Yet the knowledge of these is stored in your mind 
somewhere. That which you do not hold in your conscious mind at any one moment is your 
subconscious. Why can a baby not understand this discussion? He does not have the necessary 
stored knowledge. The full understanding of any object of consciousness depends on what is 
already known and stored in the subconscious. What is colloquially called “inspiration” – namely, 
that you write without full knowledge of why you write as you do, yet it comes out well – is actually 
the subconscious summing-up of the premises and intentions you have set yourself … [As an artist,] 
you have to train yourself to grasp your premises clearly … [for] every premise that you store in 
your subconscious in this manner – namely, thoroughly understood, thoroughly integrated to the 
concretes it represents – becomes part of your writing capital. When you then sit down to write, 
you do not need to calculate everything in a slow, conscious way. Your inspiration comes to the 
exact extent of the knowledge you have stored (Rand [1958] 2000: 2-3). 
In this description of the process of artistic production, Rand seems to hold an implicit view of the 
emotions as potential tools capable of being put to use by the best artists.43 This quite obviously 
results in an intentionalist view of artistic practice the defense and elaboration of which for my 
conception of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema will be the purpose of Chapters 1 and 2. Before 
concerning myself with intentionality, though, the worry registered earlier about the consequences 
of Rand’s Platonism on aesthetic judgment still remains. 
43 My emphasis on the best artists rather than on artists tout court is an extension of what Minsaas observes is, 
following from Rand’s ethical distinction between the human and the hero, the “honorific sense” in which Rand tends 
to discuss art (Minsaas 2005: 24-26).  
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After arguing that it is the artist’s sense of life that directs the process of artistic production, an 
argument which I hope to have usefully clarified, Rand argues that it is similarly the critic’s sense 
of life that directs the process of artistic reception. On this premise, Rand puts forth one of her 
most contentious aesthetic propositions: 
A sense of life is the source of art, but it is not the sole qualification of an artist or of an aesthetician, 
and it is not a criterion of aesthetic judgment … Aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, and just as a 
philosopher does not approach any other branch of his science with his feelings or emotions as his 
criterion of judgment, so he cannot do it in the field of aesthetics. A sense of life is not sufficient 
professional equipment. An aesthetician – as well as any man who attempts to evaluate art works 
– must be guided by more than an emotion. The fact that one agrees or disagrees with an artist’s 
philosophy is irrelevant to an aesthetic appraisal of his work qua art. One does not have to agree 
with an artist (nor even to enjoy him) in order to evaluate his work. In essence, an objective 
evaluation requires that one identify the artist’s theme, the abstract meaning of his work 
(exclusively by identifying the evidence contained in the work and allowing no other, outside 
considerations), then evaluate the means by which he conveys it – i.e. taking his theme as criterion, 
evaluate the purely aesthetic elements of the work, the technical mastery (or lack of it) with which 
he projects (or fails to project) his view of life (Rand [1969] 1975: 32-33). 
As an initial step into the hermeneutic minefield Rand is traversing in this complex passage, 
consider the first line where Rand argues that a sense of life “is not the sole qualification of an 
artist or of an aesthetician, and it is not a criterion of aesthetic judgment.” The emphasis in the first 
part is on “not” but “sole” is at least present; in the second part, however, the emphasis is once 
again on “not” but “sole” has now been removed. This would seem to differentiate the processes 
of artistic production and reception in significant fashion. As if sensing the implications of her 
formulation, Rand mollifies her position when she writes that an aesthetician “must be guided by 
more than an emotion.” The claim that an aesthetician must be guided by more than an emotion 
does not invalidate the emotions in toto and instead implies that the emotions are valid as a 
cognitive tool in aesthetics. Recalling Rand’s model of conceptualization – “something exists of 
which I am conscious; I must discover its identity” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 59) – it seems that a 
comparable model of aesthetic judgment can be formulated as follows: I like (or dislike) an 
artwork; I must discover the reason(s). On this model, emotion precedes and directs cognition in 
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an attention-guiding fashion. Hence, aesthetic judgment may be posited as rational without 
necessitating the elimination of the emotions from the judgment process. 
Crucial to this model of aesthetic judgment is the practice of introspection. Rand once lamented 
the fact that “the field of introspection” is “an untouched jungle in which no conceptual paths have 
yet been cut” and in which most people are “unable [or unwilling] to identify the meaning of any 
inner state,” hence they “spend their lives as cowed prisoners inside their own skulls, afraid to look 
out at reality, paralyzed by the mystery of their own consciousness” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 76-
77); in her estimation, “if men identified introspectively their inner states one tenth as correctly as 
they identify objective reality, we would be a race of ideal giants” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 227). 
After reaffirming that it is each individual’s epistemological task “to set into motion a process in 
which emotions and reason are brought into harmony,” Chris Matthew Sciabarra takes the baton 
from Rand and emphasizes the centrality of introspection in the lives of rational individuals as they 
“seek to articulate the cognitive basis of [their] emotions”; as he explains, “though we experience 
emotions as immediate primaries in our awareness, the introspective person does not accept them 
as axiomatic” (Sciabarra [1995] 2013: 171). The model of aesthetic judgment that I am proposing 
here is thus the introspective process by which, in the aesthetic realm, each individual may 
articulate the cognitive basis of their aesthetic judgments rather than merely accepting their initial 
emotional reactions to artworks as axiomatic.44
44 The influential film theorist Christian Metz famously psychoanalyzed the type of film scholar who feels compelled 
upon finding that he likes a given film to then set about “rationalizing this liking after the fact” (Metz [1975] 1982: 
10). Intriguingly – and in a manner perfectly in step with the Objectivist model of aesthetic judgment that I am 
proffering – Metz distinguishes between what I would call rationalizing critical discourses on the one hand – which 
he argues are philosophically invalid – and introspective critical discourses on the other hand – which he argues are 
philosophically valid. Rationalizing critical discourses operate on the basis of what Metz calls the “cocoon principle” 
according to which “the real object (here the film which has pleased) and the [philosophically valid critical] discourse 
by which it might have been [analyzed] have been more or less confused with the imaginary object (= the film such 
as it has pleased, i.e. something which owes a great deal to its spectator’s own phantasy) and the virtues of the latter 
have been conferred on the former by projection” (Metz [1975] 1982: 11). Metz goes on to argue that such 
rationalization betrays “a kind of advanced structure of the phobic (and also counter-phobic) type, a proleptic 
reparation of any harm which might come to [the film in question], a depressive procedure occasionally breached by 
persecutory returns, an unconscious protection against a possible change in the taste of the lover himself, a defense 
more or less intermingled with pre-emptive counter-attack. To adopt the outward marks of [valid philosophical 
criticism] is to occupy a strip of territory around the adored film, all that really counts, in order to bar all the roads by 
which it might be attacked. The cinematic rationalizer, locking himself up in his system, is gripped by a kind of siege 
psychosis … [and] the question never posed is precisely the one which would overthrow [his attempts at 
rationalization]: ‘Why did I like this film (I rather than another, this film rather than another)?’” (Metz [1975] 1982: 
11-12). In other words, rationalization is a technique of “deproblematization” and “to that extent the exact opposite of 
the procedures of knowledge” (Metz [1975] 1982: 12; see also Rand [1974b]), whereas introspection is a technique 
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Furthermore, consider the second half of the previously quoted passage. The confusion emanating 
from this part of the passage is rooted, in my estimation, in Rand’s ill-advised amalgamation of 
different cognitive activities under the heading of “evaluation.”45 The initial claim animating this 
part of the passage, that “one does not have to agree with an artist (nor even to enjoy him) in order 
to evaluate his work,” is reasonable as far as it goes. One obviously does not have to agree with or 
like an artist prior to evaluating his work. Yet, I confess to having difficulty countenancing the 
idea that one may disagree with and dislike an artist’s work and yet judge his work to be good
(much less great). This strikes me as a cheap variant of the mind/body split46 – to which, it bears 
mentioning, Rand was vehemently opposed: 
[Those who promulgate the mind/body split] have cut man in two, setting one half against the other. 
They have taught him that his body and his consciousness are two enemies engaged in deadly 
conflict, two antagonists of opposite natures, contradictory claims, incompatible needs, that to 
benefit one is to injure the other, that his soul belongs to a supernatural realm but his body is an 
evil prison holding it in bondage to this earth … They have taught man that he is a hopeless misfit 
made of two elements, both symbols of death. A body without a soul is a corpse, a soul without a 
body is a ghost, yet such is their image of man’s nature: The battleground of a struggle between a 
corpse and a ghost … [On the contrary,] you are an indivisible entity … Renounce your 
consciousness and you become a brute. Renounce your body and you become a fake (Rand 1957: 
1026, 1029-1030). 
The New Intellectual … will discard [the mind/body split and] its irrational conflicts and 
contradictions, such as mind versus heart, thought versus action, reality versus desire, the practical 
of problematization and therefore can help to ensure not only the philosophical validity of one’s critical approach but 
also the objectivity of one’s criticism. Thus, for as easy (or as deproblematizing) as it may be to marshal Metz in 
arguments against the possibility of objective criticism – which is what Fredric Jameson tried to do in his critique of 
William Rothman’s work on Alfred Hitchcock (Jameson [1982] 2007; cf. Rothman [1982] 2012) – it is clear that 
Metz’s argument actually helps to clarify the means by which a scholar may hope to achieve at least a measure of 
objectivity in criticism. These are issues to which I will have plenty of occasions to return in subsequent chapters, and 
I will do so against this Metzian/Randian backdrop.   
45 For an astute interrogation of the hermeneutical tendency to amalgamate different cognitive activities and the 
consequences stemming therefrom, see Ruth Lorand (2000). 
46 Although he makes this connection in a different argumentative context (viz. the utilitarian function of architecture 
and its bearing on its art status), the ensuing discussion of the mind/body split in relation to Rand’s conception of 
aesthetic judgment takes its cues from Enright (2001). 
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versus the moral. He will be an integrated man … [who knows] that ideas divorced from 
consequent action are fraudulent and that action divorced from ideas is suicidal (Rand 1961a: 43). 
Recalling Rand’s epistemological razor – “concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity –
the corollary of which is: nor are they to be integrated in disregard of necessity” (Rand [1966-
1967] 1990: 72) – I think that, in the interest of conceptual clarity, an Objectivist aesthetics of 
cinema will benefit from a distinction between the two related but distinct cognitive activities of 
interpretation and evaluation. Proceeding from the previously articulated model of aesthetic 
judgment – I like (or dislike) an artwork; I must discover the reason(s) – the steps that a critic takes 
in coming to terms with the initial emotional response provoked by a given artwork are as follows: 
First, the critic interprets the artwork towards the goal of understanding what it is, how it works, 
and whether or not it succeeds on the terms established by the artist; second, the critic evaluates 
the artwork towards the goal of articulating why he likes it (or does not like it), i.e. articulating 
what it is about the artwork (if anything) that he values and why.47
To interpret an artwork, then, a critic must accept the terms established by the artist; to evaluate 
an artwork, however, a critic must consider the terms established by the artist in relation to his 
own terms. Through these principles of aesthetic judgment, a link may be – and, as I will argue 
throughout the rest of this thesis, should be – established between the Objectivist aesthetics and 
the Objectivist ethics. As I outlined in the section on the Objectivist ethics, Rand argues that her 
conception of the Morality of Life is premised on an “independent mind that recognizes no 
authority higher than its own” (Rand 1957: 1030). In a similar fashion, the moral vigilance for 
which Rand argues in relation to the Morality of Life must, I submit, be conterminally asserted in 
the realm of Objectivist aesthetics, thereby elevating the Objectivist aesthetics to an Aesthetics of 
Life. Indeed, as I will argue at length in this thesis, this is the only path to objective and, ultimately, 
moral criticism: 
To pronounce moral judgment is an enormous responsibility ... A judge puts himself on trial every 
time he pronounces a verdict. It is only in today’s reign of amoral cynicism, subjectivism, and 
47 For a more elaborate metacritical exploration of this activity and how it functions, see Barrowman (2018c). See also 
the recent investigations of critical protocols in film studies undertaken by such scholars as Alex Clayton (2011), 
Andrew Klevan (2011a, 2011b), and James Zborowski (2013), to which my own work is very much indebted. 
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hooliganism, [however,] that men may imagine themselves free to utter any sort of irrational 
judgment and suffer no consequences. But, in fact, a man is to be judged by the judgments he 
pronounces ... [and] it is their fear of this responsibility that prompts most people to adopt an 
attitude of indiscriminate moral neutrality. It is the fear best expressed in the precept: “Judge not, 
that ye be judged.” But that precept, in fact, is an abdication of moral responsibility ... There is no 
escape from the fact that men have to make choices; so long as men have to make choices, there is 
no escape from moral values; so long as moral values are at stake, no moral neutrality is possible 
... The moral principle to adopt [from this perspective] is: “Judge, and be prepared to be judged”
(Rand 1962d: 50-51). 
As a first pass over the Objectivist terrain, I have attempted in this Introduction merely to stake 
out the relevant philosophical problem areas that will be explored in greater detail over the course 
of this thesis and to outline the philosophical foundation on which I will endeavor to build an 
Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. I will leave it to the ensuing chapters to prove its viability and 
validity. The first task that I set for myself is refuting poststructuralist philosophies of art, first in 
the general context of the philosophy of art with reference to the writings of Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida and then in the specific context of the philosophy of film with reference to the 
writings of Peter Wollen. It is my contention that poststructuralism has served, either implicitly or 
explicitly, as the dominant philosophical reference point for film studies and has since the 
inception of the discipline provided the default aesthetic foundation. Therefore, it is necessary 
before arguing for an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema to first argue against poststructuralist 
aesthetics. This is the purpose of Chapter 1, in which I mobilize a number of the Objectivist ideas 
and arguments that I have gone over in this Introduction in order to demonstrate the intellectual 
and moral shortcomings of poststructuralist philosophies of art. In the case of Roland Barthes, I 
highlight the myriad logical fallacies on which Barthes relies over the course of his immoral 
attempt to construct what he described himself as a “hedonistic aesthetics” (Barthes 1971), while, 
in the case of Jacques Derrida, I highlight the persistent threats to his work of skepticism and 
nihilism and demonstrate their deleterious effects on the coherence of his philosophy of art. I then 
close the chapter with a consideration of Peter Wollen’s integration of poststructuralist philosophy 
with the study of film, a project which was plagued by a number of the same issues that plagued 
Barthes and Derrida. 
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After demonstrating the cons of poststructuralism in Chapter 1, I take the lead of David Bordwell 
– who noted that “it is exhilarating but not very enlightening to criticize a position without 
proposing one of your own” (Bordwell 1985: xiii) – and demonstrate in Chapter 2 the pros of 
Objectivism. Though I emphasize the same concepts in Chapter 2 as those in Chapter 1 – most 
notably the concepts of objectivity, authorship, meaning, and value – I shift from critiquing the 
misguided postulations of poststructuralists to outlining the probative value of the Objectivist 
perspective. First, I work through a number of problems in the philosophy of art with respect to 
the notion of objective interpretation and I attempt to justify on metaphysical, epistemological, and 
ethical grounds an intentionalist philosophy of film. Second, I work through a number of problems 
with respect to the notion of objective evaluation and I expound on a conception of “artful 
conversation” indebted to D.N. Rodowick’s readings of Cavell’s philosophical writings on the 
basis of which I clarify the sense in which aesthetic judgments may be deemed objective. 
In the end, I hope that I will have established the insight in and the value of Ayn Rand’s 
philosophical writings as well as the many possibilities of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. It 
is on this note that I conclude this thesis, as I summarize the preceding ideas and arguments and 
then look ahead to the future of the discipline. With respect to the possibilities of Objectivism vis-
à-vis film studies, I discuss what I characterize as the (re)turn to value, which I discuss in reference 
to the work of contemporary scholars who are showing a renewed interest in questions of aesthetic 
value in light of a quality component on the one hand and a function component on the other. 
Ultimately, I hope to make with this thesis a compelling case for a mode of engagement with the 
cinema facilitated by Objectivism, one that exemplifies a personal and emotional, as well as a 
rational and objective, model of film criticism, for, as I will argue at length in this thesis, it is only 
on the basis of such a mode of engagement that scholars may hope to do justice to all that the 
cinema has to offer.
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1
Poststructuralism and the History of Film Studies 
In any given period of history, a culture is to be judged by its dominant philosophy, by the prevalent trend 
of its intellectual life as expressed in morality, in politics, in economics, in art. Professional intellectuals 
are the voice of a culture and are, therefore, its leaders, its integrators, and its bodyguards. [Our] intellectual 
leadership has collapsed … If we look at modern intellectuals, we are confronted with the grotesque 
spectacle of such characteristics as militant uncertainty, crusading cynicism, dogmatic agnosticism, boastful 
self-abasement, and self-righteous depravity – in an atmosphere of guilt, of panic, of despair, of boredom, 
and of all-pervasive evasion. 
– Ayn Rand (1961a: 7-8)  
As I stated in the Introduction, an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema logically entails an intentionalist 
philosophy of art. Authorship, in any rational philosophy of art, must be the conceptual alpha and 
omega. And yet, if the history of 20th Century aesthetics is any indication, no concept has been the 
target of more, or more violent, attacks than the concept of authorship. The aesthetic principles on 
which my conception of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema is based – principles which follow 
from what I have designated elsewhere the axiom of authorship (Barrowman 2017) – are the 
following: 
1) The Objectivity Principle – An artwork exists independent of the act of 
reading/listening/viewing (for, without the artwork, there would be nothing to read/listen to/view) 
and an artwork is what it is independent of the act of interpretation (for, without the artwork, there 
would be nothing to interpret). 
2) The Identity Principle – An interpretation of an artwork can be considered valid only if it 
adequately explains what the artwork is and why the artwork is the way it is. 
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3) The Causality Principle – An artwork is a made object; thus, explanations as to what an artwork 
is and why an artwork is the way it is must consider the intentions of the person who created the 
artwork, i.e. its author. 
These three aesthetic principles seem eminently straightforward if not self-evident. Indeed, these 
were the principles according to which film critics and scholars first formulated la politique des 
auteurs, which is often referred to as the auteur theory but which in this thesis I will refer to as the 
author policy.48 Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, the author policy was the order of the 
day. Critics and scholars writing for the French magazine Cahiers du Cinéma, the British journal 
Movie, and the American magazine Film Culture, among many others, produced writings that still 
stand as some of the most insightful ever produced on the cinema.49 The insightfulness of the 
criticism of such eminent critics as André Bazin, Robin Wood, and Andrew Sarris is due largely 
to the scrupulousness with which they explored the construction of the films that most affected 
them in relation to the artistry of the authors that most inspired them. Despite the considerable 
boon to the analysis of the cinema represented by the author policy, it did not take long for there 
to appear a series of misguided “radicals” keen to challenge the “authority” of the author and to 
institute a new model of criticism.50
48 The story of authorship in the history of film studies is a familiar one which has been told since the beginning of 
the discipline. Thus, I will not go over this familiar territory in this thesis. However, for the influential writings that 
heralded the author policy, see André Bazin (1946, [1948] 1997, [1950] 1978, 1951, 1952, 1955, [1957] 1966, [1958] 
1974), Alexandre Astruc (1948), François Truffaut ([1954] 1966), Ian Cameron (1962), and Andrew Sarris ([1962] 
1979, 1963, 1977, 1996). For additional important writings around the concept of authorship, as well as for added 
historical and philosophical context, see John Caughie (1981) and Jim Hillier (1985, 1986). I do want to mention, 
however, that, contrary to Sarris’ interpretation of la politique des auteurs as a theory of authorship, in this thesis, I 
will refer to it as a policy so as to remain closer to what the French critics and scholars writing in Cahiers du Cinéma
intended – logically and morally – with the formulation. The significance of this ostensibly slight terminological issue 
will receive more elaborate treatment in the final section of this chapter. 
49 In addition to the critics and criticism cited in the previous note, see also the work of Robin Wood (1965, [1968] 
1981, [1969] 2013, [1986] 2003, 2006) and V.F. Perkins (1962, 1963a, 1963b, 1972). 
50 From this point forward, I will be focusing exclusively on the consequences of these irrational and immoral ideas 
in the aesthetic realm. However, for lucid denunciations of these ideas in the realms of ethics and politics, see the 
work of Jordan Peterson (1999, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 2017g, 
2017h, 2017i, 2017j, 2017k, 2017l, 2017m, 2017n, 2017o, 2017p, 2017q), Gad Saad (2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f), Jonathan Haidt (2012, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017), and, 
in an Objectivist register, Stephen R.C. Hicks (1998a, 1998b, 2004). See also Peterson and Hicks (2017), Peterson 
and Haidt (2017), Peterson and Camille Paglia (2017), and Peterson, David Haskell, and William McNally (2017); 
Saad and Peterson (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) and Saad and Haidt (2017); and Rubin and Haidt (2016), Rubin and 
Peterson (2016, 2017a, 2017b), and Rubin and Saad (2016a, 2016b, 2017).  
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A prescient voice amidst this shifting philosophical terrain, E.D. Hirsch maintained that it was 
essential for philosophers of art to not only understand the epistemological conditions of possibility 
for the “heavy and largely victorious assault on the sensible belief that a text means what its author 
meant” that is the sad legacy of 20th Century aesthetics, but, even more importantly, “to determine 
how far the theory of [textual] autonomy deserves acceptance” (Hirsch 1967: 1-2). The same is 
true today. However, in the interest of conceptual clarity, I would argue, pace Hirsch, that what is 
essential is to understand that the very notion of “textual autonomy” is nonsense. Although 
challenges to author-based criticism and to the concept of authorship in the broader sphere of the 
philosophy of art came from diverse individuals from a variety of academic and non-academic 
backgrounds, I will direct my attention here in Chapter 1 to what I will be calling the 
poststructuralist objection.  
In the influential work of poststructuralist avatars Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, author-
based criticism is alleged to be a house of cards built on a philosophical foundation that is rotted 
to its core. Due to the troubling combination of the contemporaneity, the extremism, and the 
continued influence of poststructuralist ideas in the realm of film studies – discernible, among 
other places, in the foundational work of Peter Wollen, which I will consider at length in the final 
section of this chapter – it will be my task in what follows to prove initially that both Barthes and 
Derrida fail to make a prima facie case against authorship. Furthermore, I intend to prove that 
Barthes and Derrida fail to construct a coherent philosophy (of art or of anything else) capable of 
providing the foundation for the discipline of film studies (or any other discipline) and to 
demonstrate why the attempt to build the discipline of film studies on a poststructuralist foundation 
ultimately failed. After proving in this chapter that the philosophy of poststructuralism is without 
merit, I will proceed in the following chapter to build an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema anchored 
by the axiom of authorship and in accordance with the aesthetic principles of objectivity, identity, 
and causality.  
Elsewhere, I have made the case that the greatest threat to the philosophy of art (and, by extension, 
to film studies) is, perversely enough, philosophy itself. But not philosophy as such. It is my 
contention that the threat is a very particular – and particularly pernicious – form of philosophizing, 
one that produces scholarship that is, in Rand’s terminology, unreadable (Barrowman 2017). An 
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unreadable book or essay, as explicated by Rand, “does not count on men’s intelligence, but on 
their weaknesses, pretensions, and fears”; it “is not a tool of enlightenment, but of intellectual 
intimidation”; and it “is not aimed at the reader’s understanding, but at his inferiority complex” 
(Rand 1973c: 117). For all of her optimism, Rand was surprisingly – and, in my estimation, 
unhelpfully – pessimistic with respect to her prognosis for academia vis-à-vis the unreadable.51 As 
she related: 
Within a few years [of the publication of an unreadable book or essay], commentators will begin 
to fill libraries with works analyzing, “clarifying,” and interpreting its mysteries. Their notions will 
spread all over the academic map, ranging from the appeasers, who will try to soften [its] meaning 
– to the glamorizers, who will ascribe to it nothing worse than their own pet inanities – to the 
compromisers, who will try to reconcile its theory with its exact opposite – to the avant-garde, who 
will spell out and demand the acceptance of its logical consequences. The contradictory, antithetical 
nature of such interpretations will be ascribed to [its] profundity – particularly by those who 
function on the motto: “If I don’t understand it, it’s deep.” The students will believe that the 
professors know the proof of [its] theory, the professors will believe that the commentators know 
it, the commentators will believe that the author knows it – and the author will be alone to know 
that no proof exists and that none was offered. Within a generation, the number of commentaries 
will have grown to such proportions that the original [unreadable book or essay] will be accepted 
as a subject of philosophical specialization, requiring a lifetime of study – and any refutation of 
[its] theory will be ignored or rejected if unaccompanied by a full discussion of the theories of all 
the commentators, a task which no one will be able to undertake (Rand 1973c: 117-118). 
Against the appeasers, the glamorizers, the compromisers, and the avant-garde stands the 
“intelligent man.” Far from valiantly defending reason, though, the intelligent man, on Rand’s 
account, will simply reject the unreadable, “refusing to waste his time on untangling what he 
perceives to be gibberish” (Rand 1973c: 117). Despite being an eminently understandable and 
even sympathetic response, important questions nevertheless remain. If “the man able to refute its 
51 Perhaps Rand would have countered by accusing me of being naïve for thinking that convincing academics that the 
emperor has no clothes is anything but an exercise in futility. After all, over the course of their own famous attempt 
to convince their academic peers that the emperor has no clothes, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont felt compelled, 
despite not wanting to sound “unduly pessimistic,” to acknowledge that “the story of the emperor’s new clothes ends 
as follows: ‘And the chamberlains went on carrying the train that wasn’t there’” (Sokal and Bricmont [1997] 1999: 
177). 
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arguments will not (unless he has the endurance of an elephant and the patience of a martyr)” 
(Rand 1973c: 117), then what hope is there? Is such intellectual withdrawal not a form of moral 
treason? Worse yet, is such silence in the face of the unreadable not sanction? 
Poststructuralism has been critiqued by countless scholars from diverse backgrounds across a wide 
range of academic disciplines,52 but it is a curious feature of film studies that it does not have a 
comparable disciplinary history of such critiques.53 Even with the recent emergence of “film-
philosophy,” no film scholars have bothered to critically engage poststructuralism.54 It is therefore 
not surprising to find Robert Sinnerbrink arguing the following with reference to the work of 
Richard Allen and Murray Smith, two intelligent men who had previously rejected the unreadable:  
[Allen and Smith] assert that [poststructuralists have] attempted to demonstrate “the impossibility 
of knowledge” and have apparently “embraced this contradiction as the defining feature of 
philosophy and the only legitimate path that philosophy can take in response to modernity” [but,] 
apart from a derisory and mocking tone, little argumentative or textual evidence is provided to 
support such hyperbolic claims (Sinnerbrink 2011a: 198).   
Against this backdrop, the critique of poststructuralism that will comprise this chapter is meant to 
serve as an elaborate answering of the bell vis-à-vis Sinnerbrink’s implicit challenge to provide 
the “argumentative [and] textual evidence” necessary to prove that poststructuralism is, in fact, 
unreadable nonsense that intelligent scholars ought to reject. As a final word (of warning) before 
I set out on my critique, I should emphasize that my engagements with the poststructuralist writings 
52 In addition to the broad ethical and political critiques that I have cited previously, see also, among many others, 
Cary Nelson (1985) and Donald G. Ellis (1991) in the context of communication theory; Steven Knapp and Walter 
Benn Michaels (1987), Seán Burke ([1992] 2008), and Noël Carroll (1992) in the context of the philosophy of art; 
Alex Callinicos (1990), Barbara Epstein (1995, 1997), Terry Eagleton (1996), and Rey Chow (2006) in the context of 
political philosophy; and Sokal and Bricmont ([1997] 1999) and David Detmar (2003) in the context of the philosophy 
of science.   
53 For the few anomalies, see Andrew Britton (1979), Robin Wood (1989), David Bordwell (1989b), and Richard 
Allen and Murray Smith (1997). 
54 In fact, quite the contrary: There is a particularly strong effort at present to solidify the connection between film 
studies and Continental philosophy generally and poststructuralism specifically. Beyond the continued 
influence/prestige of such contemporary Continental philosophers as Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Rancière, this is 
evidenced by the release of such titles as Roland Barthes’ Cinema (Watts 2016), Cinema without Reflection: Jacques 
Derrida’s Echopoiesis and Narcissism Adrift (Lippit 2016), Acinemas: Lyotard’s Philosophy of Film (Jones and 
Woodward 2017), and Foucault at the Movies (Maniglier and Zabunyan 2018). 
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of Barthes, Derrida, and Wollen will not merely be critical engagements; more to the point, they 
will be polemical engagements. Since I do not believe in pulling my punches, this chapter will 
proceed according to what Simon Critchley has referred to as an “economy of viciousness” 
(Critchley 2007: xiv). To Critchley’s mind, polemics are an “intellectually healthy” activity with 
“sharp philosophical edges” (Critchley 2007: xiv). In a similar vein, Stephen Prince has 
encouraged “spirited opposition” not only because it can serve as a “measure of vitality” with 
respect to a given field but because “the flash and fire of [polemics] can illuminate [a] field’s basic 
and often unexamined assumptions and methods, its very history and traditions” (Prince 1992: 49). 
This is what Rodowick calls “the value of being disagreeable” (Rodowick 2013): Since an 
argument is “a public and social event open to conversation and debate, agreements and 
disagreements,” there is the potential, through polemical engagements, of “transform[ing] the 
terms of debate, the language in which it is expressed, and the nature of the epistemological and 
axiological commitments that have been entered into” (Rodowick 2015: 79).  
Given the “sedimented dogma” (Bordwell and Carroll 1996: xiv) that has accrued in film studies 
over the last half century – to say nothing of the “crushing weight of the philosophical wreckage 
under which generations [of scholars] have been brought up” (Rand [1969] 1975: 94) –
transforming the terms of debates in film studies and encouraging film scholars to transform their 
epistemological and axiological commitments are precisely the outcomes that I hope will result 
from current efforts in film-philosophy. In the hopes of being able to contribute to such efforts, 
what follows is my “elephantine” endeavor to refute the philosophy of poststructuralism 
propaedeutic to the construction of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. 
I 
Roland Barthes and the Attempted Murder of the Author 
In the following two sections focusing on the work of Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, I will 
not provide comprehensive exegeses of either man’s respective corpus. Rather, with respect to the 
rule of fundamentality (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 45-46), I will look to interrogate the fundamentals 
of each man’s philosophy of art, a process Rand liked to refer to as philosophical detection:  
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A detective seeks to discover the truth about a crime. A philosophical detective must seek to 
determine the truth or falsehood of an abstract system and thus discover whether he is dealing with 
a great achievement or an intellectual crime. A detective knows what to look for, or what clues to 
regard as significant. A philosophical detective must remember that all human knowledge has a 
hierarchical structure; he must learn to distinguish the fundamental from the derivative, and, in 
judging a given philosopher’s system, he must look – first and above all else – at its fundamentals. 
If the foundation does not hold, neither will anything else (Rand 1974b: 12). 
In the case of Roland Barthes, the trail obviously leads first and foremost to the 1967 publication 
of his landmark essay “The Death of the Author.” Despite the fact that Barthes’ call-to-arms is 
made up of conspicuous logical fallacies, contradictions, and equivocations – to say nothing of its 
toxic Nietzschean “morality” – “The Death of the Author” still holds sway in a number of academic 
circles half a century later. In fact, in the years since the publication of this extraordinarily 
influential essay, the author has been disavowed in virtually every critical and theoretical context 
across the humanities.55 In film studies, following the era of the author policy and the politicization 
of film criticism in the 1960s, the author was subjected to innumerable critiques and denunciations; 
as Laurence Knapp recalls, the author “became less and less of an architect and more and more of 
55 In literary theory, Barthes’ essay disturbed the semblance of peace that had been achieved following the publication 
of Monroe C. Beardsley and W.K. Wimsatt Jr.’s controversial essay on “the intentional fallacy” (Beardsley and 
Wimsatt Jr. 1946). In a sense, Barthes’ position represents a radicalization of New Criticism, which, to his mind, failed 
in its attempts to invalidate the concept of authorship and instead did “no more than consolidate it” (Barthes 1967: 
143). Barthes’ radicalism was embraced, with varying degrees of extremism, by countless literary theorists, notably 
those associated with the French publications Communications and Tel Quel and with what eventually came to be 
known as the “Yale School” of literary criticism. It inspired Jean-Louis Baudry to attempt to explode the temporal 
logic of writing and reading and reconceive them as “merely simultaneous moments in a single process of production” 
(Baudry quoted in Rodowick [1988] 1994: 28); it inspired Terence Hawkes to reject as “dishonest” all criticism “based 
on the supposition that the [artwork] exists in some objective, concrete way before the critical act” (Hawkes 1977: 
155) and to imperiously affirm in place of such criticism a mode of reading that “tears away the veil” of authorship 
based on the supposition that the artwork “remains genuinely ours to make and to remake as we please” (Hawkes 
1977: 73); and it inspired J. Hillis Miller to proclaim that authorial intention can never be “wholly explained, after the 
fact, by however exhaustive a retrospective repertory of [artworks], including the psychobiographies of the authors in 
question” and to encourage instead an emphasis on “the residue of the unexplained” (Miller 1998: 85). Film scholars, 
too, were swept up by the radical spirit of Barthes’ essay, particularly those associated with Cahiers du Cinéma in the 
late 1960s/early 1970s and with the British journal Screen in the 1970s and into the 1980s. It inspired critic-filmmaker 
Jacques Rivette to urge filmmakers and filmgoers alike to renounce “all the bourgeois aesthetic clichés, like the idea 
that there is an auteur of the film, expressing himself” (Rivette 1968: 319); it inspired Jean Narboni to champion a 
criticism that deprives films of “the author, the Creator, the ‘temperament’ through which Nature must be seen” 
(Narboni 1970: 151); and it inspired Stephen Heath to denounce the notion of an “englobing consciousness” capable 
of intending/being responsible for the particular “articulation of the film text” (Heath 1973: 89). I will return to these 
arguments and the long-lasting effects they have had on the development of film studies in the final section of this 
chapter. 
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an unwitting bricklayer” (Knapp 1996: 2). Fortunately, despite the frequency and severity of 
attacks, the author has endured. Towards the goal of articulating an Objectivist aesthetics of 
cinema, I intend to subject Barthes’ influential essay to a sustained interrogation in an effort to 
identify and condemn the logical and moral shortcomings of what I will hereafter refer to as 
Barthes’ attempted murder of the author. Ultimately, I will argue that Barthes’ failure in “The 
Death of the Author” is not, strictly speaking, a failure of knowledge, but rather, in Cavell’s 
terminology, a failure of acknowledgment: 
Acknowledging is not an alternative to knowing … In incorporating, or inflecting, the concept of 
knowledge, the concept of acknowledgment is meant, in my use, to declare that what there is to be 
known philosophically remains unknown not through ignorance … but through a refusal of 
knowledge, a denial or a repression of knowledge, say even a killing of it (Cavell 1986a: 51). 
In one sense, then, “The Death of the Author,” inasmuch as it represents a failure of logic and 
morality, may seem irrelevant (or anathema) to my endeavor to construct an Objectivist aesthetics 
of cinema. In another sense, however, its logical and moral shortcomings may be considered 
instructive and, as such, indispensable. This latter sense aligns with the philosophical practice of 
J.L. Austin, who maintained that identifying and mastering techniques for “dissolving 
philosophical worries” is a crucial skill in the realm of philosophical argumentation; as he 
observed, “there is nothing so plain boring as the constant repetition of assertions that are not true, 
and sometimes not even faintly sensible,” and if the cultivation of philosophical habits conducive 
to rational thought allows for nonsensical assertions (such as those of which “The Death of the 
Author” is composed) to be dissolved, then “it will be all to the good” (Austin 1962a: 5).56
Unfortunately, due to the schizophrenic sloppiness with which Barthes presents his argument in 
“The Death of the Author,” discerning what exactly he is arguing at any given moment and how 
56 It is interesting to note that Austin’s philosophical practice aligns perfectly with the philosophical method prescribed 
by Wittgenstein: “Most of the [questions] to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. 
Consequently, we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical 
… [Thus,] the correct method in philosophy would really be the following: To say nothing except what can be 
[sensibly] said … and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something [nonsensical], to demonstrate to him 
that he had failed to give a [sensible] meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying 
to the other person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this method would be the 
only strictly correct one” (Wittgenstein [1921] 2001: 22-23 [4.003], 89 [6.53]). 
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the entire argument hangs together is no easy feat (never mind dissolving the philosophical worries 
therein).57 In fact, even at this preliminary stage of my critique, there has already been a misstep, 
for to speak of the argument in “The Death of the Author” implies that it consists of one argument. 
To be more precise, “The Death of the Author” consists of two arguments. And, as if this is not 
confusing enough, within each of these arguments, Barthes vacillates between an extreme version 
and a moderate version.  
On the one hand, in what I will refer to as the production argument, Barthes calls for a paradigm 
shift in artistic production. In the extreme version, writing calls for a “prerequisite impersonality” 
(how writing “calls for” this “impersonality,” Barthes does not say). In the moderate version, 
writing does not “call for” a prerequisite impersonality, but the author is nevertheless supposed to 
approach art impersonally and to intentionally suppress his “authority” so as to allow language to 
work its magic (why and by whom the author is “supposed” to approach art impersonally, Barthes 
does not say). Even though the terms of the extreme version and the moderate version are different, 
they are both designed to bring art to the Barthesian “utopia” in which “it is language which speaks, 
not the author” (Barthes 1967: 143). On the other hand, in what I will refer to as the reception 
argument, Barthes also calls for a paradigm shift in artistic reception. Ironically, the very existence 
of the reception argument proves that the extreme version of the production argument is nonsense. 
After all, if language were the only volitional entity in production (i.e. if the author did not have a 
role to play in the first place), then there would be no need to make an argument for reception 
based on the premise that language is the only volitional entity in production. It would be self-
evident. Thus, both the extreme version and the moderate version of the reception argument are 
related to the moderate version of the production argument.  
The moderate version of the reception argument follows from the implementation of the moderate 
version of the production argument. Once art has been transformed into an arena wherein authors 
willingly submit to language, readers may thus dispense with the notion of deciphering art and 
57 Though my repeated ascriptions to poststructuralists of schizophrenic tendencies will no doubt strike some as 
hyperbolic at best and malicious at worst, I maintain that, more than mere rhetorical bluster, it is diagnostically 
accurate; I do not consider it an exaggeration to say, as Richard Harland has said, that “meaning on the schizophrenic’s 
level is in precisely that state to which all poststructuralists aspire” (Harland 1987: 174). Needless to say, I do not 
aspire to schizophrenia, nor do I think that any sane person would/should, hence my pejorative tone. 
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may concern themselves solely with disentangling it.58 However, in the event that there are authors 
who refuse to submit to language, then the extreme version of the reception argument is deployed. 
In the extreme version, the “revolutionary” reader is supposed to “refuse God and his hypostases 
– reason, science, law” and forcibly remove the author (why and by whom the reader is “supposed” 
to “remove” the author, Barthes does not say) (Barthes 1967: 147).
Fueling these two arguments is a putative quest to “liberate” art from the “tyranny” of the author, 
after which “the people” may rejoice in the jouissance of the “infinitely polysemous” text. Barthes 
puts on the airs of Robin Hood, but the key point to be made is that this is merely misdirection.59
Operating beneath his alleged quest for liberation is a far more sinister project (which he would 
later refer to as the construction of a “hedonistic aesthetics”60) the end result of which is out-and-
out murder. Of course, Barthes does not explicitly endorse (at least not initially) the murder of the 
author. Instead, he proceeds as if his arguments are strictly, even peaceably, logical. Thus, the first 
58 Even though Barthes is content to leave his distinction between deciphering and disentangling poetically vague, the 
implication, if not convincing, is at least clear: Since, without an author to “authorize” its meaning, a text can no longer 
be said to “have” (a) meaning, it is less like a “message” and more like, as Barthes claims, “the thread of a stocking,” 
which can be “followed” or “run” – in a word, disentangled – but “beneath” which “there is nothing” to decipher
(Barthes 1967: 147). That this formulation entails a significant reconceptualization of what art is and what an artwork 
does is an issue that I will discuss in greater detail in the final section of this chapter as well as in Chapter 2. 
59 George Orwell famously reported a similar suspicion of altruism: “Sometimes I look at a socialist – the intellectual, 
tract-writing type of socialist, with his pullover, his fuzzy hair, and his Marxian quotation – and wonder what the devil 
his motive really is” (Orwell [1937] 1981: 156). In his sustained (and astonishingly perspicacious if not prescient) 
rumination on precisely this issue of motivation, Carl Jung asked: “Who is making the [argument in question]? Is it, 
perchance, someone who jumps over his own shadow in order to hurl himself avidly on an idealistic program that 
promises him a welcome alibi? How much respectability and apparent morality is there cloaking with deceptive colors 
a very different inner world of darkness?” (Jung [1957] 2002: 73).
60 The two most relevant writings regarding Barthes’ conception of a hedonistic aesthetics (an outcropping of what 
Andrew Britton astutely identified as Barthes’ juvenile “metaphysics of transgression” [Britton 1979: 419]) are “From 
Work to Text” (1971) and The Pleasure of the Text ([1973] 1975). For a brief description of the Nietzschean “ideal” 
manifest in Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics, consider the following passage: “There exists a pleasure of the work … but 
this pleasure, no matter how keen … [remains] a pleasure of consumption; for if I can read [certain] authors, I also 
know that I cannot re-write them … As for the Text, it is bound to jouissance, that is to a pleasure without separation” 
(Barthes 1971: 164). As for the stakes of pursuing this “pleasure without separation,” Barthes is admirably clear with 
respect to how thoroughly it separates him from reality: “Imagine someone (a kind of Monsieur Teste in reverse) who 
abolishes within himself all barriers, all classes, all exclusions, not by syncretism but by simple discard of that old 
specter: logical contradiction; who mixes every language, even those said to be incompatible; who silently accepts 
every charge of illogicality, of incongruity … Such a man would be the mockery of our society: court, school, asylum, 
polite conversation would cast him out: who endures contradiction without shame? Now this anti-hero exists: he is 
the reader of the text at the moment he takes his pleasure” (Barthes [1973] 1975: 3). In line with the Cavellian notion 
that one cannot just not know that which is known philosophically, I am reminded of a similar sentiment once 
expressed by Wittgenstein: “In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake … [which means] we should not 
just not share his opinion: We should regard him as demented” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 23e).
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problems to arise in “The Death of the Author” are relatively straightforward problems of logic; 
in both the production argument and the reception argument, and in both the extreme versions and 
the moderate versions of each, Barthes relies at every turn on two logical fallacies. The first fallacy 
is the previously discussed fallacy of concept stealing, whereby one denies the primacy of a 
putatively invalid concept (e.g. authorship) and then asserts the primacy of a derivative concept 
(e.g. art). The second fallacy is a fallacy Rand terms package dealing, whereby one attempts to 
integrate into a unified conceptual whole, or package, a series of contradictory concepts/premises 
(e.g. conflating the author and God). She elaborates on the “logic” of package dealing as follows:
[Package dealing] runs as follows: To prove the assertion that there is no such thing as “necessity” 
in the universe, [a package dealer] declares that, just as [the United States] did not have to have 
fifty states – there could have been forty-eight or fifty-two – so the solar system did not have to 
have nine planets – there could have been seven or eleven. It is not sufficient, he declares, to prove 
that something is, one must also prove that it had to be – and, since nothing had to be, nothing is 
certain and anything goes … From the assertion, “Man is unpredictable, therefore nature is 
unpredictable,” the argument goes to, “Nature possesses volition, man does not – nature is free, 
man is ruled by unknowable forces – nature is not to be conquered, man is” (Rand 1973a: 28-29). 
These two fallacies are at work in both of the arguments running throughout “The Death of the 
Author.” According to the production argument, Barthes claims that artistic production is not (in 
the extreme version) or should not be (in the moderate version) a matter of people “expressing 
themselves,” but rather, a matter of allowing language to “express itself” through them. 
Theoretically, Barthes formulates the extreme version of the production argument in the following 
manner:
Enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be 
filled with the person of the interlocutors … Language knows a “subject,” not a “person,” and this 
subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language “hold 
together” (Barthes 1967: 145).
Applying this theoretical model to actual artistic practice, Barthes outlines the process as follows:
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The modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his 
predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion … On the contrary, the hand, cut 
off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field 
without origin – or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself (Barthes 1967: 146).
These formulations lead to the major contradiction that contributes to the collapse of the 
production argument. In the moderate version of the production argument, Barthes tries to preserve 
the concept of intention without the concepts of identity or consciousness. This is a straightforward 
case of concept stealing, for intention presupposes an entity capable of intending, which in turn 
presupposes the concepts of identity and consciousness. In the extreme version of the production 
argument, however, Barthes shifts from concept stealing to package dealing, anthropomorphizing 
capital-L “Language” and then proceeding to deny that either consciousness or intention are 
attributable to human beings, thus leaving Language as the only “conscious” entity possessing 
volition and thus capable, by some unexplained supernatural means, of intending.61
Interestingly, Barthes opts for a positive conception of the “pure” functionality of Language akin 
to the popular (mis)reading of the Hegelian “Cunning of Reason” as opposed to the negative 
conception of the insidiousness of language often attributed to Jacques Lacan.62 In either case, it 
61 The “logic” of Barthes’ arguments here in “The Death of the Author” indicates a significant deviation from his 
earlier work in which authors were acknowledged as individuals possessing and capable of acting on conscious 
intentions. For example, in Writing Degree Zero, Barthes claims that the author “shows himself clearly as an 
individual” in his “choice of” and “responsibility for” a “mode of writing.” Indeed, Barthes conceives writing as “the 
morality of form” and he acknowledges, in a curiously Objectivist gesture, that a morality of form presupposes volition 
on the part of the author (Barthes [1953] 2012: 14-16). I will elaborate on the moral consequences of Barthes’ 
arguments in “The Death of the Author,” which deny the eminently rational claims for authorship made in Writing 
Degree Zero, later in this section. 
62 With reference to the Hegelian Cunning of Reason, Slavoj Žižek seeks to clarify that the correct reading “in no way 
involves a faith in a secret guiding hand” (Žižek 2012: 510). As for the insidiousness of language often attributed to 
Lacan (and endorsed, as I will discuss in the next section, by Derrida), Bruce Fink provides a diagrammatically clear 
explication when he alleges that “language ‘lives’ and ‘breathes’ independently of any human subject. Speaking 
beings, far from simply using language as a tool … are the playthings of language, and are duped by language” (Fink 
1995: 14). Incidentally, I say “attributed to” Lacan rather than “proposed by” or “promulgated by” Lacan because, 
contra Fink, Lacan argues that language is a tool for making meaning – or, to use Lacan’s own word, an “instrument” 
(Lacan 1953: 227). The caveat is that, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is the unconscious that is responsible for using 
language to make meaning. That psychoanalytic invocations of the unconscious are often no less mystical than capital-
L Language is a battle for another day. The fact remains that, for Lacan, language and the unconscious are distinct 
and it is the latter that uses the former as a meaning-making instrument. For more on Lacan’s conception of language, 
see, among his many seminars and publications, Lacan (1953, [1954-1955] 1991, 1957, 1958, 1966, [1972-1973] 
1998). 
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is Language that is posited as possessing volition and thus capable of intending, though it should 
be noted that, regardless of whether it is Language that possesses volition while human beings do 
not, as in the extreme version, or whether both Language and human beings possess volition but 
human beings are to cede their volition to Language, as in the moderate version, both pictures of 
language are nonsense.63 Undeterred, Barthes astonishingly tries to bolster the extreme version of 
the production argument with reference to ordinary language philosophy as if it confirms his thesis 
when, in point of fact, ordinary language philosophy is its antithesis (Barthes 1967: 145-146). 
Cavell provides a clear description of the perspective of ordinary language philosophy on language 
and communication, a description which illuminates how fundamentally it contradicts Barthes’ 
antihumanist model:
There must, [in language], be reasons for what you say … if what you say is to be comprehensible. 
We can understand what the words mean apart from understanding why you say them, but apart 
from understanding the point of your saying them, we cannot understand what you mean … The 
emphasis is [thus] on the fact that [expressions] are said (or, of course, written) by human beings, 
to human beings, in definite contexts, in a language they share, hence the obsession with the use of 
expressions (Cavell 1979: 206). 
The final piece of corroborating evidence against the extreme version of the production argument 
is, ironically, Barthes’ own critical practice. When he has occasion to lament the “sway of the 
author” and how powerful it has proven to be, he claims that “certain writers have long since 
attempted to loosen it” (Barthes 1967: 143). To Barthes’ mind, writers such as Stéphane Mallarmé, 
Paul Valéry, and Marcel Proust intended in their work – and, as far as Barthes was concerned, 
followed through successfully on their intentions – to problematize in various ways and to varying 
degrees the concept of authorship. Counter-intuitive and self-destructive though this intention may 
63 Oddly enough, despite his allegiance to the semiological principles explicated by Ferdinand de Saussure, Barthes is 
here blatantly contradicting Saussure, who, for his part, maintained (sensibly) that “language is not an entity” 
(Saussure [1916] 2011: 5). In an effort not to misrepresent Saussure, I should mention that he does go on to say that, 
even if formulations such as “language does this or that” or “life of language” contradict the facts of reality, one “must 
not go too far” and “require that only words that correspond to the facts” be permitted (Saussure [1916] 2011: 5). I 
would, indeed, go so far as to say – in line with the Wittgensteinian notion of philosophy being “a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 47e) – that only words that 
correspond to the facts ought to be used, and if an example is necessary to prove the disastrous consequences of 
countenancing language that contradicts the facts of reality, I shudder to think that there exists a better example than 
“The Death of the Author.”
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be, the fact remains that Barthes’ assessment of these men’s respective work as attempts to 
challenge the sway of the author relies for its persuasiveness on intentions imputed to Mallarmé-
as-author, Valéry-as-author, and Proust-as-author.64
Having invalidated the extreme version of the production argument, the moderate version, where 
the author accedes to the “will” of Language, may still seem viable. The reason Barthes believes 
Mallarmé stands out is because, as Barthes puts it, he recognized “the necessity to substitute 
language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner” (Barthes 1967: 
143).65 There are a number of questions that seem worth asking here: How did Mallarmé recognize 
this “necessity”? How does one “substitute language itself” for the “person”? Why is it necessary 
to do so? Beyond these obvious questions, a less obvious question is also hovering in the 
background: Who benefits from such a substitution? These questions are meant to underscore the 
fact that “The Death of the Author” does not merely exemplify a corruption of logic. Even more 
important to recognize, “The Death of the Author” exemplifies a corruption of morality.
Early in “The Death of the Author,” Barthes observes that the value of the author (and thus of logic 
and reality) is related to “capitalist ideology, which has attached the greatest importance to the 
‘person’ of the author” (Barthes 1967: 143). He is absolutely correct in this observation, which 
implies that the moral foundation of capitalism is the individual and his rights. Where he is wrong 
is in thinking that this is a knock against either authorship or capitalism (or logic, or reality). On 
the basis of this observation and the implication that it indicates an error, it becomes clear that the 
link between the moderate version of the production argument and the moderate version of the 
64 For an even more explicit reliance on authorial intention in Barthes’ critical practice, see his classically auteurist 
essay – which, strangely, was written three years after “The Death of the Author” and one year before “From Work to 
Text” and originally published in Cahiers du Cinéma at the height of its militant Marxism – entitled “The Third 
Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills,” in which Barthes claims that the films of Sergei Eisenstein bear 
his “imperishable signature” (Barthes 1970: 64). 
65 Once again, Barthes is significantly deviating from his earlier work. In Writing Degree Zero, Barthes chronicles 
“the multiplication of modes of writing” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 84) and assesses Mallarmé’s artistic practice as merely 
one mode among many. In “The Death of the Author,” however, Mallarmé’s artistic practice is no longer merely one 
possible mode; it has now become the only acceptable mode. I will explain the reason for this shift presently. 
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reception argument is the morality of altruism. In the moral register, altruism is marshaled to 
oppose individualism, while, in the political register, Marxism is marshaled to oppose capitalism.66
According to Barthes’ altruistic aesthetic model, the author must sacrifice his individuality for the 
“good” of “the people.” Barthes states that “as soon as a fact is narrated … outside of any function 
other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself … the author enters into his own death” 
(Barthes 1967: 142). If, in Barthes’ altruistic aesthetics, it is necessary for the author to “substitute 
language itself” for his “person” – the moral/political implication of which is that the individual 
does not have the right, is not free, to exist for himself – and if, in doing so, he “enters into his 
own death” – the moral/political implication of which is that the individual must sacrifice himself 
for the sake of others – then what is necessary in Barthes’ aesthetics on the part of the author is 
suicide.67 Worse yet: What happens if Barthes comes across an author who rejects the morality of 
altruism and who refuses to commit suicide? What happens if he comes across an author who 
instead lives according to a morality of individualism and who insists on the right to and the 
freedom of self-expression?  
In the event that the extreme version of the production argument, in which language is a volitional 
entity that uses helpless and mindless human beings to produce texts by ineffable means, is invalid 
– which, as I hope to have convincingly demonstrated, it is – and if the conjunction of the moderate 
versions of the production argument and the reception argument, in which the author is required 
to sacrifice his individuality and commit suicide for the good of the people who may then do with 
the remaining text qua alms whatever they wish, is also invalid – which, as I hope to have 
convincingly demonstrated, it is – Barthes still needs a way to ensure that he is able to indulge in 
the jouissance of the infinitely polysemous text. In these circumstances, if the author refuses to 
commit suicide on Barthes’ command, then Barthes is left with only one option: Murder. 
Rand once observed that there are only two means by which people can deal with one another, 
logic or force, and that irrational and immoral people who cannot win by means of logic invariably 
66 The conjunction of authorship and capitalism here reminds me of the famous remark made by Walter Benjamin that 
“capitalism will not die a natural death” (Benjamin [1927-1940] 1999: 667). 
67 This is confirmed by Barthes, who proudly proclaims that the “poignant self-destruction” of such nonsensical artistic 
endeavors “has the very structure of suicide” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 75).
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resort to the use of force (Rand [1966] 1970: 66). Even though Rand made this observation before 
Barthes wrote “The Death of the Author,” it nevertheless serves as a perfect description of the path 
taken by Barthes over the course of his essay. Initially, Barthes attempts to disguise the murderous 
nature of his essay. To prove that he is not committing murder, he attempts to show, on logical 
grounds, that there simply is no author to be murdered: 
Did [the author] wish to express himself, he ought at least to know that the inner “thing” he thinks
to “translate” is itself only a ready-formed dictionary … Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no 
longer bears within him passions, humors, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary 
from which he draws a writing that can know no halt (Barthes 1967: 146-147). 
Barthes’ substitution of a “ready-formed dictionary” for the “self” allegedly “expressed” by the 
author signals the radicalization of a more modest argument of his from Writing Degree Zero. In 
this early text, Barthes begins from the premise that art has its roots “in the depths of the author’s 
personal and secret mythology” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 10). Unfortunately, Barthes’ explication of 
authorial intention is steeped in mysticism; he alternatively conceives authorial intention as “the 
writer’s ‘thing’” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 11), an “occult aspect” of his “carnal structure” that is 
“locked within [his] body” (Barthes [1953] 2012: 12), and a “miracle” of “transmutation” 
indicating a “supra-literary operation which carries man to the threshold of power and magic” 
(Barthes [1953] 2012: 12). Given the mercuriality of Barthes’ conception of authorship and how 
little time he invests in articulating its logic, it is hardly surprising that he proceeds to vitiate the 
concept by claiming that Language, insofar as it “remains full of the recollection of previous 
usage” and consists of signs with “a second-order memory which mysteriously persists in the midst 
of new meanings,” invariably “drowns the sound” of the author’s self-expression (Barthes [1953] 
2012: 16-17).  
While Barthes’ conception of Language in “The Death of the Author” is clearly carried over from 
Writing Degree Zero, his conception of authorship is demonstrably different. In Writing Degree 
Zero, Barthes grants the author a (limited) degree of autonomy. In “The Death of the Author,” 
however, Barthes begins from the premise that art “is the destruction of every voice, of every point 
of origin” (Barthes 1967: 143). Of course, recalling my point about the reception argument 
invalidating simply by virtue of its existence the extreme version of the production argument, if it 
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were true that art is now/always was as destructive as Barthes claims, then insisting that authors 
sacrifice themselves in the spirit of altruism would be useless if not inconceivable.68 As if sensing 
the insufficiency of his precarious yoking together of the extreme and moderate versions of the 
production argument with the moderate version of the reception argument, Barthes resorts in the 
end to the extreme version of the reception argument. This entails a shift on Barthes’ part from 
speaking of the author being (naturally) succeeded (by the scriptor) to being (forcibly) removed 
(by the reader):
To give a text an author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close 
the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important 
task of discovering the author … [and] when the author has been found, the text is “explained” –
victory to the critic … It is [therefore] derisory to condemn the new writing in the name of a 
humanism hypocritically turned champion of the reader’s rights … We are now beginning to let 
ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favor 
of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that, to give writing its 
future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death 
of the author (Barthes 1967: 147-148). 
This argument is the logical endpoint for “The Death of the Author,” its toxic “morality” 
culminating in unadulterated murder. There are so many things wrong with this passage that I will 
enumerate them in list form: 
68 The fact that it is unclear whether Barthes believes art always was and always will be constitutively destructive to 
authors or whether he believes art is now and should forever be approached by authors as a self-destructive practice 
is a significant and telling equivocation. It is on this point that the utility for Barthes of the criticism playbook of 
Ellsworth Toohey, the villain in Rand’s novel The Fountainhead and an exemplar of the altruist (corruption of) 
morality, becomes clear. As Toohey explains at one point: “Every system of ethics that preached sacrifice grew into 
a world power and ruled millions of men. Of course, you must dress it up. You must tell people that they’ll achieve a 
superior kind of happiness … You don’t have to be too clear about it. Use big vague words. ‘Universal Harmony’ –
‘Eternal Spirit’ – ‘Divine Purpose’ – ‘Nirvana’ – ‘Paradise’ – ‘Racial Supremacy’ – ‘The Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat.’ The farce has been going on for centuries and men still fall for it. Yet, the test should be so simple. Just 
listen to any prophet and if you hear him speak of sacrifice – Run. Run faster than from a plague. It stands to reason 
that, where there’s sacrifice, there’s someone collecting sacrificial offerings. Where there’s service, there’s someone 
being served. The man who speaks to you of sacrifice speaks of slaves and masters. And intends to be the master” 
(Rand [1943] 2007: 666-667).   
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1) The notion of giving a text an author is a package deal predicated on the author/God conflation.69
Authors are not given, they are acknowledged. Moreover, Barthes goes so far in this passage as to 
actually assume the role of God. At various points in “The Death of the Author,” Barthes makes 
references to refusing God and to anti-theological reading practices which reject the “theological” 
meaning of the Author-God (Barthes 1967: 146-148). By virtue of this passage, however, it is clear 
that what draws Barthes’ wrath is not the concept of God, but rather, the fact that he is not God. It 
is hubris, pure and simple, and following the “logic” of “the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away,” 
Barthes-as-God assumes the position of being able to give to or take away from a text the author. 
The lunacy has here reached its apogee.70
2) Readers cannot impose limits on texts. The only choice readers have is to (a) read within the 
(author’s) limits or to (b) read beyond the (author’s) limits. In short: Writers write, readers read.71
3) By putting “explained” in quotes, Barthes is implying that, once the author is discovered, there 
is no more work to be done by criticism. This is a reductive conception of criticism and, quite 
simply, another straw man. 
69 Cavell provides a succinct refutation of this ubiquitous package deal: “What is discredited [in “The Death of the 
Author”] is [a straw man], a picture of human creation as a literalized anthropomorphism of God’s creation – as if to 
create [an artwork] I were required to begin with the dust of the ground and magic breath” (Cavell 1984: 111).
70 It warrants mentioning that even poststructuralists who claim to reject the “extreme” terms of Barthes’ arguments 
against authorship still ultimately promulgate the exact terms of and conclusions reached in his arguments. Consider, 
as exemplary of this (foolish at best and disingenuous at worst) position, Samuel Weber’s dealings with Barthes in his 
well-known Institution and Interpretation. In his Introduction, Weber acknowledges that “Barthes’ obituary has 
proven premature” (Weber [1987] 2001: xv), yet this does not stop him from repeating exactly and on more than one 
occasion Barthes’ arguments against authorship (presumably because he either feels Barthes’ obituary was not 
premature or because he feels it is his responsibility to finish what Barthes started). In a critique of Wolfgang Iser’s 
The Act of Reading (1978), Weber asks the metaphysical nonquestion “Who – or what – controls the text?” (Weber 
[1987] 2001: 184) and then tries to answer it via package dealing, arguing that “the author” is a “secular emanation” 
of the “Divine Creator” and to that extent “never speaks for itself” (Weber [1987] 2001: 196). This despite the facts 
that (a) authors very often speak for themselves and (b) the Author-God is a straw man. 
71 Gone in this passage from “The Death of the Author” is the subtlety of Barthes’ prior conceptualizations of the 
activity of reading. Consider, as an example of Barthes’ transient lucidity, the following postulation (in a section 
significantly titled “Objectivity”) from Criticism and Truth: “Nobody has ever denied or will ever deny that the 
language of the text has a literal meaning ... What we need to know is whether or not one has the right to read in this 
literal language other meanings which do not contradict it” (Barthes [1966] 2007: 5-6). Leaving aside the irony in the 
fact that Barthes, in “The Death of the Author,” is doing precisely what he, in Criticism and Truth, assured no one 
will ever do, Barthes’ consideration in Criticism and Truth of the ethics of reading is as elegant and rational as it is 
nuanced and provocative. It is unfortunate that the more irrational and megalomaniacal formulations of “The Death 
of the Author” have sedimented into critical dogma, thereby occluding the far more stringent efforts discernible in 
Barthes’ earlier work.
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4) To imply that respecting the role of the author in art (which is to say, respecting the role of the 
human in the world) is not a humanist position while committing violence against the author and, 
by extension, art (which is to say, lashing out against humanity and the world) is a humanist 
position is an egregious reversal of the facts of reality and the only authentic display of hypocrisy 
and antiphrasis.72
That Barthes’ aesthetic “utopia” ultimately reaches this point of out-and-out murder and mayhem 
should not be a surprise given its indebtedness to the political philosophy of Josef Stalin, who 
proclaimed that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule – unrestricted by law and based on 
force” (Stalin [1924] 2015: 45-46). Shockingly, Barthes’ reprehensible Stalinist turn has never 
given poststructuralists pause. This despite the fact noted by Charles Sanders Peirce (and 
confirmed in horrific detail a century later by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn [{1973} 2002]) that 
“cruelties always accompany this system, and when it is consistently carried out, they become 
atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man” (Peirce 1877: 1014). For her 
part, Rand delineated the contours of this Stalinist aesthetic philosophy: 
[The author] contributes the most to [the artistic community] but gets nothing except his material 
payment, receiving no intellectual bonus from others to add to the value of his time. [The reader] 
who, left to himself, would [be without art,] contributes nothing … Such is the nature of the 
“competition” between [author and reader]. Such is the pattern of “exploitation” for which you 
have damned [the author]. Such was the service [authors] were glad and willing to give. What did 
[they] ask in return? Nothing but freedom … Such was the price [they] asked, which you chose to 
reject as too high … You decided that you had a right to your [experience] but [they] had no right 
to [their expression] … You did not care to [live] in terms of intelligence – you are now [living] in 
terms of brutality (Rand 1957: 1065). 
72 This reversal is even more explicit in “From Work to Text,” in which Barthes decrees that “no vital ‘respect’ is due 
to the Text: It can be broken” (Barthes 1971: 161). Ironically, in a consideration of theories of textual analysis in 
relation to Freudian psychoanalysis, Weber notes that “to disfigure a text and to commit a murder” are “similar” acts 
(Weber [1987] 2001: 76) insofar as, in Freudian terms, “the difficulty lies not in the execution of the deed but in the 
doing away with the traces” (Freud [1937] 1939: 70). It would appear that Freud’s perspicuous observation did not 
prevent Barthes (any more than it prevented Weber) from going ahead with his attempted murder, perhaps because he 
was confident that he would be able to do away with the traces.  
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As Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics reduces art to a pile of ash and critics to violent, mindless 
savages, there is an obvious question that remains: Is there a moral alternative? Is there a 
conception of art that does not lead to death and destruction? Fortunately, there is. The moral 
alternative to Barthes’ hedonistic aesthetics is a conception of art which is not predicated on 
looting, on demanding and taking the unearned, but on trading. In line with the discussion in the 
Introduction of Rand’s emphasis on trade as “the moral symbol of respect for human beings” (Rand 
1057: 1022), she provides a practical demonstration of art as trade and author and critic as traders 
in the following passage: 
I do not care to be admired causelessly, emotionally, intuitively, instinctively – or blindly. I do not 
care for blindness in any form, I have too much to show – or for deafness, I have too much to say. 
I do not care to be admired by anyone’s heart – only by someone’s head. And when I find a 
customer with that invaluable capacity, then [art] is a mutual trade to mutual profit … [Hence,] the 
payment I demand … [is not merely] your enjoyment … [but, more importantly,] your 
understanding and the fact that your enjoyment was of the same nature as mine, that it came from 
the same source: From your intelligence, from the conscious judgment of a mind able to judge my 
work by the standard of the same values that went to [create] it – I mean, not the fact that you felt, 
but that you felt what I wished you to feel, not the fact that you admire my work, but that you 
admire it for the things I wished to be admired (Rand 1957: 782). 
The problem in “The Death of the Author” is that the ideas of art as trade and author and critic as 
traders are anathema to Barthes. Art, according to Barthes’ moral code, is a matter of conquest, 
and he will be damned if he will allow himself to be conquered by any author. As Rand makes 
clear, though, art and its criticism come from the same source, which is not a source of victory or 
defeat, but rather, “from an inviolate capacity to see through one’s own eyes – which means, the 
capacity to perform a rational identification – which means, the capacity to see, to connect, and to 
make what had not been seen, connected, and made before” (Rand 1957: 783). A truly moral 
criticism does not encourage critics to commit violence against the authors who have demonstrated 
their capacity to see through their own eyes and communicate their philosophies of life in their art; 
rather, a moral criticism encourages the mutuality, the connection, the harmony, the 
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acknowledgment between critic and author whereby a critic is moved to respond to an author 
whose philosophy of life resonates (for better or worse) with his own.73
The critic who “believes in” (i.e. who values) the author is, in Barthes’ estimation, a pathetic fraud; 
yet, the critic he envisions – the pirate who pillages and plunders art indifferent to (or, worse yet, 
gleeful at the prospect of) its destruction – is to be considered a moral ideal? This inversion of 
morality is the logical result of an irrational moral code that values the murder of the author as the 
height of critical nobility, the destruction of art as a demonstration of critical brilliance, and death 
as the standard of life. This inversion of morality is equally the logical proof of Barthes’ guilt, for 
if a moral crime is, as Rand defines it, the attempt to create, through words or actions, an 
impression of the irrational – and thereby shake the concept of rationality in others (Rand 1957: 
488) – then Roland Barthes is a moral criminal whom scholars have been aiding and abetting for 
half a century. 
II 
Jacques Derrida and the Failure to Communicate 
Over the course of a historical survey of philosophy, Rand identifies two figures – the man of faith 
and the man of force – that stand out as “philosophical archetypes, psychological symbols, and 
historical reality”:
As philosophical archetypes, they embody two variants [of mysticism]. As psychological symbols, 
they represent the basic motivation of a great many men who exist in any era, culture, or society. 
As historical reality, they are the actual rulers of most of mankind’s societies, who rise to power 
whenever men abandon reason. The essential characteristics of these two remain the same in all 
ages: Attila, the man who rules by brute force, acts on the range of the moment, is concerned with 
nothing but the physical reality immediately before him, respects nothing but man’s muscles, and 
regards a fist, a club, or a gun as the only answer to any problem – and the Witch Doctor, the man 
who dreads physical reality, dreads the necessity of practical action, and escapes into his emotions, 
73 The variety and validity of such critical responses will be taken up more explicitly in Chapter 2. 
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into visions of some mystic realm where his wishes enjoy a supernatural power unlimited by the 
absolute of nature (Rand 1961a: 10). 
To shift from the writings of Roland Barthes to those of Jacques Derrida is, on Rand’s terms, to 
shift from an Attila to a Witch Doctor, from a thinker who traffics primarily in brute force to a 
thinker who traffics primarily in mystic faith. Of course, faith and force are not mutually exclusive. 
There is an Attila in every Witch Doctor and a Witch Doctor in every Attila. Indeed, Rand points 
out that “both feel secretly inadequate to the task of dealing with existence” and hence “come to 
need each other” (Rand 1961a: 14). Nevertheless, the distinction between an Attila and a Witch 
Doctor is worth preserving, for it speaks to the vicissitudes of philosophical failure beyond sheer 
evil. 
In an insightful consideration of the role of ethics in philosophy, David Kelley stresses that moral 
judgments in philosophy are only valid if they are supported “by observing how a person thinks, 
by attending to his reasoning rather than his conclusions in isolation”:
In judging rationality, we are concerned with the process by which a person arrived at his ideas. 
We cannot observe this process directly; we cannot literally see an act of thought or evasion in 
someone else’s mind. But the process is revealed in numerous ways – by the kinds of connections 
a person makes, by his openness to evidence, by his general demeanor. One may observe how a 
person deals with the objections one raises, how willing he is to examine the issues in depth, to lay 
out his reasons for his position. One may observe whether a person gets angry when his position is 
challenged, or relies on the cruder sorts of fallacies such as ad hominem or appeal to emotion, or 
dodges from one issue to another in response to objections. These are all signs of non-objectivity. 
They tell one that some motive is at work other than a desire to grasp the facts (Kelley [1990] 2000: 
56). 
In line with Rand’s acknowledgment that “truly and deliberately evil men are a very small 
minority” (Rand 1966a: 39), Kelley considers it irresponsible to condemn all who err in philosophy 
as irredeemably evil. Because, as I discussed at length in the Introduction, the activity of thinking 
is volitional rather than automatic and subject to error rather than infallible, “it is perfectly possible 
to commit errors of thinking because one has not fully mastered the relevant skills, or because 
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some complexity in the subject matter makes it difficult to apply the methods properly” (Kelley 
[1990] 2000: 51-52). After all, the philosophical problems with which this thesis is concerned are 
problems that have occupied thinkers for millennia. To assume that they will be easy to solve for 
all-time, or that mistakes made along the way invariably indicate immorality, would be downright 
silly. 
This difference between evil and error is important to stress here because this is precisely the 
difference that I maintain separates Barthes and Derrida. In the previous section, I argued that 
Barthes was a moral criminal. In this section, I will argue that Derrida is a moral coward. Unlike 
Barthes, who was driven by a Nietzschean “will to power,” that which drives Derrida is what 
Cavell calls a fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness, a fantasy “in which I am not merely unknown 
but in which I am powerless to make myself known” (Cavell 1979: 351). It was against
powerlessness that Barthes was fighting in “The Death of the Author,” it was the very idea of being 
powerless that frightened Barthes and fueled his irrational and immoral quest for omnipotence. 
Derrida, by contrast, finds solace in the idea of powerlessness as a (paradoxically powerful) force 
capable of annulling his responsibility and accountability as a human being alive in and to the 
world. Discernible in the fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness is what I discussed in the 
Introduction as the fear that drives skepticism. It is also, as I will endeavor to prove in this section, 
the fear that drives Derrida’s practice of deconstruction. 
The “origin” of deconstruction can be traced back to Derrida’s early engagements with the 
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Indeed, it is not overstating the case to equate the Derridean 
practice of deconstruction with the Husserlian practice of conducting “sense-investigations.” In 
his introduction to his translation of Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida identifies as the 
“main find” of his translation the presence of a “spiraling movement” in Husserlian sense-
investigations which he argues points the way towards the “new form of radicality” he would 
eventually call deconstruction: 
Concerning the intentional history of a particular eidetic science, a sense-investigation of its 
conditions of possibility will reveal to us exemplarily the conditions and sense of the historicity of 
science in general, then of universal historicity … This would demonstrate, if it were still necessary, 
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at what point the juridical order of implications is not so linear and how difficult it is to recognize 
the starting point (Derrida [1962] 1989: 33-34).74
Deconstruction, then, emerges from the fecundity indicated by Husserl of inquiring into the 
“conditions of possibility” for a particular discourse, “continually calling us back to the unnoticed 
presuppositions of ever recurring problems” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 52).75 Added to which, 
deconstruction is more than merely an available option for philosophers; it is, according to Derrida, 
a philosophical necessity insofar as “every critical enterprise” allegedly suffers from a “natural 
naiveté of its language” and thus requires “rigorous philological or ‘etymological’” investigation 
(Derrida [1962] 1989: 69-70).76 In Husserl’s case, his “naiveté” is discernible in his “dogmatic” 
commitment to what Derrida famously termed the metaphysics of presence, a philosophical 
orientation according to which the “privilege” of presence was not only never put into question by 
Husserl (nor by any other like-minded philosophers going all the way back to Aristotle) – “it could 
not have been” (Derrida 1968b: 34, my emphasis).77
74 Husserl himself stated plainly, inviting someone like Derrida to take the baton, that his own sense-investigations 
were not the only paths available to philosophers: “Other paths are possible for sense-investigations with a radical 
aim” (Husserl [1929] 1969: 7).
75 Derrida is again taking the baton from Husserl: “For a rational practice, theory a priori can be only a delimiting 
form; it can only plant fences, the crossing of which indicates absurdity or aberration. What problems arise in this 
connection for self-education and the education of mankind is a separate question; and, by the way, in its universal 
form, it is itself a question to be dealt with by an all-embracing science, which considers all possibilities and truths” 
(Husserl [1929] 1969: 6). 
76 The appearance here of the word “natural” is very strange considering Derrida’s career-long rejection of all such 
notions as the “natural” or the “given.” For example: “To account for a certain stability (by essence always provisional 
and finite) is precisely not to speak of eternity or of absolute solidity; it is to take into account a historicity, a 
nonnaturalness, of ethics, of politics, of institutionality, etc. … I say that there is no stability that is absolute, eternal, 
intangible, natural, etc.” (Derrida 1988: 151, my emphases). According to Derrida’s own claim that “coherence in 
contradiction expresses the force of a desire” (Derrida 1966: 352), this contradiction expresses the force of Derrida’s 
desire for necessary inexpressiveness and constitutive communicative failure (about which I will have more to say in 
what follows). Additionally, while Derrida’s conception of philological/etymological investigation has a distinct 
Wittgensteinian ring to it, deconstruction, rather than a mere species of grammatical investigation, is, if anything, a 
perversion. For corroboration of this claim, see Cavell (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986b, 1989) and Toril Moi (2009). 
77 The “logic” of Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence is most clearly articulated in Of Grammatology 
([1967] 1997), in which Derrida explores the work of Saussure and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in the process asserts 
the (paradoxically foundational) importance of such concepts as the supplement and the trace, and “Ousia and 
Grarnmë: Note on a Note from Being and Time” (1968b), in which Derrida explores the work of Aristotle and Martin 
Heidegger and in the process asserts the (paradoxically foundational) importance of such concepts as absence and 
différance. Its affront to logic, meanwhile, is discernible in Derrida’s reliance (inherited from Heidegger) on a “vulgar 
variant” of concept stealing Rand refers to as the reification of the zero: “Observe the fact that in the writings of every 
school of mysticism and irrationalism, amidst all the ponderously unintelligible verbiage of obfuscations, 
rationalizations, and equivocations (which include protestations of fidelity to reason and claims to some ‘higher’ form 
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Derrida’s entire line of argument here corroborates the presence in deconstruction of a fantasy of 
necessary inexpressiveness. At practically every turn, whether in his rare acts of introspection or 
his more frequent acts of extrospection, Derrida adamantly affirms to his readers (and thereby 
reaffirms to himself) that self-consciousness is an illusion, intentionality belongs only to that which 
is not human, and concepts such as responsibility and culpability are utterly superfluous in the 
realm of human existence. How strange it is, then, for poststructuralists to speak of “the ethics of 
deconstruction” (Critchley [1992] 2014) and proclaim that deconstruction “always has ethical and 
political stakes and consequences” (Bowman 2013: 19). If (a) there is no such thing as self-
consciousness insofar as consciousness is inaccessible to the (non)self that is the human subject, 
and if (b) the consciousness of other human subjects is unknowable insofar as the necessary 
inexpressiveness inherent in language assures either silence or misunderstanding, then how is it 
possible for (a) and (b) to produce a (c) in which ethics is even conceivable? The idea of ethical 
responsibility often affirmed by poststructuralists is valid and noble (and consistent with 
Objectivism), but far from being deconstructionist, does it not fundamentally contradict Derrida’s 
purpose with deconstruction? 
But I am not there yet. Before considering the logical and moral consequences of Derrida’s 
inability to resolve the contradictions at the heart of deconstruction, I want to consider in greater 
detail his critiques of Husserl, and, in particular, his attempts to remove the self from 
consciousness. The ineffectuality of his critiques is attributable to his twin Kantian/Nietzschean 
bias and his consequent inability to apprehend the significance of the primacy of existence in 
Husserlian phenomenology. Interestingly, the axiom “existence exists” and the axiomatic concepts 
of existence, identity, and consciousness anchor phenomenology just as they anchor Objectivism 
(even if not in these precise Objectivist terms). Husserl also devoted a great deal of his energy, just 
as Rand did after him, to epistemological considerations, i.e. to considerations of the means by 
which human beings use their conceptual faculty to bring the objective, external world into the 
of rationality), one finds, sooner or later, a clear, simple, explicit denial of the validity (of the metaphysical or 
ontological status) of axiomatic concepts, most frequently of ‘identity’ … You do not have to guess, infer, or interpret. 
They tell you. But what you do have to know is the full meaning, implications, and consequences of such denials … 
One of the consequences (a vulgar variant of concept stealing, prevalent among avowed mystics and irrationalists) is 
a fallacy I call the reification of the zero. It consists of regarding ‘nothing’ as a thing, as a special, different kind of 
existent. (For example, see Existentialism.) This fallacy breeds such symptoms as the notion that presence and absence, 
or being and non-being, are metaphysical forces of equal power” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 60). 
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realm of the knowable.78 Unfortunately, due to his allegiance to Kant, Derrida invariably occludes 
in his critiques of Husserl the important fact that, for Husserl, both “inner” existence and “outer” 
existence are “immediately present” in consciousness (Derrida [1967] 1973: 43).79 As Vivian 
Sobchak affirms, according to Husserl, “the condition of being conscious of the world is being a 
consciousness in it” (Sobchak 1992: 59).80 Husserl, for his part, formulated his sense of the 
primacy of existence as follows: 
When, through memories, starting from a perception, I am led back into my own past, this past is 
precisely my own, the past of this same subject who is present and living. And the past environing 
world [Umgebungswelt] which is now remembered belongs to the same world as the world in which 
I now live … To introduce the matter of intersubjectivity, what we have said also holds true if 
another person tells me about his past experiences, communicates his memories … The 
remembered environing world of the other, about which he tells us, may certainly be another world 
than that in which we find ourselves at present, and likewise the environing world which I myself 
remember may be another world; I can have changed my place of residence, have come to another 
country, with other men and other customs, etc., or this same geographical neighborhood with its 
inhabitants may have so changed in the course of a human life that it has simply become another; 
78 In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida incoherently refers to Husserlian epistemology as a 
“secondary grounding” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 54). I say “incoherently refers” because grounding is epistemologically 
irreducible. Grounding is an action performed in and by a human consciousness in response to the objective, external 
world. Derrida seems to think that the (allegedly illusory notion of an) objective, external world is itself some sort of 
mystical “grounding” rather than the ground on which a human being grounds himself. 
79 Recall the penultimate sentence in Speech and Phenomena: “Contrary to what phenomenology – which is always 
phenomenology of perception – has tried to make us believe, contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into 
believing, the thing itself always escapes” (Derrida [1967] 1973: 104). The only actual attention Derrida gives to the 
significance in Husserl’s work of the primacy of existence comes in the form of two footnotes in his introduction to 
“The Origin of Geometry” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 83-85) wherein he casually dismisses (from a conspicuously Kantian 
position) the primacy of existence as an allegedly untenable reduction of the ontologically constitutive “relativity” 
promulgated by his nonsensical metaphysics of différance (Derrida [1962] 1989: 84; see also Derrida 1968a).  
80 Allan Casebier adds that “it is characteristic of the Husserlian system that consciousness is always consciousness of
something” (Casebier 1991: 15). Compare this to the Objectivist position discussed in the Introduction according to 
which “you can become aware of the fact that you are conscious” only “after you have become conscious of
something,” that only after this point of cultivation can a person then “identify the fact that it is some function in [his 
or her] mind that is performing this process of awareness” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 246). For Derrida, on the contrary, 
the very idea of an ontological “ground” – let alone an intelligible ontological ground accessible to consciousness – is 
anathema to his Kantian sensibility. He thus rejects the Husserlian notion of “original self-evidence” (Husserl [1939] 
1970: 365) and, indeed, rejects axiomatic concepts tout court. As he puts it in his introduction to “The Origin of 
Geometry”: “Axiomatics in general (from which alone every ideal of exhaustive and exact deductivity can take its 
sense, from which alone every problem of decidability can then spring) already supposes” a “primordial evidence, a 
radical ground which is already past” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 55).
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but, despite all this, all these different remembered environing worlds are pieces of one and the 
same objective world. This world is, in the most comprehensive sense, as the life-world for a human 
community capable of mutual understanding, our Earth (Husserl [1948] 1973: 162-163). 
Objectivity is clearly an important concept for Husserl. As Derrida puts it in his introduction to 
“The Origin of Geometry,” Husserl “repeatedly and obstinately” returns to the question of 
objectivity (Derrida [1962] 1989: 63). Despite his ability to register the importance of objectivity 
in Husserlian phenomenology, Derrida’s reliance on the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy leads to a 
grotesque distortion of the concept. In one of his earliest engagements with Husserlian 
phenomenology, Derrida characterizes the phenomenologist in search of objectivity as “the ‘true 
positivist’ who returns to the things themselves and who is self-effacing before the originality and 
primordiality of meanings” (Derrida 1959: 194). The point to be made in response to this 
nonsensical characterization is that the notion of effacing oneself is phenomenologically 
unthinkable inasmuch as it contradicts, in favor of the mystical “logic” that underpins intrinsicism, 
what Husserl calls the “necessary regress to the ego” in all sense-investigations (Husserl [1931] 
1960: 6). 
Now, to be fair to Derrida, his ill-advised recourse to the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy may have 
seemed the only option available to him given Husserl’s own occasional confusion as to the means 
by which objectivity is epistemologically assured. For example, in his Formal and Transcendental 
Logic, Husserl asserts the following pertaining to his method of sense-investigation:  
We must place ourselves above this whole life and all this cultural tradition and, by radical sense-
investigations, seek for ourselves singly and in common the ultimate possibilities and necessities 
on the basis of which we can take our position toward actualities in judging, valuing, and acting. 
True, in that manner we gain nothing but universalities for which we can give an ultimate 
accounting … whereas life, after all, consists in decisions of the “moment,” which never has time 
to establish anything with scientific rationality (Husserl [1929] 1969: 5-6). 
Even though Husserl was inspired in his phenomenological enterprise by Descartes and meant to 
proceed in his efforts along Cartesian lines, in this passage he could not be further from 
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Descartes.81 Husserl is here attempting to reify the familiar split between “theoretical” knowledge 
and “practical” knowledge. For Husserl, theoretical knowledge is rational, measured, and 
objective; it yields “universalities.” Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is…what? Irrational? 
Unmeasured? Subjective? Husserl’s incoherence in speaking of “decisions of the ‘moment’” as 
somehow unreachable by rationality – thereby implying that rationality and practicality are 
mutually exclusive – is a holdover not from Cartesianism but, on Rand’s account, from Platonism:
[Platonists] profess a devotion to some sort of “pure knowledge” – the purity consisting of their 
claim that such knowledge has no practical purpose … [and they] reserve their logic for inanimate 
matter [since they] believe that the subject of dealing with men requires and deserves no rationality 
… [But,] since there is no such thing as “non-practical knowledge” or any sort of “disinterested” 
action, since they scorn the use of their science for the purpose and profit of life, they deliver their 
science to the service of death (Rand 1957: 1066).82
Considering, moreover, Husserl’s confusion vis-à-vis the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy, Derrida 
was absolutely right to apply pressure to the contradictions that undermine Husserlian objectivity. 
Derrida formulates Husserl’s quest for objectivity as the attempt to “give rise” to an object that 
81 Husserl framed his ostensibly Cartesian project in the following manner: “In recent times, the longing for a fully 
alive philosophy has led to many a renaissance. Must not the only fruitful renaissance be the one that reawakens the 
impulse of the Cartesian Meditations … to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit, the radicalness 
of self-responsibility … Must not the demand for a philosophy aiming at the ultimate conceivable freedom from 
prejudice, shaping itself with actual autonomy according to ultimate evidences it has itself produced, and therefore 
absolutely self-responsible – must not this demand, instead of being excessive, be part of the fundamental sense of 
genuine philosophy?” (Husserl [1931] 1960: 6).
82 In Husserl’s defense, he was likely inspired to this ill-advised split by comments made by Descartes to the effect 
that “the pressure of things to be done does not always allow us to stop and make such a meticulous check” (Descartes 
1641a: 62) – this despite the fact that such meticulous checking is, according to Descartes himself, the only way to 
“unquestionably reach the truth” (Descartes 1641a: 43). This apparent aporia was noted upon the initial publication 
of the Meditations by Marin Mersenne (Mersenne 1641: 90-91). In response, Descartes not only pragmatically 
acknowledged that “from time to time we will have to choose one of many alternatives about which we have no 
knowledge, [and that], once we have made our choice, so long as no reasons against it can be produced, we must stick 
to it as firmly as if it had been chosen for transparently clear reasons” (Descartes 1641b: 106), he also referred his 
readers to his earlier Discourse on Method, in which is epitomized that “self-responsibility” for which Husserl so 
respected Descartes (and of which Derrida was so frightened): “Since often enough in the actions of life no delay is 
permissible, it is very certain that, when it is beyond our power to discern the opinions which carry [the] most truth 
… we at least should make up our minds to follow a particular one and afterwards consider it as no longer doubtful in 
its relationship to practice but as very true and very certain inasmuch as the reason which caused us to determine upon 
it is known to be so. And henceforward this principle [should be] sufficient to deliver [philosophers] from all the 
penitence and remorse which usually affect the mind and agitate the conscience of those weak and vacillating creatures 
who allow themselves to keep changing their procedure” (Descartes [1637] 2003: 18). 
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satisfies the criteria of “omnitemporal validity, universal normativity, intelligibility for ‘everyone,’
uprootedness out of all ‘here and now’ factuality, and so forth,” and this quest, as Derrida 
understands it, hinges on the answer provided to the question of how consciousness can “go out of 
itself in order to encounter or constitute the object” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 63). While Derrida is 
right to maintain Husserl’s confusion vis-à-vis consciousness going “out of itself,” he inadvertently 
introduces even more confusion with two additional philosophical errors. The first error is Kantian 
in nature and is discernible in his equivocation between encountering an object and constituting 
an object, the two of which indicate precisely the difference between objectivity and subjectivity. 
The second error, meanwhile, is Cartesian in nature, and it is discernible in the following crucial 
part of Derrida’s critique:
No doubt geometrical truth is beyond every particular and factual linguistic hold as such, one for 
which every subject speaking a determined language and belonging to a determined cultural 
community is in fact responsible. But the objectivity of this truth could not be constituted without 
the pure possibility of an inquiry into a pure language in general. Without this pure and essential 
possibility, the geometrical formation would remain ineffable and solitary. Then it would be 
absolutely bound to the psychological life of a factual individual, to that of a factual community, 
indeed to a particular moment of that life. It would become neither omnitemporal nor intelligible 
for all. It would not be what it is. Whether geometry can be spoken about is not, then, the extrinsic 
and accidental possibility of a fall into the body of speech or of a slip into a historical movement. 
Speech is no longer simply the expression of what, without it, would already be an object: Caught 
again in its primordial purity, speech constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of 
truth. The paradox is that, without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history, a 
fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense, sense would remain an empirical formation 
imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity – in the inventor’s head (Derrida [1962] 1989: 
76-77). 
Beyond his Kantian confusion and the persistence of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy, evident 
in this passage is an additional Cartesian confusion vis-à-vis Derrida’s bizarre conception of 
language as an all-powerful causal agent that makes meaning and “always-already” thwarts human 
autonomy after the fashion of Descartes’ evil demon. There is the presumption in Derrida’s 
conception of language that, as Carroll puts it, if human thought and action have “structural 
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conditions,” then these conditions are constraints, they are inimical to human autonomy. But 
Carroll observes how strange it is to think of these conditions of possibility as conditions of 
impossibility, for without these conditions, “nothing could be said, which would in fact be a real 
blow to the possibility of human autonomy” (Carroll 1988b: 78-79). More radical than Barthes’ 
conception of the “pure” functionality of language, the conception that Derrida seems to hold is 
not just of language as autonomous and omnipotent but malevolent to boot. The problem, then, is 
Derrida’s conception of freedom, which, as Carroll argues, is “too extravagant”:
This argument seems to presuppose that no speaking subject is free unless it creates the language 
it speaks. But this is absurd. If I have a hammer and I can use it to build a house, or a hobby horse, 
or simply use it to pound the ground, then it seems to me that I am free in what I hammer. And if I 
hammered someone who annoyed me – while certifiably sane – I would be responsible for my act 
since it was free. But [Derrida’s] argument, by logical analogy, would have it that I am not free 
because I did not invent hammers. This idea of freedom, however, is unacceptably exorbitant, and 
any argument that uses it as a standard of what freedom is is unsound (Carroll 1988b: 78). 
If Derrida simply held the mistaken belief that language is not a “tool” that we “use” to 
“communicate” but an all-powerful force that uses us, then dissolving such a silly philosophical 
worry would be simple enough. The difficulty in dissolving Derrida’s philosophical worry is due 
to his motivation in clinging to such a silly belief – which, as I mentioned at the start of this section, 
is his fear of the responsibility and accountability that comes with being human.83 Responsibility, 
83 Interestingly, for as much as Derrida was influenced by Nietzsche’s critique of the self, his nihilistic tendencies are 
fundamentally opposed to Nietzsche’s hedonism and place him closer to the nihilistic philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. The relationship between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is complex to say the least (for useful overviews 
of the complexities of their relationship, see, among many others, Grace Neal Dolson [1901] and Steven Bond [2006]). 
Initially devoted to Schopenhauer’s teachings (Nietzsche [1874] 1997: 125-194), Nietzsche ultimately repudiated 
Schopenhauer for his inability to conquer nihilism (Nietzsche [1883-1888] 1968: 7-82). Even though, as I discussed 
in the Introduction, Nietzsche’s solution to nihilism in the form of hedonism is merely the other side of the same 
problematic coin, his critique of nihilism is a well-intentioned plea to embrace not just a will to power but a will to 
life. For Schopenhauer, meanwhile, consider as exemplary of his nihilism the following sentiments as expressed in 
The World as Will and Representation: “Whatever one may say, the happiest moment of the happy man is the moment 
of his falling asleep, and the unhappiest moment of the unhappy that of his awaking … [Consciousness] would rather 
have soon made the calculation that the business did not cover the cost, for such a mighty effort and struggle with the 
straining of all the powers, under constant care, anxiety, and want, and with the inevitable destruction of every 
individual life, finds no compensation in the ephemeral existence itself, which is so obtained, and which passes into 
nothing in our hands … Accordingly, existence is certainly to be regarded as an error or mistake, to return from which 
is salvation” (Schopenhauer [1819] 1966: 578-579, 605). While I believe that this connection between Derrida and 
Schopenhauer is valid and salient, it is to Derrida’s credit that, for all of his nihilistic tendencies, he never truly 
acquiesced to nihilism and instead retained throughout his career a certain Nietzschean will to life. 
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to Derrida, means “shouldering a word one hears spoken, as well as taking on oneself the transfer 
of sense, in order to look after its advance” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 143). This responsibility is what 
Derrida has in mind when he confesses that “speaking frightens me” (Derrida 1963: 9); it is what 
motivates him to mobilize a nonsensical conception of language that, in his fantasy, “restricts 
meaning – and our responsibility for it” (Derrida 1963: 9, my emphasis). And Derrida’s “solution,” 
in the form of his quasi-Cartesian conception of language, is meant to ensure that “no intention 
can ever be fully conscious, or actually present to itself” (Derrida 1977: 73), which would mean, 
fulfilling Derrida’s fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness, that language “leaves us no choice but 
to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say 
something other than what we say and would have wanted to say” (Derrida 1977: 62).84
This fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness would, I admit, be a neat solution to the problems of 
consciousness and the issue of responsibility, and for many scholars who have followed in 
Derrida’s wake, it has proven to be a satisfactory solution. Paul de Man, for instance, rejects on 
Derridean grounds the postulation of a “happy relationship” between consciousness and the 
external world since “the very fact that the relationship has to be established within the medium of 
language indicates that it does not exist in actuality” (de Man [1970] 1984: 8). John Mowitt, 
meanwhile, rejects in the realm of art the concept of value since it presupposes not only that there 
are objective attributes identifiable in artworks, but, even more affrontingly, that artworks have, 
“presumably by virtue of their ‘natures,’ clear and distinct insides” immune to the “tenacious 
heterogeneity” of textual discursivity (Mowitt 1992: 215). And Paul Bowman rejects the concept 
of objective meaning since the invocation of objectivity “is enabled by something like a second 
‘structure,’ one that is never fully knowable” (Bowman 2007: 64). Yet, despite the neatness of this 
solution, it is ultimately untenable. To prove this, it will be instructive to consider in detail the 
ubiquitous contradictions that prevent Derrida from ever actually indulging in his fantasy of 
necessary inexpressiveness. And, intriguingly enough, these contradictions are the clearest and 
84 Jordan Peterson has gone so far as to posit as the “cardinal issue” regarding people’s motivation in clinging to such 
self-destructive ideas – ideas which he convincingly argues appeal “to the most hypocritical, deceitful, and 
responsibility-shedding element[s]” of human nature (Peterson in Rubin and Peterson 2016) – the “avoidance of 
responsibility” (Peterson 2017i; see also Peterson and Anderson 2018). As framed by Peterson, the tragedy of human 
being is not, contra Schopenhauer, existence itself; rather, it is that “we have been granted the capacity to voluntarily 
bear” the “terrible weight” of existence, and yet, “because we are afraid of responsibility … we turn from that capacity 
and degrade ourselves” (Peterson 1999: 466-467).  
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most persistent in Derrida’s attempts to move from his general philosophy of deconstruction to a 
deconstructive aesthetics.  
After completing a dissertation on Husserlian phenomenology in 1954, Derrida set out, in 1957, 
to write a thesis on “the ideality of the literary object.”85 That thesis was never written, but, as J. 
Hillis Miller convincingly argues, the ideas that motivated Derrida in his consideration of such a 
project underwrite his deconstructive aesthetics; they are everywhere, “from one end to the other 
of his work” (Miller 2001: 58). One of the earliest places where they emerge is in his 1963 essay 
“Force and Signification.” In this essay, Derrida explores such issues in the philosophy of art as 
artistic inspiration and creation, the ontology of literature, the vicissitudes of interpretation, and 
problems of evaluation, and he does so on the basis, primarily, of a critique of the literary criticism 
of Jean Rousset. According to Derrida, Rousset exemplifies in the philosophy of art the tendency 
to uncritically and dogmatically adhere to the metaphysics of presence and idealize the artistic 
object. Indicating the centrality of his critiques of Husserl to his deconstructive aesthetics, Derrida 
has in mind when speaking of the idealization of the artistic object the Husserlian idealization of 
mathematics. In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida identifies “the 
mathematical object” as “the privileged example and most permanent thread guiding Husserl’s 
reflection.” The privilege and permanence of the mathematical object in Husserlian 
phenomenology is, according to Derrida, attributable to its ideality, to its being “thoroughly 
transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality”; as an “absolutely objective” object, it is, at its 
most ideal, “totally rid of empirical subjectivity” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 27). 
It is this form of Husserlian ideality that Derrida detects in Rousset’s “ultrastructuralism,” which 
he argues has the dangerous effect of cutting off from criticism the necessary “attentiveness to the 
internal historicity of the work itself,” including its relationship to a “subjective origin” (Derrida 
1963: 15). By deploying the concept of “origin,” Derrida appears to be contradicting his stated aim 
in his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry” to dispense with what he refers to as the 
“mythology of the absolute beginning” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 69). To avoid erroneous claims of 
contradiction, it must be clarified that Derrida is here invoking a modified conception of “origin” 
85 For background on and analysis of this early point in Derrida’s career, see Derrida ([1980] 1983) and Miller (2001). 
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based on the following explanation provided by Husserl as to the trajectory of his sense-
investigation into the origins of geometry: 
The question of the origin of geometry (under which title here, for the sake of brevity, we include 
all disciplines that deal with shapes existing mathematically in pure space-time) shall not be 
considered here as the philological-historical question, i.e. as the search for the first geometers who 
actually uttered pure geometrical propositions, proofs, theories, or for the particular propositions 
they discovered, or the like. Rather than this, our interest shall be the inquiry back into the most 
original sense in which geometry once arose, was present as the tradition of millennia, is still 
present for us, and is still being worked on in a lively forward development; we inquire into that 
sense in which it appeared in history for the first time – in which it had to appear, even though we 
know nothing of the first creators and are not even asking after them (Husserl [1939] 1970: 354, 
my emphasis). 
Following Husserl, Derrida further clarifies his conception of “origin” in the following manner: 
It is not at all a question of determining what in fact were the first acts, the first experiences, the 
first geometers who were in fact responsible for the advent of geometry. Such a determination, even 
if possible, would flatter our historical curiosity … [and] a certain ‘romanticism’ … but even if, at 
its limit, this determination would embrace all the historical facts that have constituted the empirical 
milieu for truth’s founding, it would still leave us blind about the very sense of such a founding, a 
sense that is necessary and compared to which these facts have at best only an exemplary 
signification (Derrida [1962] 1989: 37-38). 
If this explains what Derrida means by “origin,” it remains to be explained what he means by 
subjective origin. If the “subjective origin” of geometry is not traceable to the “primally instituting 
geometer” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 100), then the “subjective origin” of an artwork should not be 
traceable to its “author.”86 Indeed, according to the terms of Derrida’s critique of Rousset’s 
86 The following is arguably Derrida’s most explicit rehearsal of the “question” of the author conceived of as the 
“origin” of meaning: “The play [of the chain of signification] seems systematic. But the system here is not, simply, 
that of the intentions of an author ... the system is not primarily that of what someone meant-to-say ... These 
communications or corridors of meaning can sometimes be declared or clarified [by the author] ... Then again, in other 
cases, [the author] can not see the links, can leave them in the shadow or break them up. And yet these links go on 
working of themselves. In spite of him? Thanks to him? In his text? Outside his text? But then where? Between his 
text and the language? For what reader? At what moment? To answer such questions in principle and in general will 
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“ultrastructuralism,” the very notion of a “center” or “ground” for the meaning of an artwork is 
anathema to his deconstructive aesthetics. This may be corroborated by considering Derrida’s 
critique of Rousset in light of his subsequent critique of the structural anthropology of Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, in which Derrida focuses on the problematic concept of the “center” that is 
presupposed in the concept of structure:  
The function of [the] center [is] not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure – one cannot 
in fact conceive of an unorganized structure – but above all to make sure that the organizing 
principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure … The concept 
of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play 
constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is 
beyond the reach of play. And, on the basis of this certitude, anxiety can be mastered (Derrida 
1966: 352).87
Against the (metaphysical) concept of “structure” and its presupposition of a (Lévi-Straussian) 
“center” or (Husserlian) “ground,” the result of which is, in the “geometrism” of Rousset’s
criticism, an “ideal” artistic object, Derrida argues for unstructured, ungrounded, decentered 
“play.” Yet, at the beginning of his critique of Rousset, Derrida acknowledges that meaning in art 
“is the author’s responsibility before being the critic’s” (Derrida 1963: 4). This ambivalence 
regarding the artwork – on the one hand, understood as possessing an “internal historicity” and a 
“subjective origin,” and, on the other hand, understood as “a world of signs without fault, without 
truth, and without origin” (Derrida 1966: 369) – highlights the fundamental contradiction of 
Derrida’s deconstructive aesthetics, one that he never successfully resolves. 
In “Force and Signification,” Derrida acknowledges the logical priority of authorship in criticism. 
However, in a reading of Franz Kafka’s The Trial (1925), he contradicts this sensible position and 
seem impossible; and that will give us the suspicion that there is some malformation in the question itself” (Derrida 
[1972] 1981: 95-96).  
87 The fact that the antipathy to the concept of structure exemplified by Derrida’s critique of Lévi-Strauss has structured 
poststructuralism ever since is one of the many instances where such anti-foundationalist thinking proves self-
defeating. As Wittgenstein averred: “The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 
18e) inasmuch as “the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt 
from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 44e). For a more elaborate 
consideration of this paradox in relation to poststructuralism in particular, see Britton (1988). 
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derides the “law” of authorship and the equally silly belief in objective, discoverable meaning.88
Reversing course again, in his critique of Lacan’s reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined 
Letter” (1844), Derrida takes Lacan to task for failing to consider Poe’s authorship over the course 
of his analysis and, for his part, engages in detailed, author-based criticism.89 Finally, within the 
space of a single interview, Derrida discusses the authorship of James Joyce as an “absolutely 
singular event,” an absolutely singular “autobiographical inscription” in which “historical, 
theoretical, linguistic, [and] philosophical culture” are condensed (Derrida 1989: 43), yet at the 
same time maintains that there is an irreducible “literary intentionality” that “suspend[s] ‘thetic’
and naive belief in meaning” (Derrida 1989: 45).
Throughout his entire career, Derrida remained tragically torn between two warring conceptions 
of life and art, one according to which “the category of intention will not disappear” (Derrida 
1972b: 18) and another according to which intention will disappear in the act of “Logos retaking 
possession of itself” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 146). The significance of the concept of intention (and 
the concept of meaning necessarily implied) is made explicit in Derrida’s defense, in response to 
the criticisms of John Searle, of his concept of “iterability”90: 
88 Derrida’s derision takes the form of a parody of the Declaration of Independence: “We presuppose [The Trial], 
which we hold to be unique and self-identical, to exist as an original version … [which] constitutes the ultimate 
reference for what might be called the legal personality of the text, its identity, its unicity, its rights, and so on” (Derrida 
1982: 185). 
89 Derrida’s lengthy engagement with Lacan can essentially be split into two halves. In the first half, Derrida seeks to 
bring to light Lacan’s analytical blindspot. According to Derrida, this blindspot was inherited from Freud and the 
dubious practice of “applied psychoanalysis” whereby art “is brought into an illustrative position, ‘to illustrate’ here 
meaning to read the general law in the example, to make clear the meaning of a law or of a truth” (Derrida 1972a: 
425-426), which, Derrida charges, merely results in the critic-as-analyst “anticipating the truth of the text” and thereby 
denuding the artwork of its original “semantic material” (Derrida 1972a: 415). In the second half, having demonstrated 
how and where Lacan’s analysis was lacking, Derrida sets out to demonstrate and analyze “the recurrence of certain 
motifs” (such as “the letter hanging under the mantel of the fireplace,” which Derrida indicates “has its equivalent in 
‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ [1841]”) in order to better understand “The Purloined Letter” both as a unique 
artwork unto itself, with its own structuring principles, and as part of a “textual network” within Poe’s oeuvre (Derrida 
1972a: 458). 
90 The infamous clash between Derrida and Searle originated with Searle’s response (Searle 1977) to Derrida’s critique 
of Austin (Derrida 1972b), which in turn elicited a borderline hysterical response from Derrida (Derrida 1977). 
Subsequent to this initial battle, they each continued to occasionally and obliquely critique the other (Searle 1983, 
2000; Derrida 1988). In what follows, I will limit my focus to the ramifications of Derrida’s incoherence regarding 
the concept of intention. For more comprehensive contextualization/analysis of this clash, both in relation to Derrida 
and Searle in particular and to deconstruction and ordinary language philosophy more broadly, see, among the many 
commentaries, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1980), Jonathan Culler (1982), Christopher Norris (1990), Cavell (1994), 
Gordon C.F. Bearn (1995, 1998), Stephen Mulhall (2001), Leslie Hill (2007), Moi (2009), Raoul Moati ([2009] 2014), 
and Judith Wolfe (2013). 
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If the law of iterability, with all its associated laws, exceeds the intentional structure that it renders 
possible and whose teleo-archaeology it limits … then the question of the specificity of 
intentionality in this field without limit remains open. What is intentionality? What does “intention” 
properly mean as the particular or original work (mise en oeuvre) of iterability? I admit that this 
enigma grows increasingly obscure for me. It communicates with the greatest questions of being, 
of meaning and of the phenomenon, of consciousness, of the relation to the object in general, of 
transcendence and of appearing as such, etc. … [which] only cause[s] my uncertainty to increase, 
as well as my distrust of this word or of this figure, I hardly dare to say “concept” (Derrida 1988: 
130). 
This passage indicates the logical and moral consequences, in life and art, of the confusions and 
contradictions regarding objectivity, consciousness, and intention that I have been discussing in 
Derrida’s philosophical practice. The notion that iterability “renders possible” and “limits” the 
concept of intention follows from Derrida’s quasi-Cartesian conception of language as the 
condition of possibility and impossibility of human autonomy. Furthermore, Derrida’s “glass half 
empty” approach to iterability as the condition of impossibility of human autonomy confirms for 
Derrida that intention can never be “fully conscious” or “actually present to itself.” The fact that 
Derrida was never able to actually indulge in this fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness is due to 
his recognition (acknowledged in moments of courage, denied in moments of fear) of the following 
unfortunate consequences:  
1) If intention can never be “fully conscious,” then ethics, responsibility, authorship – in short, all 
concepts that are predicated on human beings as conscious, volitional entities – are null and void.91
91 Derrida’s conception of “fully conscious” intention begs a number of questions. For example: “Fully” conscious as 
opposed to what? What is the concept of consciousness with which Derrida is working that it makes sensible the 
postulation of states such as “fully” conscious, “primarily” conscious, “slightly” conscious, etc.? What are Derrida’s 
criteria for determining a given state of consciousness? How often does consciousness “shift” states? How does 
Derrida explain such shifts? Perhaps as a preemptive measure against such questioning, Derrida introduces, over the 
course of his dealings with Austin and the concepts of intention and meaning presupposed by ordinary language 
philosophy, the “supplement” of a “structural unconscious,” which he describes as “alien” to and “incompatible with” 
conscious intention (Derrida 1977: 73). Even if, for the sake of argument, the existence of a structural unconscious is 
conceded, does not the existence of an “alien” entity pulling the strings of consciousness preclude such ethical 
haranguing as that to which Derrida subjects Searle? 
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2) If ethics and responsibility are not valid concepts, then deconstruction loses its sense and 
purpose.92
3) If authorship is not a valid concept, then the concept of meaning in art loses its sense and 
purpose.93
Even though Derrida was never able to successfully resolve these contradictions, he did 
acknowledge near the end of his life, with disarming sincerity, the problematic ubiquity in his work 
of contradictions. In his last interview, conducted mere weeks before his death, Derrida stated the 
following: 
It is true, I am at war with myself, and you have no idea to what extent, more than you can guess, 
and I say things that contradict each other, that are, let’s say, in real tension with each other, that 
compose me, that make me live, and that will make me die. This war, I see it sometimes as a 
terrifying and painful war, but at the same time I know that it is life … [Deconstruction thus] 
proceeds with me from an unconditional affirmation of life … [it] is not death-oriented, just the 
opposite, it is the affirmation of someone living who prefers living, and therefore survival, to death 
(Derrida 2004: 15).94
92 In his introduction to “The Origin of Geometry,” Derrida describes his fledgling philosophical method of 
deconstruction as the means by which to avoid in philosophical practice “aberration, forgetfulness, and 
irresponsibility” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 52). However, in light of his fantasy of necessary inexpressiveness (and once 
again highlighting the relevance of Derrida’s own point about the implications of “coherence in contradiction” to the 
practice of deconstruction itself), is Derrida’s pathological fear throughout his career of “aberration, forgetfulness, 
and irresponsibility” not already a rejection of the claim that we are fated “to mean (to say) something that is (already, 
always, also) other than what we mean (to say)”?
93 In “Force and Signification,” Derrida asks if it is possible for meaning to “come forth” if not “animated” by an 
intentionality, or animated by an intentionality which “does not necessarily and primarily belong to a consciousness” 
(Derrida 1963: 31). If one were to assess deconstruction as if Derrida believed it was possible – as supported, for 
example, by his critique of Lévi-Strauss – then Derrida’s critique of Rousset and his rejection of the idealization of 
the artistic object denuded of its “internal historicity” and “subjective origin” contradicts the terms of his own fantasy; 
if, however, one were to assess deconstruction as if Derrida believed it was not possible – as supported, for example, 
by his critique of Lacan – then Derrida’s reading of The Trial contradicts the terms of his own methodology. 
94 Reflected in this confession is the truth contained in the Jungian sentiment that “any internal state of contradiction, 
unrecognized, will be played out in the world as fate”; as Peterson elaborates, “if we are suffering from moral 
uncertainty at the philosophical level and cannot settle the internal war, then our behavior reflects our inner disquiet 
and we act out our contradictions in behavior, much to our general discredit” (Peterson 1999: 347).
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In light of this admirably honest and heartfelt confession from Derrida, which depicts nothing if 
not a man tortured by his own fears and inadequacies yet unwilling to acquiesce to nihilism, is 
Jonathan Culler’s characterization of deconstruction not profoundly – even shockingly – insulting? 
[Deconstruction] cannot be brought together in a coherent synthesis. For this reason, it may not 
seem [valid] to many, who would argue that logic forbids [contradiction] ... The objection to this 
double procedure [invokes] ... physical and empirical inappropriateness. Deconstruction’s 
procedure is called “sawing off the branch on which one is sitting.” This may be, in fact, an apt 
description of the activity, for though it is unusual and somewhat risky, it is manifestly something 
one can attempt. One can and may continue to sit on a branch while sawing it ... The question then 
becomes whether one will succeed in sawing it clear through, and where and how one might land 
... If “sawing off the branch on which one is sitting” seems foolhardy to men of common sense, it 
is not so for Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida, for they suspect that if they fall there is no 
“ground” to hit (Culler 1982: 149).95
If, as attested to by Wittgenstein, philosophical errors “can be fitted into what [one] knows aright” 
(Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 11e), then the possibility of a redemptive critique of Derrida and 
deconstruction gains considerable purchase. It is a testament to the degeneracy of 
poststructuralism, however, that the first step in such a rescue effort would have to be to rescue 
Derrida and deconstruction from poststructuralism. After all, given Derrida’s own disposition, any 
poststructuralist with even a passing familiarity with Derrida and his work should find horrifying 
the magnitude of abasement in Culler’s repulsive caricature of deconstruction. First of all, the fact 
that Derrida was unable to bring deconstruction into a “coherent synthesis” and was unable to 
resolve its fundamental contradictions is not, as Culler would have it, an indication of its success. 
This backwards “logic” might fly in reference to Barthes and his desire to “discard” the “old 
95 It was in an effort to avoid precisely this type of skeptical nonsense that Descartes implored philosophers to 
distinguish between “the conduct of life and the contemplation of the truth” (Descartes 1641b: 106), or, as he rendered 
it elsewhere, “the actions of life and the investigation of the truth” (Descartes 1641d: 243). As he put it: “When I said 
[in the Meditations] that the entire testimony of the senses should be regarded as uncertain and even as false, I was 
quite serious ... When it is a question of organizing our life, [however], it would, of course, be foolish not to trust the 
senses, and the skeptics who neglected human affairs to the point where friends had to stop them falling off precipices 
deserved to be laughed at” (Descartes 1641d: 243). The rise of poststructuralism to philosophical prominence 
represents perhaps the most tragic kind of validation of the fear expressed by Antoine Arnauld, who worried of the 
harm those “of only moderate intelligence” could do to themselves and others if they tried to adopt Descartes’ “free 
style of philosophizing which calls everything into doubt” (Arnauld 1641: 151; cf. Descartes 1641a: 15).  
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specter” of “logical contradiction” in pursuit of the primordial jouissance of the infinitely 
polysemous text, but it is anathema to Derrida’s lifelong commitment to logic and morality.96
Added to which, the characterization of Derrida as gleefully sawing off the branch on which he 
was sitting in a spirit of philosophical anarchy reduces the pathos of his sincere quest for 
knowledge of the world and his place in it to something out of Looney Tunes.97
The fact that, far from precipitating a swarm of scholars rushing to his defense, Culler’s explication 
of deconstruction was accepted by poststructuralists as the authoritative account of Derrida and 
his philosophical practice indicates the staggering amount of work facing anyone who wishes to 
undertake a redemptive critique of deconstruction. First and foremost, it will be necessary to 
dissolve the philosophical worries that led Derrida into philosophical error and that are responsible 
for the contradictions at the heart of deconstruction. To his credit, the path for dissolving these 
philosophical worries, although never followed, was charted by Derrida himself in his moments 
of courage. As he once acknowledged, in a decidedly Objectivist spirit, it is essential that one lives 
according to a logic of “all or nothing”:
Every concept that lays claim to any rigor whatsoever implies the alternative of “all or nothing” … 
Even the concept of [for example] relativity is, qua concept, determined according to the logic of 
all or nothing, of yes or no … It is impossible or illegitimate to form a philosophical concept outside 
this logic … [and] whenever one feels obliged to stop doing this (as happens to me when I speak 
of différance, of mark, of supplement, of iterability, and of all they entail), it is better to make 
explicit in the most conceptual, rigorous, formalizing, and pedagogical manner possible the reasons 
one has for doing so (Derrida 1988: 116-117). 
96 The troubling fact that Culler frames his landmark text on deconstruction according to the terms of Barthes’ 
hedonistic aesthetics clearly indicates that Culler was reading Derrida on Barthesian terms rather than on Derrida’s 
own terms and thus explains, in part, his distortion of deconstruction (Culler 1982: 31). Derrida himself claimed an 
undying “love for philosophy” (Derrida 1988: 122) and insisted on an “ethics of discussion” committed to the canons 
of logic, to “proof, discussion, and exchange” (Derrida 1988: 157) in the quest for “truth” – concepts which Derrida 
states unequivocally he never sought to “put into question” in the sense of contesting their objective existence in the 
world or their importance to human existence (Derrida 1988: 150). 
97 Additionally, the anarchic implication of Culler’s cartoonish characterization of deconstruction is that, in defiance 
of logic and reality, one can say and do whatever one wishes. Derrida, however, stressed that, even if this is his legacy, 
it was not his intention: “I have never accepted saying, or encouraging others to say, just anything at all, nor have I 
argued for indeterminacy as such … What has always interested me the most, what has always seemed to me the most 
rigorous … is not indeterminacy in itself, but the strictest possible determination[s]” (Derrida 1988: 144-145). 
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Strangely enough, the logic of all or nothing to which Derrida aspired with deconstruction is 
precisely the logic of Objectivism: 
Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only means to gain it. Reason 
is the faculty that perceives, identifies, and integrates the material provided by his senses. The task 
of his senses is to give to him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his 
reason … His means [of identification] is logic, and logic … is the art of non-contradictory 
identification … No concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into 
the total sum of his knowledge. To arrive at a contradiction is to confess an error in one’s thinking; 
to maintain a contradiction is to abdicate one’s mind and to evict oneself from the realm of reality 
(Rand 1957: 1016-1017). 
Recalling Cavell’s characterization of skepticism as the history of one’s turnings, “in distraction 
or denial,” from reality (Cavell [1971] 1979: 114), deconstruction serves as the history of Derrida’s 
turnings from reality. For giving in to fear and continually turning from reality, Derrida paid the 
price that all skeptics are forced to pay, the price of, in Cavell’s terminology, “living one’s 
skepticism”:
In saying that we live our skepticism, I mean to register [an] ignorance about our everyday position 
… Not that we positively know that we are never, or not ordinarily, in best cases for knowing …
but that we are rather disappointed in our occasions for knowing, as though we have, or have lost, 
some picture of what knowing … would really come to – a harmony, a concord, a union, a 
transparence, a governance, a power – against which our actual successes at knowing, and being 
known, are poor things. To say that there is a skepticism which is produced [not just] by a doubt 
about whether we can know [but also] by a disappointment over knowledge itself, and to say that 
this skepticism is lived … is to say that this disappointment has a history (Cavell 1979: 440).98
98 On one of the rare occasions where Cavell responds specifically to Derrida (more specifically, to what he 
understands to be the fundamental error of perspective evident in Derrida’s formulation of the concept of différance), 
Cavell offers the following: “If each word had to be sounded for its powers before we entrusted ourselves to it, we 
would be able to say nothing, never come to a beginning, let alone to the end, of a sentence. Some philosophers spook 
us, or themselves (not alone Derrida), with this thought; they speak, for example, of meaning as always deferred. Who 
would deny that our words mean more, and other, than we ask them on a given occasion to say? That is reason enough 
to be interested, as I am, in the fact that meaning is – also – not deferred, that I can mean, now, here, exactly, precisely, 
accurately, fully, assuredly, what I mean” (Cavell 2004: 332). 
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It is on the basis of this picture of the skeptic as doubtful, fearful, and perpetually disappointed in 
his attempts to alleviate his doubts and fears that Rodowick makes the case that what philosophy 
requires is not further conceptual fine-tuning – which was Derrida’s proposed solution with his 
array of idiosyncratic concepts – but rather a “diagnosis or etiology” of the reasons one is 
compelled to turn from reality (Rodowick 2015: 201). I have attempted in the previous two sections 
to diagnose Barthes’ and Derrida’s respective reasons for repeatedly turning from reality and to 
indicate the consequences of their turnings for their critical practice. What remains in this chapter 
is to explore the development of film studies in the wake of poststructuralism and to cast out for 
the sake of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema the specious specters of Barthes and Derrida. 
III 
Film Studies and the Legacy of Poststructuralism 
As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of 
authorship anchored the practice of film criticism. Beginning in post-World War II France and 
heralded by the writings of such pioneering critics as André Bazin and Alexandre Astruc, what 
blossomed in the 1950s in the pages of Cahiers du Cinéma under the heading of la politique des 
auteurs was an eminently logical and resolutely moral critical position. However, contra Andrew 
Sarris ([1962] 1979, 1977), it is important to note that the author policy was never meant to be a 
“theory” of authorship. To the early Cahiers critics – including Bazin, one of the founding editors 
of Cahiers, as well as François Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Jacques Rivette, Eric Rohmer, and 
Claude Chabrol, the “Young Turks” who would go on after changing the landscape of film 
criticism to also change the landscape of filmmaking – “theorizing” authorship would have made 
no sense, for, to them, authorship was axiomatic.99 As proclaimed by Roger Leenhardt, one of the 
Founding Fathers of the French New Wave and a significant critical influence on the Young Turks: 
99 On this point, it is worth clarifying that, philosophically speaking, authorship was an axiomatic concept for the 
Cahiers critics; however, this is not to imply that, aesthetically speaking, they considered all authors to be of the 
same “order.” Similar to the “honorific sense” in which Rand tended to discuss art (see Minsaas 2005: 24-26), the 
specific concept of the auteur was introduced by François Truffaut as an honorific title distinct from, and nobler 
than, the mere metteur (see Truffaut [1954] 1966; see also Sarris [1962] 1979). 
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A film becomes a work of art only when made by an artist, to the end of expressing a style or a 
vision of the world … I reject immediately the false problem of collective film creation. The 
numerous technical specialists, even if you call them collaborators in the production, contribute to 
the success of the film, but simply in terms of its production – not its creation (Leenhardt [1957] 
1966: 43, 49).100
More important to the early critics of Cahiers than trying to provide theoretical justification for 
the self-evident fact of authorship was the critical policy according to which what was of primary 
importance when engaging films as artworks was the adjudication of quality and the determination 
of value – in short, the pronouncement of aesthetic judgments. If, as encouraged by the Cahiers 
critics, authorship was to be acknowledged as axiomatic, then both the production and the criticism 
of films would have to be acknowledged as profoundly moral activities.101 This is the source of 
the revolutionary impact of the Cahiers critics, an impact that was felt both on paper in the pages 
of Cahiers and onscreen in the films of the French New Wave. Fueling this revolutionary spirit 
was a desire on the part of the Cahiers critics to, in Jim Hillier’s words, “upset established values 
and reputations” in order to elevate the art status of the cinema: 
There was nothing new or scandalous in either France or Britain or the USA in discussing, say, 
[F.W.] Murnau, [Luis] Buñuel, [Carl Theodor] Dreyer, [Sergei] Eisenstein, [Jean] Renoir, [Jean] 
Cocteau, or [Robert] Bresson, or, from the USA, [Erich von] Stroheim or [Orson] Welles or 
[Charlie] Chaplin, as the auteurs of their films. It was a slightly different matter … to propose, say, 
Howard Hawks as an auteur … In other words, the closer Cahiers moved to what had been 
traditionally conceived as the “conveyor belt” end of the cinema spectrum, the more their “serious” 
discussion of filmmakers seemed outrageously inappropriate. As it happens (even if Cahiers did 
not see it in quite these terms at the time), the more they outraged in this way, the more acutely 
they raised crucial questions, however unsystematically, about the status and criticism appropriate 
100 Inspired by the films of Ingmar Bergman, Jean-Luc Godard would echo Leenhardt and proclaim that filmmaking 
“is not group work” and that – in the spirit of Astruc’s influential articulation of the concept of la camera-stylo, or the 
“camera-pen,” on the basis of which he argued that the filmmaker “writes with his camera as a writer writes with his 
pen” (Astruc 1948) – in the cinema, the filmmaker “is always alone, on the sound stage as in front of the blank page” 
(Godard [1958] 1966: 59). 
101 For a landmark debate from the “pre-history” of academic film studies which turned on precisely this issue, see the 
debate conducted in the pages of Screen between Alan Lovell (1969, 1970) and Robin Wood (1969). See also the 
follow-up commentary of John C. Murray (1971). I will return to this debate to consider its logical and moral 
implications for the practice of film criticism in detail in Chapter 2. 
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to film as an art form … If Cahiers came to be associated primarily with American cinema and a 
revaluation of its status, it was not because they talked about American cinema more than about 
other cinema – quite simply, they did not – but because American cinema as a whole, so generally 
ignored, misunderstood, or undervalued, provided the most obvious site for engagement with these 
critical questions (Hillier 1985: 7). 
From this vantage point, it is not simply inaccurate but downright affronting for Nick Browne to 
claim that later Cahiers critics such as Jean-Louis Comolli, Jean Narboni, Serge Daney, and Jean-
Pierre Oudart continued and carried on in the spirit of the original author policy.102 On the contrary, 
the entire purpose of the later Cahiers was to initiate an Althusserian “epistemological break”; as 
framed by Rodowick, “the idea of the epistemological break, so expressive of the apocalyptic 
desire to ‘return to zero,’ [was] the central rhetorical feature” of the era (Rodowick [1988] 1994: 
xv).103 The later Cahiers critics (and the Screen critics they inspired) wanted nothing less than “to 
make a complete break with the cinema and the theory of the past” (Rodowick [1988] 1994: x). 
To this end, it is no surprise that the first casualty upon Cahiers’ change in course was the author.
Intoxicated by the radical spirit of the era and inspired by the critical transformations initiated by 
such trailblazing French publications as Communications and Tel Quel, the new collection of 
critics at Cahiers began marching to the beat of a different drum.104 An early sign of scission is 
the 1965 roundtable discussion published in Cahiers entitled “Twenty Years On: A Discussion 
102 In an editor’s note added to Daney and Oudart’s psychoanalytic/deconstructive critique of the concept of 
authorship, “The Name of the Author” (Daney and Oudart 1972), Browne claims that their essay continues “the early 
Cahiers auteurism” and represents, rather than a break with “the traditional figure of the author,” a “re-inscription” of 
that “figure” within “poststructuralist problematics” (Browne 1990: 324). This is demonstrably false; it was plainly 
the case that the “traditional figure of the author” was the explicit target of Daney and Oudart’s psychoanalytic 
deconstruction and represented to the newly radicalized critics of Cahiers a hopelessly romantic (hence bourgeois, 
hence capitalist, hence deplorable) fantasy to be demolished for the sake of a radical new political (re: Marxist) 
aesthetic. I will have more to say on this course change in Cahiers in what follows. However, for a more accurate 
assessment of this turbulent period in Cahiers and a more thorough chronicle of the critical transformations it produced 
beyond the scope of this thesis, see Rodowick ([1988] 1994: 67-110).  
103 For more comprehensive accounts of the considerable influence exerted on the critics of this era by Louis Althusser, 
see, among others, Britton (1979), Carroll (1988b: 53-88), and Rodowick ([1988] 1994: 28-34, 67-110; 2014: 232-
251). 
104 For more elaborate treatments of these shifts in the French intellectual terrain, see Rodowick ([1988] 1994: 1-41; 
2014: 131-152, 214-231) and Jean-Michel Rabaté (2002: 47-92). Rodowick, in fact, goes so far as to call Barthes and 
Derrida the “discursive founders” of the problematics of the era (Rodowick 2014: 223) and identifies Derrida in 
particular as the “philosophical underwriter” of the era’s most influential criticism (Rodowick [1988] 1994: 21).
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about American Cinema and the politique des auteurs” (Comolli et al. 1965). Nearly two decades 
after the Cahiers critics had sown the seeds of what would become the author policy, the Cahiers
critics were now starting to sow the seeds of what would become the revolt against it. The stated 
purpose of the discussion was to “look at the balance sheet” and assess the state of contemporary 
film criticism in the wake of the author policy. The discussants were happy to report that those 
critics committed to “stand for” the cinema and those “crabby” critics committed to stand against 
it were equally “aware of the reality of the concept of auteur and the soundness of the politique … 
On this front, the battle has been won more decisively than anybody could ever have predicted.” 
Despite the apparent stolidity of the discussants, shortly after this proclamation of victory is a 
curious remark about how the author policy “exceeded [its] limits,” a remark followed by the 
jarringly incongruous declaration of the discussants’ intent to “challenge the elevation of the 
politique des auteurs into dogma” (Comolli et al. 1965: 196). 
This (by now all-too-familiar) schizophrenic gesture of affirming and denying the concept of 
authorship in the same breath is the founding gesture of academic film studies and represents its 
fundamental impasse. Looking back at the history of film studies, Rodowick claims that the 
poststructuralist models of film criticism that were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s and that 
represented the concerted effort of scholars to challenge the author policy are mere “relics of a 
near past that [have been] surpassed by a variety of approaches” (Rodowick [1988] 1994: vii). 
Quite the contrary, I think that it would be more accurate to say that, as Paul Bowman observes, 
film studies did not “surpass” the “relic” of poststructuralism but rather “morphed into [a 
discipline] dominated by the problematics of poststructuralism” (Bowman 2013: 31). Given the 
persistence of poststructuralism in film studies, I intend in what remains of this chapter to look at 
the balance sheet and, in a similar vein as the Cahiers assessment of film criticism in the wake of 
the author policy, assess the practice of film criticism in the wake of poststructuralism.  
Now, while it may appear that I am framing this final section as a Dante-esque descent on my part 
into the film studies Inferno, it is important to stress that, from a certain Objectivist perspective 
(similar to the Objectivist distinction between evil and error stressed in the previous section), the 
fact that the academic institutionalization of film studies followed from the dissolution of the 
author policy is not proof of scholars’ “essential evil”; rather, it is “a great and tragic proof of 
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[their] essential morality” (Rand 1943: 87-88), of their willingness to always consider alternative 
methodologies and constantly check their premises. This determination on the part of scholars to 
be wary of error, ignorance, prejudice, etc., is not a vice. In fact, it is a virtue. However, it is 
important for scholars to be vigilant regarding what Rand calls the “dangerous little catch-phrase” 
of “keeping an open mind”:
This is a very ambiguous term – as demonstrated by a man who once accused a famous politician 
of having “a wide open mind.” That term is an anti-concept. It is usually taken to mean an objective, 
unbiased approach to ideas, but it is used as a call for perpetual skepticism, for holding no firm 
convictions and granting plausibility to anything … What objectivity and the study of philosophy 
require is not an “open mind” but an active mind … An active mind does not grant equal status to 
truth and falsehood, it does not remain floating forever in a stagnant vacuum of neutrality and 
uncertainty; by assuming the responsibility of judgment, it reaches firm convictions and holds to 
them … If you keep an active mind, you will discover (assuming that you started with common 
sense rationality) that every challenge you examine will strengthen your convictions; that the 
conscious, reasoned rejection of false theories will help you to clarify and amplify the true ones; 
that your ideological enemies will make you invulnerable by providing countless demonstrations 
of their own impotence. No, you will not have to keep your mind eternally open to the task of 
examining every new variant of the same old falsehoods. You will discover that they are variants 
or attacks on certain philosophical essentials – and that the entire, gigantic battle of philosophy 
(and of human history) revolves around the upholding or the destruction of these essentials (Rand 
1974b: 21-22). 
Proceeding from the notion of what Rand refers to as the sanction of the victim, it is one of the 
principles of Objectivism that “there comes a point in the defeat of any man of virtue when his 
own consent is needed for evil to win” (Rand 1957: 1048). If, in Randian terms, the gigantic battle 
of film studies revolves around upholding or destroying the concept of authorship, then it is not 
possible for the concept of authorship to be destroyed unless those committed to upholding it 
sanction its destruction. Arguments against authorship are, in and of themselves, harmless. Only 
when they are given the sanction of reason do they become dangerous. As Rand makes clear, a 
basic premise is “an absolute that permits no cooperation with its antithesis and tolerates no 
tolerance” (Rand 1957: 741-742). As it relates to film criticism, any scholar who accepts the denial 
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of the basic premise of authorship is guilty of “granting the sanction of reason to formal dementia” 
and “it is they who achieve the destruction of the mind” (Rand 1957: 741). 
Recalling the discussion at the end of the previous section, the logic of Objectivism is the logic of 
all or nothing: “There are two sides to every issue: One side is right and the other is wrong … In 
any compromise between food and poison, it is only death that can win. In any compromise 
between good and evil, it is only evil that can profit” (Rand 1957: 1054). Authorship is a basic 
premise. Cooperation with and tolerance for critical methodologies that deny the basic premise of 
authorship cannot be permitted. A compromise between an author-based critical methodology and 
an anti-author critical methodology accomplishes nothing but the destruction of the concept of 
authorship. A is not A and B. A is A. All or nothing.105 And yet, as a discipline, film studies is 
remarkable for the insistence of its scholars to try to have their cake and eat it. Myriad film scholars 
over the years have granted the sanction of reason to arguments against authorship and have tried 
to reconcile author-based criticism with its antithesis. For example, in his magisterial account of 
the films of Fritz Lang (in virtually every respect a towering achievement in film criticism), Tom 
Gunning laments the fact that film studies scholars unproductively “jettisoned” the concept of 
authorship and thereby “stunted the growth of a dynamic film criticism” (Gunning 2000: x). His 
solution? To practice criticism as advocated by the author policy but according to the principles of 
poststructuralism. He encourages scholars to conceptualize authorship in the “novel manner” 
according to which the Derridean “play of discourse” ought to take precedence over the romantic 
search for authorial “self-expression” (Gunning 2000: 5). Why? Because, following the “logic” of 
Barthes’ package dealing, just as “the gods [were] created by man,” so the author is “the creation 
of the reader” (Gunning 2000: 7). 
In an effort to exorcise from film studies the specious specters of Barthes and Derrida and expel 
once and for all the “logic” of poststructuralism, I will focus in what remains of this chapter on the 
book that Rodowick credits with “laying the foundation” for what would eventually become 
academic film studies (Rodowick [1988] 1994: 45) and, mutatis mutandis, the book that I hold 
105 This is not, of course, to deny the difficulty, in certain instances, of attribution (cf. Knapp 1996: 1-4). Nor is it to 
deny that film authorship is an exceedingly complex phenomenon (cf. Cameron 1962). It is simply to stress that 
authorship, though it can at times present epistemological problems (determinable only on a case-by-case basis), is 
not an ontological problem (cf. Cavell 1996: 8-9). 
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responsible for sanctioning the destruction of authorship: Peter Wollen’s Signs and Meaning in 
the Cinema. To describe Wollen’s landmark text as schizophrenic would be an understatement. In 
an interview with Wollen conducted by “Lee Russell” (Wollen’s pseudonym while writing for the 
New Left Review and a disturbing confirmation of his schizophrenic tendencies), Wollen explains 
that he wrote the first edition of Signs and Meaning in the Cinema in May of 1968:  
As fortune decreed, this has become an emblematic date. May 1968 – it seemed like the beginning 
of a new epoch. Signs and Meaning is full of the same sense of a beginning – a new approach to 
film studies, a new intellectual seriousness, new theoretical developments, the promise of a new 
cinema, even the foundation of a new academic discipline (Wollen 1997: 211). 
In its original publication, the chapter on the “auteur theory” and the inclusion of a “pantheon” of 
great directors firmly situated Wollen’s text in the early Cahiers tradition of the author policy. 
However, with the publication in 1972 of a new edition, the pantheon was eliminated and a new 
Conclusion introducing a host of poststructuralist concerns was added. Wollen’s decision to 
eliminate the original pantheon pursuant to a critique of the author policy was, by his own 
admission, symptomatic of the effect of Barthes’ “The Death of the Author”:
I felt that Barthes’s [essay was] ridiculous … All the same, I still felt called upon to revise my own 
section on auteurism and give it a poststructuralist gloss … [which] served to occlude the question 
of the relationship between the actual author and the textual “author effect.” I’m sorry about that 
(Wollen 1997: 244).  
Through Wollen’s commendable introspection (and by virtue of his openness and honesty which 
admirably culminates in an admission of guilt and an apology), it is clear that, at the time, the sheer 
force of the authoritative pronouncements of Attilas like Barthes convinced critics and scholars 
that there must be something to their claims, otherwise why would they be making them with such 
force?106 Afraid to hold to his convictions despite correctly identifying the “ridiculous” nature of 
106 As averred by Descartes: “Confident assertion and frequent repetition are the two ploys that are often more effective 
than the most weighty [sic] arguments when dealing with ordinary people or those who do not examine things 
carefully” (Descartes 1642: 358). For an insightful examination of the source of the confusion and malaise discernible 
in Wollen’s remarks, see Rand (1966b). Over the course of her examination, she clarifies that Attilas like Barthes “do 
not seek to convert you to their values – they haven’t any – but to destroy yours. Nihilism and destruction [are their] 
explicit goals … and the horror is that [their ideas] move on, unopposed. Who is to blame? All those who are afraid 
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poststructuralism, Wollen, “at the crossroads of the choice between ‘I know’ and ‘They say’ ... 
gave in to so craven a fear of independence that he renounced his rational faculty … [and] chose 
the authority of others” (Rand 1957: 1044-1045). The result is a book utterly torn apart by 
contradictions. For organizational economy and conceptual clarity, rather than proceeding through 
Wollen’s text beginning-to-end, I will single out the principal claims that he makes for an author-
based critical methodology, organized in relation to the aesthetic principles of objectivity, identity, 
and causality as I defined them at the beginning of this chapter, and explore the ways that his 
adherence to principles of poststructuralism undercuts the claims for his proposed methodology.  
First, in corroboration of the objectivity principle, Wollen observes that meaning in art is 
“generated within the [artwork] itself” (Wollen 1972: 139). If this is true, then, as per the 
objectivity principle, the artwork exists apart from and prior to the act of criticism. A mere 
paragraph after making this claim, however, Wollen criticizes “all previous aesthetics” for 
perpetuating the notion that artworks are “monads, each enclosed in its own individuality, a perfect 
globe, a whole” (Wollen 1972: 139-140). The result of this contradiction is a bizarre (and 
unmistakably Barthesian) conception of an artwork as “a material object whose significance is 
determined not by [an author] … but through its own interrogation of its own code,” a mystical, 
“self”-generated interrogation which inexplicably produces “meaning of a new kind” (Wollen 
1972: 139, my emphasis).107
to speak. All those who are still able to know better but who are willing to temporize, to compromise, and thus to 
sanction an evil of that magnitude” (Rand 1966b: 114).
107 For an even more astonishing example of this Barthesian conception of the “autonomy” of the inexplicably 
volitional and “(self-)conscious” film “text,” consider the most recent analysis of the films of Alfred Hitchcock 
undertaken by William Rothman (2014). Throughout his examination of Hitchcock’s films (which, like Gunning’s 
examination of Lang, is in virtually every respect a masterclass in film criticism), Rothman endlessly waffles on the 
issue of whether it is the author who possesses volition and is thus responsible for the content of a film or whether it 
is the camera (which, similar to Barthes’ conception of capital-L Language, is, in Rothman’s critical practice, the 
capital-C Camera). On the one hand, in a discussion of a shot of Cary Grant in North by Northwest (1959), Rothman 
rationally argues that, “by choosing to frame Grant frontally as well as closely,” Hitchcock, as the author, “inscribes” 
his thought in the shot (Rothman 2014: 14, my emphasis). On the other hand, in a discussion of a series of shots of 
Henry Fonda in The Wrong Man (1956), Rothman irrationally argues that “this passage perfectly exemplifies 
Hitchcock’s understanding that the camera is more than a machine that passively takes in whatever happens in front 
of it. The camera also has the power to make things happen” (Rothman 2014: 114, my emphasis). More astonishing 
still, in his own recent work, even Rodowick ends up ensnared in the same contradiction. After developing even more 
extensively than Rothman a nonsensical notion of “camera consciousness” for which he claims that “no active powers 
of consciousness need be attributed” to the camera, Rodowick, exemplifying the illogic of concept stealing, proceeds 
in the very next sentence to attribute to the camera a “mode of thought” capable of activating mystical “powers” of 
“expressive intentionality” (Rodowick 2015: 223). 
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The incoherence here (as was the case with Husserlian phenomenology) is the product of Wollen’s 
reliance on the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy and the resultant distortion of the concept of 
objectivity. Wollen claims that, in all previous aesthetics, criticism is an “automatic” and 
“magical” activity in which “ideas shone through marks on paper enter the skull through the 
windows of the eyes” (Wollen 1972: 140). Wollen refers to this as “the myth of transparency, the 
idea that the mark of a good [artwork] is that it conveys a rich meaning, an important truth, in a 
way which can be grasped immediately” (Wollen 1972: 146). The key point to be made here is 
that this “myth” with which Wollen has speciously saddled all previous aesthetics is more precisely 
a straw man (indeed, it is the same straw man utilized by Barthes in “The Death of the Author” to 
justify the extreme version of the reception argument). Added to which, not only does the objective 
existence of artworks neither preclude nor annul the act(ivity) of criticism, it is precisely the 
objective existence of artworks that allows for the possibility of criticism in the first place, for an 
artwork, as defined by Andrew Britton, “is not something simply available to be constituted at 
will” by critics on the one hand nor a mystical entity in possession of supernatural powers that 
allow it to “transmit” “knowledge” to critics on the other, but rather, “a historical object to which 
criticism aspires to be adequate” (Britton 1979: 435).108
Further elaborating on the practice of criticism, Wollen makes the rational claim vis-à-vis the 
identity principle that criticism “has to be justified by an explanation of how the [artwork] itself 
works” (Wollen 1972: 146). If this is true, then, as per the identity principle, an interpretation of 
an artwork can be considered valid only if it adequately explains what the artwork is and why the 
108 Derrida struggles with the same contradiction in the construction of his deconstructive aesthetics (as do Peter 
Brunette and David Wills in their attempt to resolve this contradiction towards the goal of building a deconstructive 
aesthetics of cinema [Brunette and Wills {1989} 2014: 86-92]). In Of Grammatology, Derrida states very plainly in 
accordance with the principles of objectivity, identity, and causality that there is a “guardrail” around every text the 
“indispensable” purpose of which is to keep criticism from “developing in any direction at all and authoriz[ing] itself 
to say almost anything” (Derrida [1967] 1997: 158). Yet, he also claims in opposition to the principles of objectivity, 
identity, and causality that it is not possible for criticism to reconstruct in any text the “conscious, voluntary, intentional 
[meaning] that the writer institutes” (Derrida [1967] 1997: 158) insofar as the “presumed content” so “instituted” is 
merely “a chain of differential references” which “have always already escaped, have never existed” (Derrida [1967] 
1997: 159). Given that the notion of a “guardrail” presupposes something to be guarded, and given that Derrida has 
just claimed that there is nothing to be guarded, in the context of his deconstructive aesthetics, the notion is divested 
of all sense, for, if not the meaning (which is to say, the identity) of the objectively existing text, what is it that Derrida 
thinks this indispensable guardrail is actually guarding? 
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artwork is the way it is.109 However, immediately after establishing this eminently rational 
perspective on criticism, Wollen sets about contradicting himself by irrationally arguing that 
criticism “is not essentially grounded” (Wollen 1972: 146) in the artwork itself since the very 
notion of “the artwork itself” is an “illusion” (Wollen 1972: 147).110 The first claim proceeds from 
an acknowledgment of the objectivity principle. Recalling Rand’s “existence is identity” formula, 
if an artwork objectively exists, then it has an identity. Moreover, if an artwork has an identity, 
then it can be identified in criticism. The purpose of criticism, then, would be to identify and 
interpret objectively existing artworks. The second claim, however, proceeds from a rejection of 
the objectivity principle. If an artwork does not objectively exist, then it does not have an identity. 
Moreover, if an artwork does not have an identity, then it cannot be identified in criticism. In 
support of the latter position, Wollen argues that it is “necessary to insist” that “there is no true, 
essential meaning” to be “found” “in” an artwork (Wollen 1972: 146). However, if Wollen believes 
that it is necessary to insist that there is no true meaning to be found in an artwork, then why does 
he also find it necessary to insist that critics must justify their explanations of artworks? Indeed, to 
what can the concept of justification possibly refer? 
Finally, and most problematically, just as Derrida was tragically torn between two warring 
conceptions of art, one according to which “the category of intention will not disappear” (Derrida 
1972b: 18) and another according to which intention will disappear in the act of “Logos retaking 
possession of itself” (Derrida [1962] 1989: 146), Wollen endlessly waffles on the status of artworks 
109 Adding to the confusion endemic to deconstruction, despite the position Derrida advocates in Of Grammatology, 
the same impulse vis-à-vis the identity principle evidenced by Wollen here is also discernible in Derrida’s critical 
practice. In a consideration of the various steps taken by a critic in the interpretation of a text, Derrida once observed 
that, “in asking if [an] interpretation is justifiable, [the critic is] therefore asking” whether or not he has “understood 
the sign itself”: “In other words, has what [the author of the text] said and meant been clearly perceived? This 
comprehension of the sign in and of itself … is only the first moment but also the indispensable condition of all 
hermeneutics (Derrida 1963: 32, my emphasis).  
110 For an example of the persistence of this contradiction in attempts by film scholars to formulate “progressive” 
critical methodologies based on poststructuralist principles, consider that Rodowick, at the end of a marvelously 
perspicacious critique of the contradictions with which nearly every major critical endeavor of the era, including 
Wollen’s, was riddled, promulgates the exact same contradiction. In an effort to ensure the objectivity of artworks 
against the tendency of critics to “freely apply interpretations as [they] may,” Rodowick anchors the practice of 
criticism in “the given text itself since its particular organization of signs may either serve to facilitate or resist certain 
avenues of interpretation” (Rodowick [1988] 1994: 282). At the same time, Rodowick claims that “the ‘text itself,’ or 
the ontological definition of the text as an autonomous, self-identical formal object, must be dismantled” (Rodowick 
[1988] 1994: 283). To Rodowick’s credit, he seems to have resolved this contradiction in his more recent work 
(Rodowick 2015). 
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as either the products of or the producers of authors. At numerous points throughout his text, 
Wollen acknowledges the soundness of the author policy and, in effect, affirms the causality 
principle. He concedes that, of the “great many features” of artworks, the contribution of the author 
is “the one which carries the most weight” (Wollen 1969: 85-86); he describes story elements as 
“catalysts” which are “introduced into the mind” of the author and which “fuse with his own 
preoccupations” and “the motifs and themes characteristic of his work” (Wollen 1969: 93); and he 
acknowledges that “there can be no doubt” that meaning in art is “connected with the presence” of 
an author (Wollen 1972: 145). And yet, despite the rationality of these claims, Wollen nevertheless 
proceeds to contradict himself and posit the following: 
[Film criticism] does not consist of re-tracing a film to its origins, to its creative source. It consists 
of tracing a structure (not a message) within the work, which can then post factum be assigned to 
an individual, the director, on empirical grounds. It is wrong, in the name of a denial of the 
traditional ideas of creative subjectivity, to deny any status to individuals at all. But Fuller or Hawks 
or Hitchcock, the directors, are quite separate from “Fuller” or “Hawks” or “Hitchcock,” the 
structures named after them … It is in this sense that it is possible to speak of a film auteur as an 
unconscious catalyst (Wollen 1972: 144-145). 
Plainly obvious in this passage is the influence not only of Barthes and “The Death of the Author,” 
but, more specifically, the influence of Michel Foucault and his conception of what he famously 
termed the author-function (Foucault [1969] 1979). In response to the proliferation of the 
Barthesian idea of the death of the author, Foucault famously articulated the concept of the author-
function in an effort to supersede the allegedly antediluvian, bourgeois concept of the author. In 
the context of Foucault’s explicitly antihumanist philosophical system, the articulation of the 
concept of the author-function is the logical extension of his larger project to strip away the 
“privileges of the subject”; as he claims, “the subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its 
creative role and analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse” (Foucault [1969] 1979: 
28). Galvanized by the sanction provided by Foucault, Wollen followed his lead and sought to 
strip away the privileges of the author and analyze “authors” as variable functions of critical 
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discourses. However, if it is true that, rather than the cause of an artwork, the author is merely an 
effect, then who/what is the cause?111
At certain points in his text, Wollen endows the mystical “structures” and “patterns” of artworks 
with the creative powers required to “produce” them. For example, he claims in a distinctly 
Barthesian register that an artwork is not the “expression” of an author/subject but rather “a certain 
pattern of energy cathexis” (Wollen 1972: 144) which “provides the conditions for the production 
of meaning within constraints which it sets itself” (Wollen 1972: 140, my emphasis). At other 
points in his text, he shifts to more of a Derridean register and attributes the power of creation to 
the author’s unconscious. For example, he claims that an artwork is “associated” with an author 
“not because he has played the role of artist, expressing himself or his own vision,” but because 
“it is through the force of his preoccupations that an unconscious, unintended meaning can be 
decoded … usually to the surprise of the individual involved” (Wollen 1972: 144). And still at 
other points in his text, he shifts to a Foucauldian register and evades the concept of causality 
altogether. For example, he claims that “writer and reader” are “indifferently critics” of a given 
artwork where “artwork” refers not to an “instrument of communication” (Wollen 1972: 141) but 
rather to “something like a machine for producing meaning” (Wollen 1972: 148).
To Wollen’s credit, despite his ceaseless oscillations, he never advocates anything resembling the 
extreme version of the reception argument where out-and-out murder is passed off as the height of 
critical nobility. Instead, essentially burying his head in the sand, he follows with something 
approaching consistency Foucault’s reading of “The Death of the Author.” Intriguingly, whereas 
111 Clearly underwriting the poststructuralist objection to the concept of authorship is Nietzsche’s objection to the 
concept of causality. According to Nietzsche, the “chronological inversion” whereby “the cause enters consciousness 
later than the effect” is proof that the very concept of causality is not only “imagined,” hence not real, but imagined 
falsely (I will not hazard a guess as to how one can “falsely” imagine something that does not exist in the first place, 
though I will point out Descartes’ observation in the Meditations that the content of one’s imagination “cannot strictly 
speaking be false” qua imaginary content [Descartes 1641a: 26]); thus, Nietzsche proclaimed (in language recalling 
Kant and anticipating Derrida) that consciousness as such is merely a “groping” which is “indissolubly tied to the old 
error of the ground” (Nietzsche [1888] 1967: 265-266). I will explore the consequences of this Nietzschean perspective 
for Wollen’s critical practice in what follows. For examples of Nietzsche’s influence on poststructuralism more 
broadly, see the work of, among many others, Paul de Man, who thought the “logic” of considering a cause to be “the 
effect of an effect” and an effect to be “the cause of its own cause” (de Man 1979: 107) was perfectly suited to 
underwrite his deconstructive aesthetics, and Jonathan Culler, who accepted Nietzsche’s proto-deconstruction of 
causality since the concept of a “causal structure” is not (indicating Culler’s Derridean reliance on the 
intrinsic/subjective dichotomy) something “given as such” but is rather “the product of a precise tropological or 
rhetorical operation” (Culler 1982: 86).
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Barthes was equivocal as to whether art always was and always will be constitutively destructive 
to authors or whether art is now and should forever be approached by authors as a self-destructive 
practice, Foucault very clearly historicized sacrificial art as a then-contemporary issue of morality: 
The writing of our day has freed itself from the necessity of “expression” … Writing is now linked 
to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself; it is a voluntary obliteration of the self … In addition, 
we find the link between writing and death manifested in the total effacement of the individual 
characteristics of the writer … If we wish to know the writer in our day, it will be through the 
singularity of his absence and in his link to death, which has transformed him into a victim of his 
own writing (Foucault [1969] 1979: 15-16). 
As for the practice of criticism, Foucault excitedly observed the consequences of instituting an 
altruistic aesthetics: 
It has been understood that the task of criticism is not to re-establish the ties between an author and 
his work or to reconstitute an author’s thought and experience through his works … [but rather] 
should concern itself with the structures of a work, its architectonic forms, which are studied for 
their intrinsic and internal relationships … No longer the tiresome repetitions: ‘Who is the real 
author?’ ‘Have we proof of his authenticity and originality?’ ‘What has he revealed of his most 
profound self in his language?’ New questions will be heard: ‘What are the modes of existence of 
this discourse?’ ‘Where does it come from; how is it circulated; who controls it?’ ‘What placements 
are determined for possible subjects?’” (Foucault [1969] 1979: 16, 28-29).
Even though Foucault was strategically vague as to how/why the “new” question “Where does a 
discourse come from?” was different from the “old” question “Where does an artwork come 
from?” – not to mention as to what the answer to the “new” question could possibly be – the “logic” 
is nevertheless clear: If authors voluntarily obliterate themselves and acquiesce to their “function” 
as victims of writing, then critics may do with “their” artworks qua alms whatever they wish; the 
critic-as-God is endowed in Foucault’s Barthesian aesthetic system with the sovereign power to 
give to and take away from artworks “authors” as he sees fit, “justified” by nothing more (and 
requiring nothing more) than his whims. Thus, even though Wollen never went so far as to 
explicitly advocate hedonism, by adhering to the principles of poststructuralism, his proposed 
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methodology amounts to nothing less than the ideal critical foundation for a hedonistic aesthetics 
of cinema.112 And the tragic irony is that the position from which he set out in Signs and Meaning 
in the Cinema was for all intents and purposes an Objectivist position.  
In the original Introduction to the 1969 edition, Wollen acknowledged that, since “criticism 
necessarily depends upon knowing what a text means,” any critical methodology that refuses to 
acknowledge the aesthetic principles of objectivity, identity, and causality is “condemned to 
massive imprecision and nebulosity” (Wollen 1969: 10). At this point, having considered at length 
the arguments of Barthes, Derrida, and now Wollen, it should be clear that, at one time or another, 
every poststructuralist acknowledges this basic and eminently rational fact. It should be equally 
clear at this point that every poststructuralist argument invariably turns into a denial of this basic 
and eminently rational fact in the hopes of evading the responsibility of having to live up to it. 
Wollen claims at one particularly telling moment that a critic puts his consciousness “at risk” in 
every engagement with an artwork (Wollen 1972: 139). In the Objectivist sense that thinking is 
volitional rather than automatic and subject to error rather than infallible, this is true. However, 
given Wollen’s poststructuralist arguments regarding artworks as being subjective constructs 
which do not objectively exist, which have no essential meaning, and which neither originate in 
nor emanate from human consciousness, where exactly is the critical risk? If there is no true and 
objective meaning to be found in artworks – which implies that meaning in art is arbitrarily asserted 
based solely on critical whim – then how can an ascription of meaning ever be wrong? Far from 
embracing risk and advocating objective criticism, does Wollen not embrace subjectivism and 
advocate turning criticism into a risk-free zone in which the whims of critics reign supreme, in 
which criticism ceases to be a conversation and instead becomes a cacophony of Attilas struggling 
to outshout those around them, and in which the final arbiter in criticism shifts from logic to 
force?113
112 In his lucid rejection of this critical model, Robin Wood shrewdly observed (having recognized both the logical 
consequences and the moral implications of instituting such a critical model) that “the demolition of the author is 
necessary and central to a wider operation – the demolition of art. For without artists there is no art – only various 
configurations of signifiers awaiting deconstruction” (Wood 1989: 26, my emphasis).
113 Perhaps the paradigm case of a poststructuralist shrinking from such risk is Foucault’s work on Raymond Roussel, 
in which, to avoid “the common risk of being wrong” when formulating an interpretation of a text (Foucault [1963] 
2004: 5), Foucault shifted the terms of criticism from the terrain of the objective onto the terrain of the arbitrary
(Foucault [1963] 2004: 8-9), a treasured concept for poststructuralists inasmuch as it is, to their Nietzschean 
satisfaction, “beyond right and wrong.” For the sense of deliverance experienced by poststructuralists, consider the 
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Recalling the Cavellian notion of the truth of skepticism, I am inspired to identify in the fear that 
drives poststructuralists to embrace critical subjectivism the truth of poststructuralism. To Cavell’s 
mind, subjectivism is a painfully transparent “Kantian bargain” with skepticism, “buying back the 
knowledge of objects by giving up things in themselves” (Cavell 1986a: 65).114 To add insult to 
injury, poststructuralism “tends to soberize, or respectify, or scientize” this bargain, “claiming, for 
example, greater precision or accuracy or intellectual scrupulousness” (Cavell 1986a: 59). Hence, 
when Wollen asserts that “it is an illusion to think of any [artwork] as complete in itself” (Wollen 
1972: 147), the implication is that once he was blind but now, thanks to poststructuralism, he can 
see. As expected, what he can “see” thanks to poststructuralism is, paradoxically, “the artwork 
itself,” but nonsensically conceived as “the location of thought rather than the mind” (Wollen 
1972: 141). Regarding this mystical presumption of a “sixth sense” which allows poststructuralists 
to “think” in the absence of their minds and paradoxically “see” behind the curtain of (their fantasy 
of) reality, this, Rand explains, is merely the self-imposed blindness at the heart of skepticism:
[Skeptics] are germs that attack you through a single sore: Your fear of relying on your mind. They 
tell you that they possess a means of knowledge higher than the mind, a mode of consciousness 
superior to reason – like a special pull with some bureaucrat of the universe who gives them secret 
tips withheld from others. [Some skeptics] declare that they possess an extra sense you lack. This 
special sixth sense consists of contradicting the whole of the knowledge of your five. [Other 
skeptics] do not bother to assert any claim to extrasensory perception. They merely declare that 
your senses are not valid and that their wisdom consists of perceiving your blindness by some 
manner of unspecified means. [All skeptics] demand that you invalidate your own consciousness 
and surrender yourself into their power … The secret of all their esoteric philosophies, of all their 
dialectics and super-senses, of their evasive eyes and snarling words, the secret for which they 
destroy civilization, language, industries, and lives, the secret for which they pierce their own eyes 
and eardrums, grind out their senses, blank out their minds, the purpose for which they dissolve the 
absolutes of reason, logic, matter, existence, reality – is to erect upon that plastic fog a single holy 
absolute: Their wish (Rand 1957: 1034-1036). 
gleeful observation made by Stanley Fish that ignoring objectivity “relieves [scholars] of the obligation to be right” 
(Fish 1980: 180). 
114 For her part, Rand regards this Kantian bargain with contempt as a “gimmick worn transparently thin” (Rand [1966-
1967] 1990: 61). 
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Thus, the poststructuralist reliance on the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy betrays, vis-à-vis 
intrinsicism, “a wish that underlies skepticism, a wish for the connection between my claims of 
knowledge and the objects upon which the claims are to fall to occur without my intervention” 
(Cavell 1979: 351-352), as well as, vis-à-vis subjectivism, a wish for omnipotence to compensate 
for the lack of omniscience, for “consciousness to be an instrument not of perceiving but of 
creating existence and existence to be not the object but the subject [of] consciousness” (Rand 
1957: 1036-1037). And, regardless of which side of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy any given 
poststructuralist chooses to embrace at any given point in an argument, the fact remains that “there 
is no honest revolt against reason”:
An honest man does not desire until he has identified the object of his desire. He says: “It is, 
therefore I want it.” [Poststructuralists] say: “I want it, therefore it is.” They want to cheat the axiom 
of existence … But reality is not to be cheated. What they achieve is the opposite of their desire. 
They want an omnipotent power over existence; instead, they lose the power of their consciousness. 
By refusing to know, they condemn themselves to the horror of a perpetual unknown (Rand 1957: 
1036-1037). 
This horrifying space of the perpetually unknown and the constitutively unknowable is the space 
into which Wollen ventured with Signs and Meaning in the Cinema, and the tragedy is that he 
knew the direction he was heading but failed to adequately grasp the consequences of continuing 
down the path he had set for himself.115 Observe the clarity with which he recognized the logical 
implications of his poststructuralist conception of criticism: 
The critic, to demonstrate the value of a work, must be able to identify the “content,” establish its 
truth, profundity, and so forth, and then demonstrate how it is expressed … The world itself is an 
untidy place, full of loose ends, but the [artwork] can tie all these loose ends together and thus 
convey to us a meaningful truth, an insight, which enables us to go back to the real world with a 
re-ordered and re-cycled experience which will enable us to cope better, live more fully, and so on. 
In this way, art is given a humanistic function, which guarantees its value. All this is overthrown 
when we begin to see loose ends in works of art, to refuse to acknowledge organic unity or integral 
115 For an added dose of irony, recall that Foucault was initially impelled to formulate the concept of the author-
function because he was “not certain that the consequences derived from the disappearance or death of the author 
[had] been fully explored or that the importance of this event [had] been appreciated” (Foucault [1969] 1979: 16).
95 
content … All current theories of evaluation depend on identifying the [artwork] first and then 
confronting it with criteria … [but] if we reject the idea of an exhaustive interpretation, we have to 
reject this kind of evaluation (Wollen 1972: 147-148).116
Exemplifying more than just the logical consequences of the Nietzschean conception of causality 
that underwrites the poststructuralist objection to authorship, Wollen’s text also exemplifies the 
logical consequences of the obstinate refusal of poststructuralists to acknowledge “fixed” meaning 
(which is to say, to embrace objectivity) and to prefer instead to conceive meaning as “infinitely 
deferred” (which is to say, to embrace subjectivity). This might – and, given the persistence of 
poststructuralism, clearly does – seem seductive and “progressive,” but if meaning is not 
objectively fixed, then the very concept of “meaning” is lost, for if a given text does not mean 
something, then it does not mean anything. As Robin Wood once put it, if texts do not have fixed 
meanings, “then it makes no difference whether you choose to [analyze] conservative texts or 
radical ones, Mein Kampf [1925-1926] or Das Kapital [1867-1883]. The choice is merely arbitrary. 
Nothing ultimately means anything and nothing ultimately matters” (Wood 1989: 28).
Furthermore, as indicated by Wood and averred by Wollen himself, if objective meaning – and 
hence the practice of interpretation – is rejected, then the concept of value – and hence the practice 
of evaluation – must be rejected, as well, for, as I discussed in the Introduction, to value something 
presupposes that (a) something exists to be valued and that (b) it is being valued for what it is. In 
the previously quoted passage, Wollen is encouraging critics and scholars to reject this “bourgeois” 
aesthetic position and to embrace instead the “progressive” position from which the meaning –
and hence the value – of an artwork is a subjective construct based on the critic’s whims. But, if 
this is true, then why does Wollen so revere Jean-Luc Godard? In his 1972 Conclusion, Wollen 
remarks that “it was only right” that Signs and Meaning in the Cinema, across its three editions 
between 1969 and 1972, “should have built up towards a paean of praise” for Godard (Wollen 
116 Once again, it was Robin Wood who shrewdly observed the logical consequences of this antihumanist critical 
model: “If what we used to call works of art are mere ideological constructions, culturally determined, produced out 
of various combinations of codes, systems, and signifiers, then there is no point in choosing between them. All we 
need do is disassemble them to see how the mechanisms work – or, more commonly, to prove once again that the 
mechanisms work in exactly the ways we predicted … It’s the perfect gift [for poststructuralists] though something 
of a dead end. When you’ve demonstrated that every text can be deconstructed, it becomes fruitless to deconstruct 
more and more. You can, of course, deconstruct the deconstruction, then deconstruct the deconstruction of the 
deconstruction: The babushka-doll of contemporary aesthetics” (Wood 1989: 26, 28). 
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1972: 134). But, given his critical premises, what sense can the concept of “praise” possibly have 
in this context? If artworks do not objectively exist, if they do not have objectively fixed meanings, 
and if they are not made by authors, then is the “praise” for the alleged progressiveness of an 
artwork so nonsensically conceived (or the “blame” for the alleged lack of progressiveness of an 
artwork so nonsensically conceived) not due the critic for his subjective “construction”? Indeed, 
would it not be the case that such concepts as “good” and “bad” or “progressive” and “bourgeois” 
would no longer be attributable to objectively produced artworks (which are “illusions” anyway) 
and would instead only be attributable to “their” (whatever “they” “are”) subjective reception? 
Beyond the ubiquitous and flagrant concept stealing and package dealing, the conceptual knots 
into which poststructuralists so often twist themselves bring to light another fallacy which Rand 
terms context dropping, whereby one attempts to ignore major premises in order to make minor 
arguments. She elaborates on the “logic” of context dropping as follows: 
Context dropping is one of the chief psychological tools of evasion. In regard to one’s desires, there 
are two major ways of context dropping: The issues of range and of means. A rational man sees 
his interests in terms of a lifetime and selects his goals accordingly. This does not mean that he has 
to be omniscient, infallible, or clairvoyant … It means that he does not regard any moment as cut 
off from the context of the rest of his life and that he allows no conflicts or contradictions between 
his short-range and long-range interests. He does not become his own destroyer by pursuing a desire 
today which wipes out all his values tomorrow (Rand 1962b: 36).117
The term that Rand uses to identify the mechanism that facilitates context dropping, meanwhile, 
is blanking out, which she describes as “the willful suspension of one’s consciousness, the refusal 
to think – not blindness, but the refusal to see; not ignorance, but the refusal to know” and which 
117 To return to the impasse that Derrida reaches in Of Grammatology, it is context dropping that provided him with 
the necessary (though not sufficient) out in his subsequent battle with Searle (which, fittingly enough, was fought over 
Derrida’s essay “Signature, Event, Context,” in which Derrida explicitly worked to invalidate the concept of context). 
Indeed, Derrida’s haranguing of Searle for allegedly misinterpreting his essay, in which is contained, according to 
Derrida, “precisely what [Searle] claims to oppose to it and could have found in it” (Derrida 1977: 52, my emphasis), 
is the paradigm case of context dropping in poststructuralism. The problem for Derrida – a problem that he confessed 
was a constant bother in his career (Derrida 1988: 146) – is that, even though he wants to use the principles of 
objectivity, identity, and causality to assert and protect the objective/discoverable meaning of/in his texts, the 
fundamental premises of deconstruction vis-à-vis the nonexistence of objective/discoverable meaning of/in texts as 
such prevent him from doing so…unless he drops the context and contradicts the fundamental premises of 
deconstruction. 
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she explains makes possible attempts, undertaken “on the unstated premise that a thing will not 
exist if only you refuse to identify it, that A will not be A so long as you do not pronounce the 
verdict ‘it is,’” to “wipe out reality.” But, as Rand avers, “existence exists; reality is not to be 
wiped out; [such attempts] merely wipe out the wiper” (Rand 1957: 1017-1018).118
The nature and the consequences of Wollen’s context dropping are most clearly evidenced in his 
efforts to theorize the significance and proclaim the value of Godard’s films. If, as Wollen 
contends, criticism necessarily depends upon knowing (a) that an artwork exists, (b) what the 
artwork is, and (c) what the artwork means – which it does – then it likewise depends upon the 
objective existence of artworks the identities, meanings, and value of which it is the task of 
criticism to determine and adjudicate. If, however, the fundamental premises of a critical 
methodology dictate that artworks do not objectively exist, then the only possible way to produce 
criticism is to drop the context; steal the concepts of objectivity, identity, and causality; and blank 
out on the fact that the criticism produced contradicts the premises of the critical methodology per 
which the criticism has ostensibly been produced. And, sure enough, this is the exact trajectory 
followed by Wollen as he builds up to his “paean of praise” for Godard. In order to praise Godard 
and to insist on the development of a Godardian “counter cinema” on the one hand and a critical 
methodology capable of adequately interpreting and evaluating such a counter cinema on the other 
(Wollen 1972, [1972] 2009, 1976), Wollen drops the context of his poststructuralist methodology; 
steals the concepts of objectivity, identity, and causality; and blanks out on the fact that the 
criticism produced within the pages of Signs and Meaning in the Cinema contradicts the terms of 
the poststructuralist methodology Signs and Meaning in the Cinema is ostensibly meant to 
118 From a similar vantage point, and on similar grounds, Charles Sanders Peirce derided “the person who confesses 
that there is such a thing as truth … and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid 
it” and summarily rejected such a “sorry state of mind” (Peirce 1877: 1018). Analogizing this sorry state of mind to 
“when an ostrich buries its head in the sand,” Peirce acknowledged the possibility that “a man may go through life 
systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions” (Peirce 1877: 1014). However, 
contrary to such cowardice, Peirce encouraged the following (distinctly perfectionist) stance: “A clear logical 
conscience does cost something – just as any virtue, just as all that we cherish, costs us dear. But we should not desire 
it to be otherwise. The genius of a man’s logical method should be loved and reverenced as his bride … She is the one 
that he has chosen, and he knows that he was right in making that choice. And, having made it, he will work and fight 
for her, and will not complain that there are blows to take, hoping that there may be as many and as hard to give, and 
will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of whose splendors he draws his inspiration 
and his courage” (Peirce 1877: 1018). Incidentally, Peirce’s choice to analogize blanking out to ostriches burying their 
heads in the sand was apt; recently, the evolutionary behavioral scientist Gad Saad coined the diagnostic term “Ostrich 
Parasitic Syndrome” for this degenerate impulse (Saad 2016d, 2017c, 2017d).
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establish.119 The question that remains: If one must drop the context of one’s critical methodology 
in order to produce criticism, then should one not simply drop the critical methodology? 
Given that throughout this chapter I have worked to elucidate the myriad fallacies, contradictions, 
and equivocations entailed in the poststructuralist objection to authorship and to demonstrate the 
logical and moral consequences of embracing, in any critical methodology, for any purpose, the 
deleterious philosophical premises of poststructuralism, it should be no surprise that my answer is 
a resounding, “Yes!” Perhaps slightly more surprising – and very encouraging – is the fact that, by 
1997, nearly three decades after he had begun the influential investigation that was conducted 
within the pages of Signs and Meaning in the Cinema and that set the course for film studies, Peter 
Wollen had acknowledged that film studies needed a new foundation on which to build a new 
aesthetics of cinema: 
When you make a film, you ask yourself whether a cut is good or bad, whether a way of delivering 
a line is good or bad, whether a camera movement is good or bad. Production mainly consists of 
judgments about value and quality. Critics and theorists shouldn’t try to insulate themselves from 
a discourse which is so intrinsic to [artistic] practice. After all, our natural response after seeing a 
film at the cinema is to talk about whether it was good or bad … I strongly believe we need to make 
judgments of taste and then defend them with rational arguments … Maybe that means a new 
aesthetics (Wollen 1997: 245). 
In Signs and Meaning in the Cinema, the extent of Wollen’s self-sabotage in the form of his 
adherence to the principles of poststructuralism was grave but not fatal. While his example is proof 
of the deleteriousness of poststructuralism, it is also proof of the redemptive power of reason. Rand 
once expressed the sentiment that “no man can predict the time when others will choose to return 
to reason” (Rand 1957: 771). If, as she believed, “it is impossible to predict the time of a 
philosophical Renaissance,” then the most that one can do is “define the road to follow” (Rand 
119 Though it is beyond the scope of my present critique, it is worth mentioning that Wollen’s notion of a Godardian 
“counter cinema” inspired him to produce more than just film criticism. In addition to collaborating on the screenplay 
for Michelangelo Antonioni’s The Passenger (1975), Wollen also made in collaboration with Laura Mulvey two 
avant-garde films, Penthesilea (1974) and Riddles of the Sphinx (1977). For considerations of Wollen’s filmmaking 
practice in relation to his critical premises, see Britton (1979: 412-413, 424) and Rodowick ([1988] 1994: 244-247).   
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[1969] 1975: 115). It is from this perspective that I will now turn away from poststructuralism and 
set about defining the road to follow towards an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema.  
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2 
Objectivism and the Future of Film Studies 
Do you wish to continue the battle of your present or do you wish to fight for my world? Do you wish to 
continue a struggle that consists of clinging to precarious ledges in a sliding descent to the abyss, a struggle 
where the hardships you endure are irreversible and the victories you win bring you closer to destruction? 
Or do you wish to undertake a struggle that consists of rising from ledge to ledge in a steady ascent to the 
top, a struggle where the hardships are investments in your future and the victories bring you irreversibly 
closer to the world of your moral ideal? 
– Ayn Rand (1957: 1068)  
In the previous chapter, I expressed a desire to see debates in film studies and the epistemological 
and axiological commitments taken up by film scholars transformed. For too long, film studies has 
been bogged down by a host of irrational and immoral ideas, many of which have found their most 
extreme and influential expression in the philosophical school of poststructuralism. While the 
previous chapter consisted of, to borrow a phrase from Andrew Britton, “the necessary demolition 
work” (Britton 1986: 384), the present chapter will undertake the necessary construction work 
towards the goal of building an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. To this end, I will return to and 
expand upon the discussion in the Introduction of the Objectivist aesthetics. Through extensive 
considerations of the processes of interpreting a film on the one hand and evaluating a film on the 
other, I will establish the foundation on which scholars can enable themselves to objectively 
interpret and evaluate films. Rand once remarked that the formulation of aesthetic principles to 
guide objective interpretations and evaluations of artworks was “a task at which modern 
philosophy has failed dismally” (Rand [1969] 1975: 33). It will be the goal of this chapter to 
demonstrate that the Objectivist aesthetics is more than up to the task. 
The Objectivist aesthetics falls in line with a tradition in aesthetics that may be characterized as 
Aristotelian, the chief opposition to which has been a tradition that may be characterized as Kantian 
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(of which poststructuralist aesthetics is a contemporary and extreme variant).120 To claim, as 
Barthes does, that an artwork is less like a “message” and more like “the thread of a stocking” 
(Barthes 1967: 147), or to claim, as Derrida does, that an artwork is “a world of signs without fault, 
without truth, and without origin” (Derrida 1966: 369), is to claim that an artwork is “purposive 
without purpose.” The Kantian basis for such claims as those made by Barthes and Derrida (and 
countless others) is often taken to be a section of Kant’s Critique of Judgment titled “Analytic of 
the Beautiful” (Kant [1790] 2007: 35-74). In this section (in which Kant is importantly concerned 
with objects of nature, not art), Kant discusses the concept of aesthetic purposiveness in the 
following terms: 
Purposiveness, therefore, may exist apart from a purpose, insofar as we do not locate the causes of 
this form in a will … [Hence], we may at least observe a purposiveness with respect to form and 
trace it in objects – though by reflection only – without resting it on an end (Kant [1790] 2007: 52). 
Additionally, following David Hume, Kant anchored his consideration of aesthetic judgments in 
judgments of beauty and taste as opposed to meaning and value. I argued in the previous chapter 
that Barthes’ quasi-Kantian conception of an artwork as analogous to the thread of a stocking 
entails a reconceptualization of what an artwork is/does. By the same token, such a quasi-Kantian 
reconceptualization of what an artwork is/does requires a further reconceptualization of what 
criticism is/does. The consequences of the Kantian aesthetic tradition for the practice of criticism 
are spelled out by Carroll: 
Critics have a taste for beauty that is analogous to the sensitivity for sweetness that certain of our 
taste buds possess … Because critical taste is being analogized so closely to sensory taste, and 
beauty is being associated with sensations like sweetness, the use of the very model of taste for 
critical judgment brings with it not only the notion that critical approbation (or disapprobation) is 
120 Despite the heuristic value in framing the aesthetic battle in this fashion, there are, of course, innumerable 
discriminations and specifications that can and should be made with respect to the attempts of individual philosophers 
to fashion philosophies of art. For my purposes here, one such discrimination that must be made at the outset is that 
what scholars invested in the Kantian aesthetic tradition have taken from Kant and fashioned as their Kantian 
philosophies of art are often not, strictly speaking, Kantian philosophies of art. Rather than explore Kant’s arguments 
relating to art, the vast majority of scholars have concerned themselves solely with Kant’s broader philosophy of 
aesthetic beauty. For more on the ramifications of this dubious prerogative, see Barrowman (2018a). See also Carroll 
(1991, 1998) and Kamhi (2003, 2014). 
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subjective, in the literal sense of being in the subject (where, in fact, all experiences belong), but 
also the suggestion that critical judgments are subjective in the contemporary sense of being highly 
personal, individual, widely variant, and even idiosyncratic. The latter surmise follows smoothly 
from the analogy between critical approval (Taste with a capital T) and taste (with a small t). For, 
we know that gustatory taste is extremely variable – highly personal and even idiosyncratic. So, 
isn’t it reasonable to suppose that Taste is likewise? (Carroll 2009: 157-158). 
The problems caused by the Kantian aesthetic tradition are numerous, and they are by no means 
limited to poststructuralists. Quite the contrary. For as unfortunate as this is, though, it should 
come as no surprise, for, as Carroll points out, “Kant is probably the last philosopher whom the 
various diverse traditions of Western philosophy share in common” (Carroll 1998: 107). Thus, an 
overarching concern of this chapter will be to repudiate the Kantian aesthetic tradition in favor of 
the Aristotelian tradition. To start, I will consider the most pressing concerns in the realm of film 
interpretation in an effort to justify – metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically – an 
intentionalist philosophy of art anchored by the axiom of authorship. 
I 
Objectivity and Interpretation 
Inspired by John Crowe Ransom’s characterization of literary criticism, David Bordwell famously 
labeled the discipline of film studies “Interpretation, Inc.” (Bordwell 1989c: 26). Despite the many 
changes in theoretical fashion, interpreting films quickly became and has since remained “a going 
concern to be maintained at all costs” (Bordwell 1989c: 26). At the same time, and again despite 
the many changes in theoretical fashion, interpretation has suffered from the persistence of 
premises deriving from the Kantian tradition. In this and the following section, I will focus on the 
two following Kantian premises: First, that artworks are purposive without purpose, which is to 
say, artworks are objects of free beauty; second, that aesthetic judgments are judgments of taste, 
which is to say, aesthetic judgments are subjective.  
Given that this tradition has its roots in (misapplications of) Kantian philosophy, it will be useful 
initially to refute these premises in Kantian terms. The first premise, that artworks are purposive 
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without purpose, presupposes that artworks are objects of what Kant calls free, as opposed to 
dependent, beauty. Kant explains the distinction in the following manner: 
There are two kinds of beauty: Free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) or beauty which is merely dependent 
(pulchritudo adhaerens). The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be; the second 
does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. Those of the 
first kind are said to be (self-subsisting) beauties of this thing or that thing; the other kind of beauty, 
being attached to a concept (conditioned beauty), is ascribed to objects which come under the 
concept of a particular end (Kant [1790] 2007: 60). 
Kant’s example of choice for an object of free beauty is a flower. According to Kant, “no perfection 
of any kind, no internal purposiveness as something to which the arrangement of the manifold is 
related,” underlies a judgment such as, “This flower is beautiful.” Since a flower is not “defined 
with respect to its end,” it may “please freely”; were it to be defined with respect to its end, it 
would introduce “an incumbrance which would only restrict the freedom of the imagination that, 
as it were, is at play in the contemplation of the outward form” (Kant [1790] 2007: 60). 
Extrapolating to a philosophy of film, the preceding implies the following: First, that an 
interpretation/evaluation of a film presupposes no concept of what the film should be (i.e. neither 
a concept of medium nor of genre), and, second, that an interpretation/evaluation of a film 
presupposes no perfection or internal purposiveness and instead inclines towards a freedom of 
imagination and play.  
This, however, seems to be at odds with how we actually engage with films in our everyday lives. 
Ordinarily, we not only presuppose a concept of “film,” we presuppose such concepts as “action 
film” or “horror film” or “romantic comedy,” and with them, an “answering perfection.” Added to 
which, we ordinarily interpret and evaluate films with respect to their ends based on their internal 
purposiveness, a purposiveness often attributed to the filmmakers. We also ordinarily restrict our 
imaginations in the contemplation of films to what can be plausibly attributed to the filmmakers. 
Thus, it would appear to be the case, in both ordinary and academic life, that films are most 
commonly and most naturally treated as objects of dependent beauty rather than objects of free 
beauty. Ironically, Kant meant for this distinction to “settle many disputes” in criticism, “for we 
may show [critics] how one side is dealing with free beauty and the other with that which is 
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dependent” (Kant [1790] 2007: 62). The reason that confusion rather than clarity has been Kant’s 
legacy is because occluded in his aesthetics is the concept of objectivity. Consider the following 
passage: 
In respect of an object with a determinate internal end, a judgement of taste would only be pure 
where the person judging either has no concept of this end, or else makes abstraction from it in his 
judgement. But in cases like this, although such a person should lay down a correct judgement of 
taste, since he would be judging the object as a free beauty, he would still be censured by another 
who saw nothing in its beauty but a dependent quality (i.e. who looked to the end of the object) and 
would be accused by him of false taste, though both would, in their own way, be judging correctly, 
the one according to what he had present to his senses, the other according to what was present in 
his thoughts (Kant [1790] 2007: 62). 
The key phrase here is “both would, in their own way, be judging correctly.” Applied to film, if I 
were to judge Inception (2010) as an attempt on the part of Christopher Nolan to neutralize the 
threat of skepticism and someone else were to judge it as an unsolvable puzzle that thwarts the 
notion of objective reality and embraces skepticism, then we would both, in our own way, be 
judging correctly. That is, if Inception is conceived as an object of free beauty, then one’s 
imagination may – indeed, should – be given free rein and the question of which interpretation is 
“right” need not – indeed, should not – be of any concern; if, however, Inception is conceived as 
an object of dependent beauty, then one’s imagination may not – indeed, should not – be given 
free rein and the question of which interpretation is right should – indeed, must – be of the utmost 
concern in order to ensure that one is attending to the object in its specificity, as an objectively 
existing artwork the meaning of which it is the responsibility of the critic to accurately interpret 
and conscientiously evaluate.121
To eliminate this confusion, we must agree on whether artworks are objects of free beauty or 
objects of dependent beauty. I have argued that they are objects of dependent beauty. If this is true 
– and I hope that I have convincingly demonstrated that it is – then not only does the first premise, 
121 This example was inspired by the exceedingly problematic interpretations of Inception that have been offered by 
the likes of, among (far too many) others, Mark Fisher (2011), Todd McGowan (2012), Ruth Tallman (2012), Jason 
Southworth (2012), and Dan Weijers (2012). 
105 
that artworks are purposive without purpose, go by the board; so, too, does the second premise, 
that aesthetic judgments are judgments of taste. I will deal with the second premise more 
thoroughly in the next section. For the moment, it is worth highlighting the fact that judging a film 
as an object of free beauty is not a matter of taste, it is not a subjective preference; it is a mistake, 
it is objectively wrong. In reference to Wollen’s waffling in Signs and Meaning in the Cinema vis-
à-vis the identity principle, I maintained that, recalling Rand’s “existence is identity” formula, if 
an artwork objectively exists, then it has an identity. Moreover, if an artwork has an identity, then 
it can be identified in criticism. The purpose of criticism, on this picture, would be to identify and 
interpret objectively existing artworks. Unfortunately for many scholars, this picture of criticism 
precludes the notion of free play attendant to objects of free beauty. Hence the all-too-familiar 
scholarly tactic of trying to have one’s cake and eat it – a tactic which, it warrants mentioning, was 
endorsed by Kant: 
Since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a 
concept, [aesthetic judgment] must found upon a mere sensation of the mutually enlivening activity 
of the imagination in its freedom and of the understanding with its conformity to law. It must 
therefore rest upon a feeling that allows the [artwork] to be estimated by the purposiveness of the 
representation (by which an [artwork] is given) for the furtherance of the cognitive faculties in their 
free play (Kant [1790] 2007: 117). 
Try as critics might to have this Kantian cake and eat it, once it is conceded that artworks are 
objects of dependent beauty, to proceed in criticism as if they are objects of free beauty (in pursuit 
of ideals of free play, infinite polysemy, différance, etc.) is childish obstinacy at best.122 As Cavell 
puts it with his characteristic equipoise: 
The idea of infinite possibility is the pain, and the balm, of adolescence. The only return on 
becoming adult, the only justice in forgoing that world of possibility, is the reception of actuality –
the pain and balm in the truth of the only world: That it exists, and I in it (Cavell [1971] 1979: 117). 
122 In his famous tract on “mysticism and logic,” Bertrand Russell identified this Kantian “attitude of mind” as 
antithetical to logic; contrariwise, Russell characterized logic as a matter, “in the interests of the desire to know,” of 
“sweeping away … any wish except to see [the object] as it is, and without any belief that what it is must be determined 
by some relation, positive or negative, to what we should like it to be” (Russell [1910] 1959: 44). 
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From a similar vantage point as the one from which Cavell designates philosophy “the education 
of grownups” (Cavell 1979: 125), the Objectivist aesthetics of cinema for which I am arguing may 
be designated criticism for grownups. Grownup criticism proceeds in accordance with the 
principles of objectivity, identity, and causality, and it sees in art not Kantian “finalities without 
end,” but rather, instances of Aristotelian final causation. Rand explains the logic of an Aristotelian 
philosophy of art in the following manner:  
I call your attention to Aristotle’s concepts of efficient and final causation. Efficient causation 
means that an event is determined by an antecedent cause. For instance, if you strike a match to a 
gasoline tank and it explodes, the striking of the match is the cause and the explosion is the effect. 
This is what we normally mean by causality as it exists in physical nature. Final causation means 
that the end result of a certain chain of causes determines those causes … Final causation applies 
only to the work of a conscious entity – specifically of a rational one – because only a thinking 
consciousness can choose a purpose ahead of its existence and then select the means to achieve it. 
In the realm of human action, everything has to be directed by final causation. If men allow 
themselves to be moved by efficient causation – if they act like determined beings, propelled by 
some immediate cause outside themselves – that is totally improper. (Even then, volition is 
involved: If a man decides to abandon purpose, that is also a choice, and a bad one.) Proper human 
action is action by means of final causation. An obvious example here pertains to writing. As a 
writer, you must follow the process of final causation: You decide on the theme of your book (your 
purpose), then select the events and the sentences that will concretize your theme. The reader, by 
contrast, follows the process of efficient causation: He goes step by step through your book being 
moved toward the abstraction you intended. Any purposeful activity follows the same progression 
(Rand [1958] 2000: 20-21).123
Furthermore, Rand clarifies (using her own literary work as an example) the “process of 
communication” (Rand [1969] 1975: 25) between authors and critics with reference to what she 
calls the “circle” of interpretation:
123 It bears mentioning that Rand is far from the only artist to adopt an Aristotelian perspective. The playwright and 
screenwriter Aaron Sorkin, for example, has vociferously urged all writers to consult Aristotle. As he puts it in his 
screenwriting Masterclass: “It’s the rules that make art not finger painting … [and] the rule book is the Poetics by 
Aristotle” (Sorkin 2016).
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When you compose a story, you start with an abstraction, then find the concretes which add up to 
that abstraction. For the reader, the process is reversed. He first perceives the concretes you present 
and then adds them up to the abstraction with which you started. I call this a “circle.” For instance, 
the theme of Atlas Shrugged is “the importance of reason” – a wide abstraction. To leave the reader 
with that message, I have to show what reason is, how it operates, and why it is important. The 
sequence on the construction of the John Galt Line is included for that purpose – to concretize the 
mind’s role in human life. The rest of the novel illustrates the consequences of the mind’s absence. 
In particular, the chapter on the tunnel catastrophe shows concretely what happens to a world where 
men do not dare to think or to take the responsibility of judgment. If, at the end of the novel, you 
are left with the impression, “Yes, the mind is important and we should live by reason,” these 
incidents are the cause. The concretes have summed up in your mind to the abstraction with which 
I started, and which I had to break down into concretes (Rand [1958] 2000: 13).124
For Rand, then, artworks very clearly have purposes, purposes which it is the responsibility of 
artists to be as clear, coherent, and consistent about in the creation of art as possible and which it 
is the responsibility of critics to be as discerning, precise, and scrupulous about in the criticism of 
art as possible. Already, however, the Objectivist aesthetics would appear to be faced with an 
insurmountable problem: What about (post)modernist/avant-garde/experimental art? I have 
claimed that it is wrong to proceed in criticism as if authorial intention is irrelevant and as if there 
is no objective meaning to be discovered in artworks. But am I not presupposing very specific 
kinds of artworks? What about artworks the purpose of which are to be ambiguous and to 
encourage the free play of subjective interpretations? Is the ontology of art presupposed by the 
Objectivist aesthetics not woefully restrictive? 
From an evaluative perspective, one could argue, as Rand does, that such art, if it is art at all, is 
merely “child’s play along its periphery” (Rand [1969] 1975: 75). I will return to this argument in 
the following section.125 For now, I would simply like to clarify that this ontological “problem” is, 
in reality, a pseudo-problem. As I demonstrated in my critique of “The Death of the Author,” the 
124 In another discussion of the circle of interpretation, she adds that “the creative process resembles a process of 
deduction [while] the viewing process resembles a process of induction” (Rand [1969] 1975: 25).
125 For the most elaborate ontological argument against such art from the Objectivist perspective, see Torres and 
Kamhi (2000a), according to whom such art is “more akin to madness, or to fraud, than to art” (Torres and Kamhi 
2000a: 1). See also Kamhi (2014). 
108 
idea that authors have sought to problematize in various ways and to varying degrees the concepts 
of authorship and objectivity still presupposes authorial intention (i.e. problematizing the concept 
of authorship is the authorial intention, is, in Kantian terms, the purpose) and objective meaning 
(i.e. the problematization of objectivity is the objective meaning). Applied to film, if I were to 
argue that it is impossible to objectively resolve the central enigma of Jim Jarmusch’s Broken 
Flowers (2005), in which a man receives at the beginning of the film an anonymous letter claiming 
that he fathered a child and who remains clueless at the end of the film as to the identity of the 
letter’s author and the veracity or spuriousness of the letter, this would in no way invalidate the 
concepts of authorship or objectivity, for the film’s ambiguity is intentional and the lack of a 
determinable, objective resolution to the film is its determinable, objective meaning. 
In fact, in an ironic twist of fate, clarifying this pseudo-problem allows me to make an additional 
and seemingly paradoxical point. Even though my previous efforts were to make the case that 
poststructuralism has no philosophical merit, I would like to stress that, from this, it does not follow 
that poststructuralism has no merit tout court. Its merit, I would argue, is hermeneutical rather than 
philosophical; that is to say, poststructuralism can potentially be of use as a hermeneutic tool even 
though it is not valid as a conceptual orientation. Malcolm Turvey makes this point with respect 
to psychoanalysis: 
The way psychoanalysis is used [is] for the most part … as a theory that generates interpretations. 
People will look at a Hitchcock film or a David Lynch film and say, “You can interpret this film 
through psychoanalytic theory.” You can, for example, interpret the behavior of a character as being 
motivated by unconscious desires or impulses. I see no problem with this because there are certain 
films and works of art that lend themselves very easily to psychoanalytic interpretation. And that’s 
no surprise, because the psychoanalytical view of human nature, broadly speaking, is one shared 
by many artists, and therefore they will design works in which characters have unconscious desires 
… It’s more problematic to me to say that psychoanalysis is true as a theory of mind and mentality 
… That seems to be a much more problematic enterprise (Turvey 2013: 90-91).126
126 My agreement with Turvey extends beyond theory to practice: While I share his sense of the dubiousness of 
psychoanalysis as an all-encompassing “theory of mind and mentality,” I have nevertheless generated an elaborate 
Lacanian interpretation of Hitchcock’s philosophy of filmic romance (Barrowman 2012b). 
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In a similar vein, I have argued that, as a philosophical perspective on metaphysical, 
epistemological, ethical, political, and aesthetic issues, poststructuralism is nonsense. As a 
hermeneutic tool, however, poststructuralism can be put to productive use when it comes to 
interpreting films concerned with poststructuralist hallmarks such as the phenomena of 
miscommunication and misunderstanding, the play of presence and absence, the impossibility of 
objective knowledge, etc. Cartesian skepticism may be nonsense, but interpreting The Matrix 
(1999) as if Descartes never conjured up that evil demon strikes me as an exercise in futility.127
Likewise, interpreting Jarmusch’s films as if Derrida never waxed philosophical on the vicissitudes 
of communication will make it difficult to come to terms with Jarmusch’s enigmatic dialogue and 
ambiguous narratives.128 In other words, selecting the proper interpretive tools for the job is a 
matter of knowing what the job requires. Speaking in such a register presupposes, of course, that 
it is possible to (objectively) know the job (i.e. the film) prior to opening one’s toolkit. That is, it 
presupposes that the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a given interpretive tool is 
determinable only with reference to the objective content of the film to be interpreted.  
If I have managed to dodge the ontological bullet, I must now dodge a series of epistemological 
bullets. First, have I not entered the realm of the chicken or the egg (or, to preserve Kantian 
terminology, the realm of “phenomena and noumena”)? Far from the objective content of a film 
(the “thing-in-itself”) determining the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a given interpretive 
tool, is it not the case that the interpretive tool “determines” the “objective content”? This is what 
I will refer to as the paradigm subjectivity argument, the “logic” of which is discernible in the 
following exemplary explication: 
Questions that bear on the institutional maintenance of the hermeneutical field as such [such as 
which interpretive tool is most appropriate for a given film] ... are not concerns which come after
the particular text in question or which are properly “extrinsic” to it – they are concerns which 
address the very definition of the textual artifact as an artifact. Insofar as the artifact is meaningful 
127 This example was inspired by the Cartesian interpretation of The Matrix elaborated by Thomas E. Wartenberg 
(2007: 55-75). 
128 This example was inspired by the Derridean interpretation of Dead Man (1995) elaborated by Evelina 
Kazakevičiūtė (2018).
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... it is because [scholars] continue to support the [hermeneutical] structures ... which read the 
artifact on their terms (Mowitt 1992: 214-215). 
The paradigm subjectivity argument has been running rampant in film studies for decades.129
Dudley Andrew has argued that “there is no objective truth about signification in films, only a 
tradition of reading them in such and such a way” (Andrew 1984: 14). Likewise, Slavoj Žižek has 
argued that postulating the existence of a given film as an “objective reality” merely “begs the 
question of what ‘objective reality’ means ... [for] the procedures of posing problems and finding 
solutions to them always and by definition occur within a certain [paradigm] that determines which 
problems are crucial and which solutions acceptable” (Žižek 2001: 17-18). It would appear that 
the paradigm subjectivity argument relies principally on the phenomenon of disagreement. Carroll 
comments on the frequency with which disagreement is adduced as evidence against the possibility 
of objective evaluation, to which he responds by stressing, as a corrective to the distortion that has 
followed from this, the far more common phenomenon of agreement (Carroll 2009: 32-43). I will 
return to this issue in the following section. For the moment, I wish to extend this argument to 
defend the possibility of objective interpretation.  
Obviously, so the argument goes, given the different philosophical/political/historical/critical 
perspectives/agendas of different paradigms, it stands to reason that different paradigms will have 
different investments and will thus “discover” different “objective truths” in the “same” artwork. 
Does this actually stand (up) to reason, though? Recall the controversy between Derrida and Lacan 
vis-à-vis Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Purloined Letter” (1844), which I briefly discussed 
in the previous chapter. Part of Derrida’s strategy was to use Marie Bonaparte as a foil; he indicates 
the numerous methodological differences and interpretive strategies that separate Lacan and 
Bonaparte in their interpretations of the story. Yet, at the conclusion of his consideration of Lacan 
avec Bonaparte, which corresponds to the point at which their interpretations “mysteriously” 
converge, he asks a question with very important consequences: 
129 Even though I am remaining within the disciplinary confines of film studies, the influence across both the sciences 
and the humanities of Thomas Kuhn cannot be overstated, for it was Kuhn who gave currency to the paradigm 
subjectivity argument with the simple yet destructively mistaken postulation that “a paradigm is prerequisite to 
perception itself” (Kuhn 1970: 113; cf. Sokal and Bricmont [1997] 1999: 67-73; Hicks 2004: 74-83; and Binswanger 
2014: 383-390). For further considerations of the paradigm subjectivity argument, see Barrowman (2018a, 2018c, 
2019b). 
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Why [if Lacan’s method is so different from Bonaparte’s] does [he] refind, along with the truth, 
the same meaning and the same topos as [she] did … Is this a coincidence? Is it a coincidence if, 
in allegedly breaking with psychobiographical criticism … one rejoins it in its ultimate semantic 
anchorage? (Derrida 1972a: 444). 
Put simply: No, it is not a coincidence. It is not a coincidence that, despite protestations against 
author-based criticism, Lacan ultimately “rejoins it” (any more than it is a coincidence that Derrida 
does the same in his own work). Nor is it a coincidence that, despite methodological differences 
and despite differences in interpretive strategies, Lacan’s interpretation fits neatly alongside 
Bonaparte’s (and, at some points, matches it exactly). After all, there is only so much that one can 
do with a finite amount of material.130 This point corresponds to what Paul Ricoeur formulates as 
the “injunction of the text” (Ricoeur [1981] 2016: 155), on which Britton expounds in his 
discussion of how, in the Objectivist terms of this thesis, the objective content of a film determines 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a given interpretive tool: 
By [“text,” Ricoeur means to indicate] a “made object,” an artifact which has a concrete existence 
in a certain order – an order which produces certain structures of meaning. These structures will be 
historically determinate and, variously, complex, mutually qualifying, or contradictory, but 
inasmuch as the text is, in Ricoeur’s phrase, “fixed by writing,” meaning is not arbitrary. That 
characteristic phenomenon of 20th Century art, the work which is, theoretically, interminable … 
does not imply that meaning is any the less determined by structures of made relations, any the less 
an “injunction of the text” … No one for a moment denies that … the text “comes into existence” 
in the reading … But, [poststructuralism] to the contrary … we must be concerned with “the 
integrity of the text” unless we prefer doodling to reading: The text always precedes the reader in 
a way which Ricoeur’s formulation suggests. The desire to avoid (quite rightly) any simple 
subject/object relation (the myth of “presence”) is perpetually in danger of denying the object 
altogether (Britton 1979: 424-425).  
130 Not to mention Poe is one of the most profoundly Aristotelian of authors; the meticulousness with which he 
structured his stories thus accounts for the inevitability of interpretive convergence regardless of paradigm allegiances. 
For more on this point, see Poe’s extraordinary breakdown of his writing process for “The Raven” (1845), in which 
he argues, in a spirit that Rand no doubt would have appreciated, that “nothing is more clear [sic] than that every plot 
worth the name must be elaborated to its dénouement before anything be attempted with the pen. It is only with the 
dénouement constantly in view that we can give a plot its indispensable air of consequence, or causation, by making 
the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the intention” (Poe [1846] 2012: 318, 
my emphases). 
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Indeed, as I have demonstrated repeatedly, not only is the object frequently denied, the concept of 
objectivity itself is frequently – necessarily – denied. The paradigm subjectivity argument leads 
inexorably to the patently ludicrous conclusion that interpretive paradigms are used not to 
(objectively) understand but to (subjectively) construct artworks. In response to this nonsensical 
notion, Britton was even more hostile:  
All intellectual fashions have their slogan, and the proposition that “theory constructs its objects,” 
seductive and comforting as it is, is now part of the thinking literary person’s commonsense. This 
proposition, when it is not a truism, is little more than a self‑ serving scholastic fiction and a license 
for intellectual irresponsibility, and that conception of theory is illegitimate in which the necessarily 
creative and formative nature of discourse is understood as a means of freeing the theory in question 
from the elementary critical obligation of demonstrating its own pertinence. Such theory is 
anti‑ theoretical, as well as a betrayal of the function of criticism (Britton 1986: 383). 
If, having debunked the paradigm subjectivity argument, I have managed to dodge the first 
epistemological bullet, the second bullet will not be far behind. Signaled by the above passage 
from Britton, the question has now become: What is the function of criticism? Let’s say it is 
conceded that artworks are objectively existing, intentional objects (or, in Kantian terms, objects 
of dependent beauty). If this is true – and, once again, I hope that I have convincingly demonstrated 
that it is – then the function of criticism is to interpret and evaluate such objects. To repeat Rand’s 
formulation in full: “Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification” (Rand 1957: 1016). If 
films objectively exist, then they have identities; if films have identities, then their identities can 
be identified. Interpretation, then, is the identification of the identities, or the meanings, of 
objectively existing films. Now I must dodge the second epistemological bullet: How can I know 
if I have correctly identified the identity of a given film? Even if it is conceded that objective 
interpretation is ontologically possible – a concession that I hope is now easier for scholars to make 
– is it epistemologically possible? Is it not the case that, eventually, I will be forced to admit that, 
no matter how thorough or sophisticated a given interpretation of mine may be, I have no grounds 
on which to claim that I know the interpretation to be right?  
This is what I will refer to as the aesthetic skepticism argument. Incidentally, it is on this issue that 
Wollen’s point that a critic puts his consciousness “at risk” in every engagement with an artwork 
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(Wollen 1972: 139) hits with its greatest impact. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 
Objectivist sense that thinking is volitional rather than automatic and subject to error rather than 
infallible, Wollen’s point is absolutely true. To then claim, as Wollen did (and, truth be told, as all 
scholars with an affinity for poststructuralism or the Kantian aesthetic tradition invariably do), that 
artworks are subjective constructs which do not objectively exist, which have no essential 
meaning, and which neither originate in nor emanate from human consciousness, however, is to 
try to eliminate that risk. But that risk cannot be eliminated. Every interpretation, as with every 
knowledge claim, comes with the risk of being wrong. Thus, as it relates to film interpretation, the 
answer to the question “How do I know?” can only be answered in what Cavell refers to as a 
specific “act of criticism” (Cavell [1971] 1979: 219), an act in which the critic willingly and 
bravely decides, as Daniel Morgan puts it, to “play with danger” (Morgan 2014). In order to avoid 
such critical danger, scholars all-too-frequently go the route of the Kantian “Copernican 
Revolution” and demand films conform to their interpretations of them. In the hopes of making 
less appealing to grownup critics this route of the child smashing or biting off parts of puzzle 
pieces to make them fit into whatever slot he wants, I would like to attempt, before getting into the 
specifics of the aesthetic skepticism argument, to blunt the force of the general skepticism fueling 
it.  
The first source of unease motivating any form of skepticism is likely to be the concept of 
knowledge deployed. In the Introduction, I described what Cavell refers to as the truth of 
skepticism, that “what skepticism questions or denies my knowledge of is the world of objects I 
inhabit, is the world” (Cavell 1979: 448). From this point, he argues that the desire of skeptics to 
know with certainty the existence of the world paradoxically gives ground to “a sense of 
powerlessness” in the face of “the precariousness and arbitrariness of existence, the utter 
contingency in the fact that things are as they are” (Cavell 1979: 236), thus leading skeptics to 
embrace subjectivism and to replace the (objective) world – or, in the terms of aesthetic skepticism, 
the (objective) film – with a (subjective) world/film they fancy as subject to their whims. 
Expanding on this argument, Cavell shifts to what he refers to as the moral of skepticism, that “the 
human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of
knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (Cavell 1979: 241). 
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The key phrase is obviously “what we think of as knowing.” What do we think of as knowing?131
More often than not – and always in skeptical arguments – the concept of knowledge deployed is 
some sort of quasi-Hegelian “Absolute Knowledge” to rival the omniscience enjoyed by God. In 
response to this tendency, Cavell asks: “What rootlessness, or curse, made us, lets us, think of our 
basis in this way?” (Cavell 1979: 241). Religion is one obvious curse.132 The intrinsic/subjective 
dichotomy is another. A third source of confusion, and one with direct relevance for the aesthetic 
skepticism argument, is the very language of criticism. When critics discuss the interpretation of 
a film, is the implication not that they know the one and only true interpretation? In addition to a 
confused conception of knowledge, it turns out that there is also often floating around in aesthetics 
a confused conception of truth, one which Carroll rejects under the heading of “the final word 
conception of truth” according to which “a proposition about some state of affairs x is true if and 
only if that proposition exhausts x to such an extent that there is nothing left to be said about x.” 
This, to Carroll’s mind, is “simply a nonstarter,” although the currency of this “phony conception 
of truth” does at least help to clarify one of the reasons that aesthetic skepticism gains purchase. 
Carroll acknowledges the possibility of scholars being misled “by the fact that we sometimes speak 
of the interpretation of an artwork,” the definite article implying, as already indicated, the one and 
only true interpretation; however, he also avers that “generally we are speaking of an interpretation 
of a work,” an interpretation which, moreover, “may be complemented or supplemented or 
otherwise enlarged by others” (Carroll 2009: 125).
A proponent of the aesthetic skepticism argument may consider the refutation of “the final word 
conception of truth” as conceding skepticism, for am I not endorsing the claim that there is no one 
“right” interpretation of an artwork? Indeed, does this position not also unwittingly let the 
paradigm subjectivity argument back in? Am I not conceding that, since there are only 
interpretations of an artwork, different interpretations generated by different paradigms may, in 
Kantian terms, each be correct in their own way? In fact, I am conceding that different 
interpretations generated by different paradigms may each be correct in their own way. But this is 
131 For a stirringly ambitious attempt to unpack this question from a psychological perspective, see Peterson (1999: 
237-242). From the Objectivist perspective, meanwhile, Binswanger (2014) has provided an astonishingly shrewd and 
precisely articulated explication of what we know and how we know it. 
132 For insights into the anti-theological thrust of Objectivism, see Rand (1934a, [1943] 2007, 1957, [1945, 1948a, 
1950, 1961c, 1963b] 1995), Michael S. Berliner (1981), Peikoff (1982, 1986), and Binswanger (2014).  
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a far cry from endorsing the aesthetic skepticism argument and/or the paradigm subjectivity 
argument. It is, by contrast, what I will refer to as the complimentary paradigm argument.  
To clarify the terms of this argument, consider the following example. On the one hand, according 
to a psychoanalytic paradigm, I could interpret the coming-of-age romantic comedy Secret 
Admirer (1985) – which, much like Broken Flowers, revolves around the authorship and veracity 
of a series of anonymous letters received, rightly or wrongly, by the central characters – as an 
expression of Lacan’s thesis that “a letter always arrives at its destination” (Lacan 1966: 30); on 
the other hand, according to a deconstructionist paradigm, I could interpret the film in light of what 
Derrida describes as the “postal principle” (Derrida 1979: 189-193); still not exhausted by these 
two competing paradigms, I could even interpret the film according to an ordinary language 
paradigm as an indication of the centrality of intention in “performative utterances” (Austin 
1962b). These paradigms may not be philosophically compatible, but they each illuminate aspects 
of Secret Admirer based on their respective hermeneutic strengths. And, brought together, the 
interpretations of crucial aspects of the film generated by these three paradigms contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of the film’s objective content, which is neither determined 
by nor exhausted by a single paradigm. 
As this example should make clear, what is crucially missing in the paradigm subjectivity 
argument is the concept of objectivity (hence its name). Since there is allegedly no objectively 
existing film, each paradigm is free to generate myriad interpretation(s) without worrying about 
right and wrong (for on what grounds could one even claim an interpretation to be right or wrong?). 
The key to avoiding confusion on this point is to know at what level claims of right and wrong 
ought to be pitched. Preserving the example of Secret Admirer, if I were to claim that the Lacanian 
interpretation on the basis of which the film proves that a letter always arrives at its destination is 
true, the implication, as Carroll points out, is that the Lacanian interpretation exhausts the meaning 
to be discovered, that the Lacanian interpretation says all there is to say about the film. It may be 
true that, for a given film, a certain paradigm affords a more comprehensive interpretation than 
any other paradigm; it is unlikely, however, that any one paradigm could exhaust an entire film.  
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But the point is that none of this is in any way problematic for either the complimentary paradigm 
argument or the concept of objectivity as such. It is simply to acknowledge a fact about 
interpretation – a fact, moreover, that connects art and its criticism in a very important respect. In 
the same vein as Rand defines art as the selective recreation of reality, I will define interpretation 
as the selective recreation of artworks. Having similarly intuited the necessarily selective nature 
of interpretation, Cavell has argued that the completion of an interpretation “is not a matter of 
providing all interpretations but a matter of seeing one of them through” (Cavell 1981a: 37), the 
benefit of which for criticism is the way it “leaves open to investigation what the relations are” 
between a film, an interpretation of a film, and complimentary/conflicting interpretations of a film 
(Cavell 1981a: 38). 
The proponent of the aesthetic skepticism argument is likely still skeptical. I may have usefully 
clarified certain facets of interpretation, but even if it is conceded that films are objectively 
existing, intentional objects; even if it is conceded that interpretation is an objective process; and 
even if it is conceded that objective interpretation is a necessarily selective process the focus of 
which is on selected aspects of films and not entire films, I still have not addressed the problem of 
the alleged groundlessness of the process. That is, I still have not answered the fundamental 
question: How do I know? If it is my goal to build an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema anchored 
by the axiom of authorship, such a goal would imply that I believe authors to be the most obvious 
sources of knowledge about artworks. But how can I know an author’s intentions? To answer this 
question, I will have to clarify the terms of the intentionalist philosophy of art logically entailed 
by an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema. 
To this point, I have been concerned in this thesis with relations between individuals and the 
external world. In my considerations of skepticism, I have therefore not surprisingly focused 
primarily on one side of the skepticism coin, viz. skepticism of the external world (or, in the terms 
of the aesthetic skepticism argument, skepticism of the external film). But there are two sides to 
the skepticism coin. The other side of the skepticism coin is skepticism of other minds (or, in the 
terms of the aesthetic skepticism argument, skepticism of authorial minds). Having reached the 
point of considering the possibilities of an intentionalist philosophy of art, I have also reached the 
point at which I must deal with this other side of the skepticism coin. With respect to skepticism 
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of the external world, Cavell has argued that the final destination reached by skeptics is insanity 
(Cavell 1979: 447)133; with respect to skepticism of other minds, however, he has argued that the 
final destination reached by skeptics is tragedy (Cavell 1979: 389-496). Skepticism of the external 
world is, for Cavell, the easier dilemma to solve. As he puts it, recalling his discussion of “living 
one’s skepticism,” to say that one cannot live skepticism of the external world “is to say that there 
is an alternative to its conclusion that [one is] bound, as a normal human being, to take” (Cavell 
1979: 448). Therefore, if one does not take that conclusion, one is clearly not normal (one is, to 
recall the remark of Wittgenstein’s invoked vis-à-vis Barthes’ aesthetic hedonism, demented). 
Skepticism of other minds is, epistemologically and ethically, the far more difficult dilemma, for 
“there is no such alternative, or no such conclusion” (Cavell 1979: 448). 
Interestingly, part of Cavell’s strategy in dealing with skepticism of other minds is to observe that, 
despite being of greater difficulty to resolve, it is, logically speaking, rarely as radical as skepticism 
of the external world. The endpoint of the skeptical argument against the external world is often 
that it is not only unknowable, it may not even exist; the endpoint of the skeptical argument against 
other minds, however, is often only that they are unknowable. The existence of other minds is 
rarely doubted. As Cavell expresses it, “the other is [often] left, along with his knowledge of 
himself; so am I, along with mine” (Cavell 1979: 353). And yet, despite the fact that, in the terms 
of the aesthetic skepticism argument, the existence of authorial minds is often conceded, it is 
likewise far more difficult for scholars to acknowledge the authorial mind than to acknowledge 
the external film. Cavell maintains that “the alternative to my acknowledgment of the other is not 
my ignorance of him but my avoidance of him, call it my denial of him” (Cavell 1979: 389). 
Proponents of the aesthetic skepticism argument tend to rely, in their last-ditch attempts to justify 
the avoidance/denial of authors, on two further epistemological objections. 
133 Sounding a similar note, the famous 18th Century Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler once observed: “If a clown 
should take it into his head to conceive such [radical] doubt and should say, for example, he does not believe that his 
bailiff exists, though he stands in his presence, he would be taken for a madman, and with good reason; but when a 
philosopher advances such sentiments, he expects we should admire his knowledge and sagacity, which infinitely 
surpass the apprehensions of the vulgar” (Euler [1761] 1802: 375). Euler’s sentiment corresponds with the sentiment 
in Wittgenstein’s humorous parable: “I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again, ‘I know 
that that’s a tree,’ pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: ‘This fellow 
isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy’” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 61e). The point, as Alan Sokal and Jean 
Bricmont explain, is that “no one is systemically skeptical (when he or she is sincere)” (Sokal and Bricmont [1997] 
1999: 53, my emphases). 
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The first and most common epistemological objection to acknowledging the author is that nobody 
is psychic. I cannot possibly know what Martin Scorsese was thinking when he devised the camera 
movement during Robert De Niro’s uncomfortably awkward phone call to Cybill Shepherd 
following their disastrous date in Taxi Driver (1976)…or can I? Do I need to be a psychic to be 
able to be a mind reader? Carroll points out that, short of being psychics, we nevertheless spend 
most of our time reading minds: 
Mind reading, as the evolutionary psychologists call it, is one of the most important advantages 
that natural selection has bequeathed to human beings. The man lines up to the hot dog stand and 
the vendor recognizes that he intends to buy a frankfurter. My secretary knocks on my door, and I 
infer she needs something signed. The driver stops behind my parking space and waits for me to 
pull out; I suspect he wants my space. We spend our days and nights reading the minds of our 
conspecifics continuously, and a simply stunning number of our surmises are correct. Other people 
are hardly consummately unfathomable. We are wrong on numerous occasions, but most of us are 
right far more often than we are wrong. If we weren’t, neither our life nor human life in general 
would probably last for long. But if we are so good at grocking intentions in everyday life, why 
suppose we sour at it when we turn to art? (Carroll 2009: 71)134
This would appear to be one epistemological objection down. The second epistemological 
objection is that nobody is a medium. If I claim, short of being a psychic, to be able to read 
Scorsese’s mind and “divine” his intentions in Taxi Driver, there is at least the possibility of having 
my claims verified by the author. What about my claims for Charlie Chaplin’s intentions in making 
The Circus (1928)? I certainly cannot ask him to verify my claims. In this instance (and, truthfully, 
in all instances of interpretation), I must let the reasoning in my interpretation stand against any 
objections. This is where the Wittgensteinian notion of “bedrock” becomes relevant (Wittgenstein 
[1949] 1967: 3 [§1], 85 [§217]). Cavell relates how the persistence of the “How do I know?” 
question is the reason why skepticism, “should we feel its power, is devastating: [The skeptic] is 
not challenging a particular belief or set of beliefs about, say, other minds; he is challenging the 
ground of our beliefs altogether, our power to believe at all” (Cavell 1969b: 240). With reference 
134 Additionally, Carroll quickly acknowledges the follow-up objection: That sometimes there are aspects of films that 
were not intended (either not consciously intended or simply accidental). He also quickly points out, in perfect 
accordance with the Objectivist position on concept stealing, that the identification of something as being unintended 
presupposes knowledge of what was intended (Carroll 2009: 79; see also MacDowell and Zborowski 2013). 
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to the aesthetic skepticism argument, the persistence of the “How do I know?” question has led 
countless scholars to the erroneous belief that it is impossible to actually know what a film means. 
To avoid making this error, scholars must recognize the nonsensical argumentative protocols on 
which skepticism relies for its “power.” 
If I answer the “How do I know?” question by formulating an interpretation (which, in effect, is 
an answer in the form of “This is how I know”) but the skeptic remains skeptical, then I have 
reached bedrock. The point that I wish to make with reference to the Wittgensteinian notion of 
bedrock is that if, in response to my answer (in the form of an interpretation) to the “How do I 
know?” question, the skeptic cannot produce a counterargument (in the form of an alternate 
interpretation), then I may consider the question answered and the interpretation correct. Of course, 
in lieu of a counterargument, skeptics often have recourse, as a corollary to the “How do I know?” 
question, to the statement “Maybe you are wrong.” But this pseudo-rebuttal, as Leonard Peikoff 
(1981) has cogently argued, is merely the hollow Hail Mary of skepticism; it is not a 
counterargument to be rebutted in turn. Moreover, as Wittgenstein argues, the position from which 
the “Maybe you are wrong” statement is uttered betrays “a false picture of doubt” (Wittgenstein 
[1951] 1969: 33e). Wittgenstein explains his logic by way of two examples of this false picture: 
If someone said that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, 
tried to make sure it wasn’t “all done by mirrors,” etc., we should not be sure whether we ought to 
call that doubting. We might describe his way of behaving as like the behavior of doubt, but his 
game would not be ours (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 33e-34e, my emphasis). 
If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body, I should take him to be a half-wit. 
But I shouldn’t know what it would mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I had said 
something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why (Wittgenstein [1951] 
1969: 34e). 
Austin, for his part, takes a similar tack. Wittgenstein remarks that doubt is epistemologically 
valid, but only “in particular circumstances” (Wittgenstein [1951] 1969: 33e). It is from this 
position that Austin argues the following: 
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Doubt or question[ing] … has always (must have) a special basis, there must be some “reason for 
suggesting” [the “How do I know?” question/“Maybe you are wrong” statement] in the sense of 
some specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that [I do not know] 
… [Otherwise] I am entitled to ask, “How do you mean?” … The wile of the [skeptic] consists in 
[asking the “How do I know?” question/making the “Maybe you are wrong” statement without] 
specifying or limiting what may be wrong with [the argument], so that I feel at a loss “how to 
prove” it (Austin [1946] 1961: 55).135
“Fair enough,” a skeptic may say at this point. I may have convincingly defended my proposed 
Objectivist aesthetics of cinema and the author-based critical methodology presupposed by it on 
both metaphysical and epistemological grounds. But I have yet to defend it on ethical grounds. 
Even if films are objectively existing, intentional objects; even if the interpretation of films is an 
objective process; and even if it is possible in the formulation of interpretations to ground 
knowledge of films in the intentions of their respective authors, why should interpretation be 
concerned with authorial intention? A skeptic may have recourse at this point to what is commonly 
referred to as the “is-ought gap” and claim, following Hume, that what one ought to do does not 
automatically follow from what is the case – or, translating this Humean dilemma into Kantian 
terms, as often happens, what is the case does not automatically generate an imperative. 
But this ethical “problem” is yet another pseudo-problem. Hume was wrong (as was Kant after 
him) to implicitly shift the terms of “ought” to (an unconditional) “must.” This, in effect, betrays 
a desire for ethics to be taken out of our (human) hands, for choice (and responsibility) to be 
removed from the equation. Against this picture, Rand emphasizes that ethical action “is a process 
of reason, of thought; it is not automatic nor instinctive nor involuntary nor infallible. Man has to 
initiate it, to sustain it, and to bear responsibility for its results” (Rand 1961a: 11). Aesthetically 
speaking, Cavell frames the ethical responsibilities involved in art, for both authors and critics, in 
the following terms: 
135 Austin’s famous example in his discussion is the goldfinch, with reference to which he expounds: “If you say, 
‘That's not enough’ [to claim that you know that what is before you is a goldfinch], then you must have in mind some 
more or less definite lack. ‘To be a goldfinch, besides having a red head it must also have the characteristic eye-
markings,’ or, ‘How do you know it isn’t a woodpecker? Woodpeckers have red heads, too.’ If there is no definite 
lack, which you are at least prepared to specify on being pressed, then it’s silly (outrageous) just to go on saying, 
‘That’s not enough’” (Austin [1946] 1961: 52).
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In morality, tracing an intention limits a man’s responsibility; in art, it dilates it completely. The 
artist is responsible for everything that happens in his work – and not just in the sense that it is 
done, but in the sense that it is meant. It is a terrible responsibility; very few [artists] have the gift 
and the patience and the singleness to shoulder it. But it is all the more terrible, when it is
shouldered, not to appreciate it, to refuse to understand something meant so well (Cavell 1967: 
236-237). 
This is, in relation to the aesthetic skepticism argument, the nature of the tragedy that results from 
skepticism of authorial minds. It is important to note, however, that, even though in the previous 
chapter I exposed the essence of the altruistic aesthetics promulgated by poststructuralists as an 
Aesthetics of Death, it does not follow that critics must promulgate an Aesthetics of Life. If a critic 
does not value (his) life, then it follows that he will not act for the sake of (his) life and will, 
instead, act as a(/his own) destroyer. This ability to act as our own destroyers is one of our less 
noble traits as human beings, and one on which Rand had the following to say: 
Man has the power to act as his own destroyer – and that is the way he has acted through most of 
his history. A living entity that regarded its means of survival as evil would not survive. A plant 
that struggled to mangle its roots [or] a bird that fought to break its wings would not remain for 
long in the existence they affronted. But the history of man has been a struggle to deny and to 
destroy his mind. Man has been called a rational being, but rationality is a matter of choice – and 
the alternative his nature offers him is: Rational being or suicidal animal (Rand 1957: 1013).136
This is why, as I clarified in the Introduction, Rand’s conception of moral perfection is “an 
unbreached rationality – not the degree of your intelligence, but the full and relentless use of your 
mind, not the extent of your knowledge, but the acceptance of reason as an absolute” (Rand 1957: 
1059). This is also why, despite my best efforts to prove that poststructuralism (and, indeed, the 
entire Kantian aesthetic tradition) has no philosophical merit, my arguments will have no effect 
until the goal of poststructuralism (and the Kantian tradition) is acknowledged as a breach of 
rationality and rejected. Rand clarifies this point in a discussion of economics: 
136 On a similar note, Cavell sees philosophy as concerning “those necessities we cannot, being human, fail to know. 
Except that nothing is more human than to deny them” (Cavell 1965: 96).
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People are not embracing collectivism because they have accepted bad economics. They are 
accepting bad economics because they have embraced collectivism. You cannot reverse cause and 
effect. And you cannot destroy the cause by fighting the effect. That is as futile as trying to eliminate 
the symptoms of a disease without attacking its germs. Marxist (collectivist) economics have been 
blasted, refuted, and discredited quite thoroughly … yet people go right on accepting Marxism. If 
you look into the matter closely, you will see that most people know in a vague, uneasy way that 
Marxist economics are screwy. Yet, this does not stop them from advocating the same Marxist 
economics. Why? … [Because] that which society accepts as its purpose and ideal (or, to be exact, 
that which men think society should accept as its purpose and ideal) determines the kind of 
economics men will advocate and attempt to practice … [So,] when the social goal chosen is by its 
very nature impossible and unworkable (such as collectivism), it is useless to point out to people 
that the means they’ve chosen to achieve it are unworkable. Such means go with such a goal; there 
are no others. You cannot make men abandon the means until you have persuaded them to abandon 
the goal (Rand 1946: 257-258).
I have already demonstrated the consequences of pursuing the goal of free play for art, that it 
entails nothing less than the destruction of art. I have not demonstrated, however, the consequences 
of pursuing free play for criticism. Contrary to the violence entailed by aesthetic hedonism, I 
argued that the moral alternative is a conception of art which is not predicated on looting, on 
demanding and taking the unearned, but on trading. In line with the discussion in the Introduction 
of Rand’s emphasis on trade as “the moral symbol of respect for human beings” (Rand 1057: 
1022), I offered a conception of art as trade and authors and critics as traders. The nature of 
aesthetic trade is similar to the exchange of ideas in a conversation. Carroll provides a useful 
formulation for understanding our engagement with an author’s work as akin to entering into a 
conversation with him: 
When we read a literary text or contemplate a painting, we enter a relationship with its creator that 
is roughly analogous to a conversation. Obviously, it is not as interactive as an ordinary 
conversation, for we are not receiving spontaneous feedback concerning our own responses. But 
just as an ordinary conversation gives us a stake in understanding our interlocutor, so does 
interaction with an artwork. We would not think that we had had a genuine conversation with 
someone whom we were not satisfied we understood. Conversations, rewarding ones at least, 
involve a sense of community or communion that itself rests on communication. A fulfilling 
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conversation requires that we have the conviction of having grasped what our interlocutor meant 
or intended to say. This is evinced by the extent to which we struggle to clarify their meanings. A 
conversation that left us with only our own clever construals or educated guesses, no matter how 
aesthetically rich, would leave us with the sense that something was missing. That we had neither 
communed nor communicated … This prospect of community supplies a major impetus motivating 
our interest in engaging literary texts and artworks. We may read to be entertained, to learn, and to 
be moved, but we also seek out artworks in order to converse or commune with their makers. We 
want to understand the author, even if that will lead to rejecting his or her point of view (Carroll 
1992: 174). 
As for the ethical stakes of conceptualizing aesthetic experience as conversational, Carroll points 
out (in an ironic fashion considering the vehement anti-capitalism rhetoric that is part and parcel 
of poststructuralism) that the goal of prioritizing critical free play indifferent to or even in 
opposition to authorial intention “has a very ‘consumerist’ ring to it” inasmuch as “it reduces our 
relation to the text to an I/It relationship” where the “it” is unceremoniously chewed up and spit 
out; this as opposed to cultivating “an I/Thou relation to the author of the text” (Carroll 1992: 175). 
To Carroll’s mind, when we watch a film, one of our “abiding interests” is to commune with 
another human being, to get insight into the mind of another person and to consider what they 
think in light of what we think (Carroll 1992: 175). It would be easy at this point for a scholar 
invested in the Kantian aesthetic tradition to simply retort: “But I have no conversational interest 
in films. Nor do I have any interest in what anyone else thinks. My interest is in fashioning the 
most elaborate, sophisticated, imaginative, politically useful, etc., interpretation that I possibly 
can.” This is, recalling Rand’s dismay at those to whom she referred as “Nietzschean egoists,” a 
corruption of art and a short-range view of aesthetic experience that reduces (if it does not preclude 
entirely) the range of satisfaction and enlightenment afforded by art. It is, in short, not merely 
destructive, but also self-destructive. As Carroll puts it: 
We [ought to] have an investment in really encountering interesting and brilliant authors, not simply 
in counterfeiting such encounters. Knowing that [Ed Wood’s Plan 9 from Outer Space (1959)] is a 
schlock quickie, but responding to it as if it were superbly transgressive, is … a matter of sacrificing 
genuine conversational experiences for aesthetic pleasures. And, in doing so, one is willing to lower 
one’s self-esteem for the sake of an aesthetic high (Carroll 1992: 178). 
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In a similar vein, Cavell once expressed his dissatisfaction with the ontological position of anti-
intentionalist criticism not only for its fallacious conception of authorship but also and even more 
importantly for the abnegation of ethics entailed by that fallacious conception: 
I [have been] told that it is not [the author] speaking to us, but a mask of [the author] speaking 
to…anyway not to us. We don’t so much hear his words as overhear them. That [conception of 
authorship] explains something. But it does not explain our responsibility in overhearing, in 
listening, nor [the author’s] in speaking, knowing he’s overheard, and meaning to be. What it 
neglects is that we are to accept the words, or refuse them; wish for them, or betray them. What is 
called for is not merely our interest, nor our transport – these may even serve as betrayals now. 
What is called for is our acknowledgment that we are implicated, or our rejection of the implication. 
In dreams begin responsibilities? In listening begins evasion (Cavell 1967: 229). 
I acknowledge that there may still be scholars out there who are unconvinced, scholars I have 
failed to persuade to abandon the irrational and immoral philosophical premises that drive the 
Kantian aesthetic tradition. But then, in line with my discussion of the Objectivist ethics in the 
Introduction, the purpose of the Objectivist aesthetics is not to provide a basis for punishment, it 
is not a club with which to beat critics over the head until they fall in line. If critics refuse to act 
like grownups, it does not fall on the shoulders of grownup critics to force them to acknowledge 
the error of their ways. They must be left to suffer the grownup consequences of their childish 
actions. In Cavellian terms, their suffering takes the form of a tragic, self-inflicted “spiritual 
torture”:
Skepticism … is a cover story for … the attempt to convert the human condition, the condition of 
humanity, into an intellectual difficulty, a riddle … Tragedy is the place [where] we are not allowed 
to escape the consequences, or price, of this cover … The failure to acknowledge a best case of the 
other is a denial of that other, presaging the death of the other … and the death of our capacity to 
acknowledge as such, the turning of our hearts to stone, or their bursting. The necessary 
reflexiveness of spiritual torture (Cavell 1979: 493).137
137 Peterson corroborates Cavell’s claims, stressing that individuals who “flout” this ethic, “in ignorance or in willful 
opposition,” are “doomed to misery and eventual dissolution” (Peterson 1999: xx).
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To recall the point of Rand’s with which I closed the previous chapter, “no man can predict the 
time when others will choose to return to reason” (Rand 1957: 771). No more can he force others 
to return to reason, or force them to stop torturing themselves. My efforts in this section have not 
been to provide aesthetic “commandments” which scholars must obey. I have sought, rather, to 
provide a rational and moral foundation for film interpretation in accordance with the Objectivist 
aesthetics. If scholars remain unconvinced, then, to invoke Wittgenstein again, all that is left for 
me to say is: “This is simply what I do” (Wittgenstein [1949] 1967: 85 [§217]). Indeed, this 
Wittgensteinian position – which is also echoed in Austin’s position vis-à-vis the goldfinch, that, 
at some point, “enough is enough” (Austin [1946] 1961: 52) – is endorsed by Rand in the passage 
quoted in the Introduction: 
We do not tell – we show. We do not claim – we prove. It is not your obedience that we seek to 
win, but your rational conviction. You have seen all the elements of our secret. The conclusion is 
now yours to draw – we can help you to name it, but not to accept it – the sight, the knowledge, 
and the acceptance must be yours (Rand 1957: 735). 
I have made my case for objective interpretation in accordance with the Objectivist aesthetics and 
I have endeavored to prove its validity beyond a reasonable doubt. The conclusion is now yours to 
draw – or else, the counterargument is now yours to make.
II 
Objectivity and Evaluation 
In the previous section, Kant served as the starting point for my discussion of the possibility of 
objective interpretation. It is on the strength of Kantian premises (first, that artworks are objects 
of free beauty, and, second, that aesthetic judgments are subjective) that what I have been calling 
the Kantian aesthetic tradition has all but displaced what I have been calling the Aristotelian 
aesthetic tradition. I worked in the previous section to prove that the first premise, that artworks 
are objects of free beauty (and, by extension, that there is no objective basis to the interpretation 
of artworks), was false. In this section, I will work to prove that the second premise, that aesthetic 
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judgments are subjective (and, by extension, that there is no objective basis to the evaluation of 
artworks), is also false. The question that I wish to address in this section is the following: If there 
is no sense in arguing against the claim that the interpretation of art is firmly within the realm of 
the objective, is there also no sense in arguing against the claim that the evaluation of art is firmly 
within the realm of the subjective?  
In the Introduction, I observed that the Objectivist aesthetics lacks a coherent alternative to Kantian 
aesthetic subjectivism. So, too, it is important to stress, does film studies. In film studies, it is a 
matter of fact that evaluation is subjective and hence of no use, of no value, to the “serious” study 
of the cinema. Consider, as a representative example of this state of affairs, Swagato Chakravorty’s 
remarks in his review of Daniel Yacavone’s recent book, Film Worlds: A Philosophical Aesthetics 
of Cinema (2015). Responding to a point in Yacavone’s text where he was arguing that correctly 
interpreting films is a prerequisite to evaluating their “artistic success and interest” (Yacavone 
2015: 255), Chakravorty characterized Yacavone’s emphasis on evaluation as “archaic,” for, as he 
opined, “it can surely be said that we are some decades past the time when judgment and taste 
constituted crucial parts of art criticism and theory” (Chakravorty 2017: 153). 
In response to Chakravorty’s review, Yacavone confessed to being “perplexed” by the “bald 
assertion” regarding the irrelevance of evaluation to film studies (Yacavone 2017: 159). What I 
find perplexing, however, is Yacavone’s confession to being perplexed. In the previous section, I 
brought up Bordwell’s famous characterization of film studies as “Interpretation, Inc.” I wonder if 
Yacavone would still find Chakravorty’s assertion perplexing if he considered the fact that at no 
point in the history of film studies was the discipline ever characterized as “Evaluation, Inc.” 
Indeed, so entrenched in the study of the cinema is the idea that evaluation is a worthlessly 
subjective activity that, even today, it is hard to imagine a future for film studies in which it might 
be characterized as such. This is true all the way down to the undergraduate level, where students 
are routinely instructed to leave out of their essays any evaluative claims or references to any 
emotional investments. The result is the sad state of affairs lamented by F.R. Leavis where 
scholarship consists of “those depressing ‘contributions to knowledge’ which are so patently 
uninformed by any first-hand perception of why the subject should be worth study” (Leavis [1952] 
2011: 97). 
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Looking back at the history of film studies, I am consistently drawn to the coincidence that, in 
1972, the same year that Peter Wollen published the influential third edition of Signs and Meaning 
in the Cinema and thereby set the philosophical agenda for the discipline of film studies, there was 
another book published that could have set a very different agenda: V.F. Perkins’ Film as Film: 
Understanding and Judging Movies. Robin Wood considered Film as Film to be “among the most 
valuable books on the cinema,” and he considered Perkins’ arguments to be “beautifully developed 
with meticulous logic” to the point of being “virtually impregnable” (Wood 1976: 30). Carroll 
takes Wood’s praise one step further, claiming that Film as Film stands as “the most thoughtful, 
ambitious, and original attempt to construct a film theory in the seventies” (Carroll 1988a: 74) and 
commending Perkins for being the only film scholar to have even attempted “to deal rigorously 
with the issue of film evaluation” (Carroll 1988a: 256). At these earlier moments in the history of 
film studies, the opinions of Wood and Carroll were, regrettably, minority opinions. As Carroll 
explains: 
The main direction that film theory took in the seventies was scientific, or pseudo-scientific (the 
synthesis of semiology, psychoanalysis, and Marxism), whereas Perkins’ approach was aesthetic –
that is, he was concerned with the “artistic quality” of films, a concept that many [then and even 
now] would laugh out of court (Carroll 1988a: 74-75). 
Today, however, scholars are (re)turning to Perkins’ text and the issues with which he was 
grappling with greater frequency.138 I consider this (re)turn to be symptomatic of a more general 
desire for a (re)turn to the question of value. Murray Pomerance, for instance, argues that 
“something is inevitably missing” in all academic analyses of films, “and that something is the 
experience of actually watching the film” (Pomerance 2008: 5). Taking his cue from André 
Bazin,139 Pomerance passionately affirms that: 
138 For two representative examples of this (re)turn to Film as Film, see David Sorfa (2015) and Dominic Lash (2017). 
139 Pomerance was inspired by a moment in Bazin’s discussion of Anthony Mann’s The Man from Laramie (1955). 
After differentiating between film appreciation, which “presupposes love and familiarity,” and film analysis, which 
“can yield nothing but a crude enumeration which overlooks the essence that only taste can uncover,” Bazin wryly 
exclaimed: “But try to make taste the subject of criticism!” (Bazin 1956: 165). More recently, as part of an 
investigation into the “taste of crime” in French New Wave cinema, Pomerance was again inspired to reflect on this 
Bazinian point, reaffirming that: “My claim – and, I think, Bazin’s – is that the noblest and most serious aim of all 
film criticism is to make taste its subject, to elucidate and open the work of film in such a way as to make 
understandable how it can be a pretext for love” (Pomerance 2017).
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Because cinema is art, it remains true that the most assiduous and earnest commitment to looking 
at its historical, social, psychological, compositional, authorial, and political aspects finally brings 
any serious viewer to a consideration of love: Love of the screen, love of the cinematic image, love 
of the peculiar kind of light that is to be glimpsed in the dark theater coming from this magical 
world, that holds us fast to our fixation upon film – love of life, because, just as it includes people, 
life includes cinema (Pomerance 2008: 8).  
In a similar spirit, contemporary scholars such as Alex Clayton,140 Andrew Klevan,141 William 
Rothman,142 D.N. Rodowick,143 and Tom Gunning144 – as well as, of course, the two preeminent 
140 Over the course of a critique of David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson’s (1997) mode of engagement with 
Howard Hawks’ His Girl Friday (1940), Clayton strives (in a rather Bazinian register) to reaffirm the fact that, 
“whilst criticism is apt to involve analysis,” the goal should be “to do so without ‘breaking the film’ and without 
straining for a plateau above experience” (Clayton 2011: 29); the goal of criticism, Clayton persuasively argues, 
should be the articulation of “the developing nature of a response [that] is forged through an undertaking to 
reconnect with the film on its own terms, ideally in its own terms” (Clayton 2011: 36). 
141 By way of concluding his illuminating investigation of Cavell’s critical practice, Klevan emphasizes that, in 
addition to undertaking criticism “because we feel that we might owe it to the creators of the work,” another one of 
the most powerful reasons to undertake criticism is a certain “compulsion to share” on the basis of which criticism 
can take the following form: “I choose this moment to discuss because I value it and you may value it, too. You may 
have missed it, or you sensed it but let it go, or you saw it, too – you are not alone” (Klevan 2011a: 61). 
142 In his most recent book, Rothman encourages as an alternative to rote scholarship that “purport[s] to tell us a priori
what films are and are not capable of” that scholars (re)learn how “to receive films, to read them, moment by moment, 
trusting [in their] experience” (Rothman 2014: 280). And this sentiment importantly continues a long-running thread 
in Rothman’s work, as evident by the following (still unheeded) plea made to film scholars decades before: “Too 
many academic film critics today deny their experience [of films] … Predictably, the resulting criticism reaffirms an 
attitude of superiority to the films ... Such criticism furthers rather than undoes the repression of these films and the 
ideas they represent ... [and] we [as scholars] cannot play our part in reviving the spirit of the films we love without 
testifying, in our criticism, to the truth of our experience of those films” (Rothman 1986: 46).
143 In one of his most recent books, Rodowick considers the possibility of film scholarship becoming “a diagnosis of 
values” (Rodowick 2015: 95); indeed, he stresses the importance of film scholars (re)learning how to value films, a 
process which would involve, as Rodowick adumbrates, “adding to one’s cognitive stock, amplifying one’s perceptual 
sensitivity and openness to new experience, acquiring new frameworks or contexts for judgment, and developing the 
potential for imaginatively applying or creating concepts” (Rodowick 2015: 103).
144 In a recent consideration of the state of academic film criticism, Gunning observes how, “as academic critics, we 
know that evaluative categories exist and shape what we write about … but where they come from seems to be avoided 
as if we were prudish parents invoking the stork rather than answering tricky questions” (Gunning 2016).
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voices on this front, Cavell145 and Carroll146 – have all voiced similar sentiments.147 In the hopes 
of contributing to this surge of scholarly interest in film evaluation, I will proceed in what remains 
of this chapter to dissolve a number of additional Kantian worries towards the goal of establishing 
the rationale for an Objectivist conception of evaluation under the heading of what I previously 
introduced as an Aesthetics of Life. To start, I would like to return to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. 
If the basic premise on which I am focusing in this section – that aesthetic judgments are subjective 
– is a premise that scholars invested in the Kantian aesthetic tradition believe to be true, they are 
not without their reasons. Consider, for example, the following passage: 
The green color of the meadows belongs to objective sensation … but its agreeableness belongs to 
subjective sensation … i.e. to feeling, through which the object is regarded as an object of delight 
(which involves no cognition of the object) (Kant [1790] 2007: 38). 
As Kant sees it, to consider something (e.g. an artwork) to be good or bad (or, in Kant’s terms, 
agreeable or disagreeable) is a matter of feeling (i.e. is relegated to emotions). And matters 
pertaining to feelings/emotions are not, as Kant sees it, connected in any way to thinking/reason. 
Thus, since only that which pertains to thinking/reason may be considered objective, and since 
aesthetic judgments do not pertain to thinking/reason, aesthetic judgments are not objective. This 
is a fallacious chain of “logic” which merely reifies the ancient mind/body split. Furthermore, that 
this chain of “logic” is fallacious is something that Kant himself indicates when he turns to art (as 
opposed to nature), for it does not take him very long to introduce thinking/reason into the 
conversation. In a discussion of the aesthetic value of tragedy, Kant notes that “many an individual 
145 In a reconsideration of Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night (1934), a film that he had already analyzed as part 
of a larger study of the genre of what he calls “the comedy of remarriage” (Cavell 1981a), Cavell opined that it is only 
in one’s “concrete” appreciation for individual films that “genuine conviction of [the cinema’s] value for study can, 
or should, develop” (Cavell 1985b: 136).
146 In the only work by a film scholar where the possibility of objective evaluation is explicitly and elaborately 
defended, Carroll unequivocally avers: “I regard the discovery of value as the primary task of criticism in contrast to 
the championing of criticism as the almost clinical dissection and interpretation of various codes or signifying systems 
or regimes of power. Rather, I maintain that evaluation is the crux of criticism and that this inevitable connection to 
human value is the litmus test of membership in the humanities” (Carroll 2009: 7). 
147 I will come back to this point and consider in greater detail the landscape of contemporary film studies in the 
Conclusion. 
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… thinks himself improved by a tragedy”; he notes further that this would seem to imply that 
aesthetic judgments “in every case have reference to our way of thinking” (Kant [1790] 2007: 104). 
Breaking that chain of “logic” was easy enough. But then why do scholars persist in dividing 
interpretation/reason/objectivity and evaluation/emotions/subjectivity? As I discussed briefly in 
the previous section, Carroll identified as the major problem on this front Hume’s (and, later, 
Kant’s) misguided choice to anchor aesthetic judgments in the concept of taste. Kant is very 
explicit with respect to his choice on this front (though less so with the consequences of his choice): 
If anyone reads me his poem, or brings me to a play, which, all said and done, fails to commend 
itself to my taste, then ... I stop my ears: I do not want to hear any reasons or any arguing about the 
matter ... This would appear to be one of the chief reasons why this faculty of aesthetic judgement 
has been given the name of taste. For someone may recount to me all the ingredients of a dish, and 
observe of each and every one of them that it is just what I like, and, in addition, rightly commend 
the wholesomeness of the food, yet I am deaf to all these arguments. I try the dish with my own 
tongue and palate, and I pass judgement according to their verdict … I [therefore] take my stand 
[regarding the aforementioned judgment passed on the hypothetical poem or play] on the ground 
that my judgment is to be one of taste, and not one of understanding or reason (Kant [1790] 2007: 
114-115). 
The “logic” of this passage is very clearly that of the Copernican Revolution, the terms of which 
dictate that we ought to assume (contrary to Rand’s “Existence is Identity, Consciousness is 
Identification” formula) that “objects must conform to our cognition” (Kant 1787: 110). To 
corroborate this charge, consider the claim that Kant makes when he has occasion to return to his 
earlier example of the flower: 
To say, “This flower is beautiful,” is tantamount to repeating its own proper claim to the delight of 
everyone. The agreeableness of its smell gives it no claim at all. One person revels in it, but it gives 
another a headache. Now what else are we to suppose from this than that its beauty is to be taken 
for a property of the flower itself which does not adapt itself to the diversity of heads and the 
individual senses of the multitude, but to which they must adapt themselves, if they are going to 
pass judgement upon it? And yet this is not the way the matter stands. For the judgement of taste 
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consists precisely in a thing being called beautiful solely in respect of that quality in which it adapts 
itself to our mode of receiving it (Kant [1790] 2007: 111-112). 
Having already rejected the “logic” of the Copernican Revolution in the Introduction, I will leave 
it at calling attention to its manifestation at this point in Kant’s discussion of aesthetic judgment 
and the way it underscores Kant’s evident frustration that humans must adapt to artworks rather 
than artworks having to adapt to humans. As it relates specifically to claims of criticism, the 
problems one encounters in Kant’s arguments are, in Wittgensteinian terms, grammatical 
problems. First, it is important to note that the aesthetic judgment vis-à-vis the flower (viz. “This 
flower is beautiful”) and the grounds upon which the judgment is made (viz. its smell) have no 
logical connection. Beauty is ordinarily a matter of sight (“That is a beautiful canvas”), though the 
concept may also be extended to sound (“That is a beautiful melody”). But to say of an odor that 
it smells beautiful (or of a wall that it feels beautiful, or of a steak that it tastes beautiful) is, in 
Wittgensteinian terms once again, to conflate very different language-games. Added to which, 
suffering a headache upon smelling a flower (due presumably to some sort of allergic reaction) is 
not, strictly speaking, a judgment (even so, however, is it not possible to determine the reason why 
a person may suffer a headache upon smelling a certain flower?). 
As regards Kant’s aesthetic judgment vis-à-vis the hypothetical poem or play, his argument again 
suffers from a faulty chain of “logic.” As far as Kant is concerned, aesthetic judgments must be 
subjective because he has the inclination to stop his ears when his judgment is challenged. But it 
must be pointed out that this inclination is not evidence of a metaphysical fact regarding the nature 
of aesthetic judgments; rather, it is evidence of an (un)ethical decision regarding the nature of 
aesthetic argument. Kant is making a (poor and childish) choice to stop his ears and to refuse to 
listen to reason. The fact that he then had the gall to try to pass off such childish nonsense as 
philosophical insight merely adds insult to injury, and any scholar who provides such impudence 
with the sanction of reason and virtue is guilty of sanctioning the reduction of criticism to a 
playground full of children stomping their feet with their hands over their ears shouting, “I can’t 
hear you!” 
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In point of fact, Kant’s very phrasing here – saying that he does not want to hear any reasons or 
arguing about his hypothetical aesthetic judgment – undercuts his Copernican position inasmuch 
as it presupposes both the existence of reasons that could explain said judgment (i.e. that could 
confirm that said judgment was, in fact, reasonable) and the existence in the realm of aesthetic 
judgment of reason as such. To introduce taste at this point merely muddies the conceptual waters, 
for judgment and taste are not analogous. Similar to the way that suffering an allergic reaction to 
the smell of a flower is not a judgment passed on the basis of reasoned deliberation, a given food 
object being or not being to someone’s taste is likewise not, strictly speaking, a judgment. Even 
Kant points out that, upon trying a dish with his “tongue and palate,” his “judgment” is a result of 
“their verdict.” Kant does not even allow a space for “his own” “judgment” when it comes to taste. 
For an obvious reason, too: Because judgment and taste are two very different concepts.148 And 
only the concept of judgment is relevant in aesthetic philosophy.149
Though his decision to place his consideration of aesthetic judgments on the Humean ground of 
taste was misguided, Kant’s critique is nonetheless evidence of his well-intentioned refusal to 
simply write aesthetic judgment off as irredeemably and uselessly subjective. Similar to Derrida’s 
valiant struggle to refuse to acquiesce to nihilism despite a susceptibility to nihilistic tendencies, 
Kant struggles throughout his critique of aesthetic judgment to refuse to acquiesce to subjectivism. 
This struggle comes into sharp focus as he works to solve what he calls the antimony of taste:   
148 In a related discussion of the concept of choice, Emerson mounts a comparable critique. He characterizes the 
“choices” of what he calls “the appetites” as at best “partial” acts, whereas the choices of what he calls (likely invoking 
Kant intentionally) the “faculties” he characterizes as “whole” acts, as acts involving one’s “constitution” (Emerson 
1841b: 195). It is in this vein that I mean to distinguish the act of judging a given dish from the act of judging a given 
artwork. 
149 To corroborate this point, Carroll usefully contrasts the grammatical contours of conversations about movie 
preferences versus condiment preferences: “Of utmost importance, observe [that in conversations about movie 
preferences] we are arguing. There would [be] no point in our arguing [about condiments]. You like ketchup; I like 
mustard. That’s it. Period. Full stop. We accept each other’s preferences as facts; I don’t suppose it makes much sense 
to attempt to argue you out of your relish for ketchup … However, in stark contrast, we are arguing [in conversations 
about movie preferences]. And that entails, furthermore, that our discussion revolves around coming up with reasons 
that we believe should sway or even compel others to accept our viewpoint” (Carroll 2008: 195). This is just a choice 
example of what Carroll describes as the “ineluctable tendency for [aesthetic arguments] to drift from reports of 
subjective enjoyment or lethargy to questions of objective evaluation” (Carroll 2008: 194). For more elaborate 
treatments of these issues, see Carroll (2008: 194-199; 2009: 155-159).  
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The first commonplace concerning taste is contained in the proposition under cover of which 
everyone devoid of taste thinks to shelter himself from reproach: Everyone has his own taste. This 
is only another way of saying that the determining ground of this judgement is merely subjective 
(gratification or pain) and that the judgement has no right to the necessary agreement of others. Its 
second commonplace, to which even those resort who concede the right of the judgement of taste 
to pronounce with validity for everyone, is: There is no disputing about taste. This amounts to 
saying that, even though the determining ground of a judgement of taste [is] objective, it is not 
reducible to definite concepts, so that, in respect of the judgement itself, no decision can be reached 
by proofs … Between these two commonplaces, an intermediate proposition is readily seen to be 
missing. It is one which has certainly not become proverbial, but yet, it is at the back of everyone’s 
mind. It is that there may be contention about taste (although not a dispute). This proposition, 
however, involves the contrary of the first one, for in a matter in which contention is to be allowed, 
there must be a hope of coming to terms. Hence, one must be able to reckon on grounds of 
judgement that possess more than private validity and are thus not merely subjective. And yet, the 
above principle, everyone has his own taste, is directly opposed to this (Kant [1790] 2007: 165-
166). 
Once again, there are a number of grammatical problems in this passage that warrant investigation. 
Prior to conducting a grammatical investigation of Kant’s antinomy of taste, however, I would like 
to follow his chain of “logic” through to the end so as to bring to light the mystical core of the 
Kantian aesthetic tradition. Kant’s “solution” to the antinomy of taste involves the postulation of 
a “supersensible substrate” in which the answers to all our questions are contained but which 
reason is (inexplicably) constitutively incapable of entering: 
The solution of an antinomy turns solely on the possibility of two apparently conflicting 
propositions not being in fact contradictory, but rather, being capable of consisting together, 
although the explanation of the possibility of their concept transcends our faculties of cognition … 
The thesis should therefore read: The judgement of taste is not based on determinate concepts … 
[while the antithesis should therefore read:] The judgement of taste does rest upon a concept, 
although an indeterminate one (that, namely, of the supersensible substrate of phenomena); and 
then there would be no conflict … Beyond removing this conflict between the claims and 
counterclaims of taste, we can do nothing. To supply a determinate objective principle of taste in 
accordance with which its judgements might be derived, tested, and proved is an absolute 
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impossibility, for then it would not be a judgement of taste … This illusion is [allegedly] natural 
and for human reason unavoidable … [though, with Kant’s “solution,” it] no longer misleads us 
(Kant [1790] 2007: 168). 
This is Witch Doctoring at its most transparent. This also reflects more perfectly than parody 
Gunning’s observation that discussions of evaluation often resemble “prudish parents invoking the 
stork rather than answering tricky questions.” The stork in Kant’s story of the birth of objective 
evaluation is “the supersensible,” a dimension from which we are forever barred but the existence 
of which Kant tries to assure us is beyond question. Here, Kant betrays an operating procedure that 
Rand warned against as patently nonsensical; recalling Rand’s distinction between Witch Doctors 
and Attilas, Witch Doctors often postulate “a mode of consciousness superior to reason” (Rand 
1957: 1034) which they typically traffic under the heading of faith:150
They keep telling you what it is not, but never tell you what it is. All their identifications consist of 
negating: God is that which no human mind can know, they say, and proceed to demand that you 
consider it knowledge – God is non-man, Heaven is non-Earth, soul is non-body, virtue is non-
profit, A is non-A, perception is non-sensory, knowledge is non-reason. Their definitions are not 
acts of defining, but of wiping out. It is only the metaphysics of a leech that would cling to the idea 
of a universe where a zero is a standard of identification … [And] if an honest person asks them 
“How?” they answer with righteous scorn that … the concept of superior spirits is “Somehow” 
(Rand 1957: 1035).151
And yet, despite the myriad of equivocations and contradictions that mar his critique of aesthetic 
judgment, there is contained in Kant’s critique a moment of clarity. In the previously quoted 
150 For corroboration, recall that Kant himself characterized his efforts with his three critiques as seeking a way “to 
deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Kant 1787: 116). 
151 Regarding film studies in particular, this dubious operating procedure has been rightly rejected from the start. 
However, the only substitute that has been offered for mysticism of this Kantian variety has been skepticism of the 
poststructuralist variety. To borrow from Peikoff’s characterization of the “progress” of Kantianism from Platonism 
to make the same point vis-à-vis the “progress” of poststructuralism from Kantianism: “While condemning [Kant’s] 
mystic view [of aesthetic judgment], the [poststructuralists] embrace the same view in a skeptic version. Condemning 
[aesthetic judgments] as implicitly arbitrary, they institute an explicitly arbitrary equivalent. Condemning [Kant’s] 
“intuitive” [conception of aesthetic judgment] as a disguised subjectivism, they spurn the disguise and adopt 
subjectivism … as though a concealed vice were heinous, but a brazenly flaunted one, rational … The 
[poststructuralist] “advance” over [Kantianism thus] consist[s] of secularizing his theory. To secularize an error is still 
to commit it (Peikoff 1967: 96). 
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passage, Kant remarked that to claim objectivity for a given aesthetic judgment is “an absolute 
impossibility” because “then it would not be a judgment of taste.” This leads him precisely to the 
point that he needed, but failed, to make: Aesthetic judgments are not judgments of taste. Rather, 
as I will argue, aesthetic judgments are judgments of value. To shift the terms in discussions of 
aesthetic judgment from taste to value would be a small victory, but it would by no means 
magically solve all the problems attendant to the assertion of the objectivity of evaluation. Even 
if, in the interest of conceptual precision and clarity, the concept of taste is replaced with the 
concept of value, the objection is still the same: How can a judgment of value be made objectively? 
It will be my task in the remainder of this section to answer this question, and I will do so by 
returning to the arguments made by Rand in relation to the possibilities of an Objectivist aesthetics. 
In the Introduction, I began my consideration of the Objectivist aesthetics with a discussion of the 
nature and the function of art. As I discussed, art, by its very nature, is per Rand a concretization 
of metaphysics; it is of the nature of art to embody, or objectify, the metaphysical value-judgments 
of artists. The function of art, meanwhile, is bound up with its nature. Given that art objectifies 
metaphysical value-judgments, the function of art is to bring human concepts to the perceptual 
level of consciousness in order that they may be grasped directly. However, as Louis Torres and 
Michelle Marder Kamhi usefully point out, “it is not with just any concepts that art is primarily 
concerned, but rather, with the basic value-judgments about reality that most profoundly bear upon 
[an] individual’s life” (Torres and Kamhi 2000a: 27). They further clarify that art, from this 
perspective, “like language … serves the basic cognitive need to condense and integrate 
knowledge and experience into graspable concretes” (Torres and Kamhi 2000a: 27).
This understanding of the nature and the function of art is quite clearly a cognitive understanding. 
From the Objectivist perspective, art is not detachable from life. This is an important point on 
which the Objectivist aesthetics departs from the Kantian aesthetic tradition. Rand asserted 
unequivocally that “there is no such thing as ‘non-practical knowledge’ or any sort of 
‘disinterested’ action” (Rand 1957: 1066). Thus, the following axiom of the Kantian aesthetic 
tradition is obviously anathema to the Objectivist aesthetics: 
Everyone must allow that [an aesthetic judgment] which is tinged with the slightest interest is very 
partial and not a pure [aesthetic judgment] … One must not be in the least prepossessed in favor of 
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the existence of the [artwork], but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to 
play the part of judge (Kant [1790] 2007: 37). 
In the Kantian aesthetic tradition, it is axiomatic that art serves no essential function in human life, 
that there is nothing of fundamental value in either aesthetic creation or aesthetic experience. Rand, 
by contrast, argues that art does serve an essential function in human life, that aesthetic creation 
and aesthetic experience are of fundamental value. In fact, she goes so far as to argue that art is 
“inextricably tied to man’s survival” (Rand [1969] 1975: 5):
Consciously or subconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, man knows that he needs a comprehensive 
view of existence to integrate his values, to choose his goals, to plan his future, to maintain the 
unity and coherence of his life – and that his metaphysical value-judgments are involved in every 
moment of his life, in his every choice, decision, and action. Metaphysics … involves man’s widest 
abstractions. It includes every concrete he has ever perceived, it involves such a vast sum of 
knowledge and such a long chain of concepts that no man could hold it all in the focus of his 
immediate conscious awareness. Yet, he needs that sum and that awareness to guide him, he needs 
the power to summon them into full, conscious focus. That power is given to him by art (Rand 
[1969] 1975: 7-8). 
To support her argument regarding the essential function and enduring value of art, Rand points 
out that art has “existed in every known civilization” and has “accompan[ied] man’s steps from 
the early hours of his prehistorical dawn” (Rand [1969] 1975: 3). Indeed, even in its role “as an 
adjunct (and, often, a monopoly) of religion,” it served the purpose of concretizing the 
metaphysical value-judgments of primitive cultures (Rand [1969] 1975: 8). This is not a 
coincidence or a contingent historical oddity. This is simply what art does.152 If this is the nature 
and the function of art, then such familiar notions from the history of aesthetic philosophy as 
“disinterested pleasure” and “art for art’s sake” are nonsensical and have no place in the Objectivist 
152 For more thorough Objectivist elaborations on the centrality of art in human existence and evolution, see Sciabarra 
([1995] 2013: 191-192), Torres and Kamhi (2000a: 109-130), and Kamhi (2014: 141-168). And, of course, it goes 
without saying that Rand was neither the first nor the last person to stress the essential importance of art in human 
history. Joseph Campbell, for instance, highlighted “the unity of our species” by tracking the “mythological aims and 
concerns” that have been “shaping the arts and world of Homo sapiens” ever since “the emergence of our species” 
(Campbell 1966: 21). In addition to Campbell’s work (Campbell [1949] 2004, 1960, 1962, 1965, 1968, 1972), see 
also the work of, among others, Mircea Eliade ([1954] 1991, [1957] 1987, [1976] 1978, [1978] 1982, [1983] 1985), 
Northrop Frye (1982, 1990), Ellen Dissanayake ([1992] 1995), Peterson (1999, 2012), and Saad (2012).  
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aesthetics. On the contrary, these ideas indicate a philosophical abnegation with respect to art. As 
Rand strenuously argued: 
To isolate and bring into clear focus, into a single issue or a single scene, the essence of a conflict 
which, in “real life,” might be atomized and scattered over a lifetime in the form of meaningless 
clashes, to condense a long, steady drizzle of buckshot into the explosion of a blockbuster – that is 
the highest, hardest, and most demanding function of art. To default on that function is to default 
on the essence of art (Rand [1969] 1975: 75). 
It is at this point that I think that it is worth recalling my brief discussion in the previous section 
of (post)modernist/avant-garde/experimental art. In discussing artworks the purpose of which are 
to be ambiguous and to encourage the free play of subjective interpretations, I observed that one 
could argue, as Rand did, that such artworks, if they even qualify as art in the first place, are merely 
“child’s play along its periphery” (Rand [1969] 1975: 75). The sense of this observation should 
now be clear. To compare, at opposite ends of the aesthetic spectrum, the poignancy and profundity 
of Sergio Leone’s meditation on the passage of time in Once Upon a Time in America (1984) to 
the self-indulgent flickerings of Stan Brakhage’s Mothlight (1963) is to compare two completely 
different filmic objects the first of which is definitively an art object and the second of which is, if 
anything, an anti-art object.153 I would argue that such experimental work as Brakhage’s films is 
153 Though, as I said, I think that at this point the sense of the Objectivist rejection of experimental work such as 
Brakhage’s from the realm of art is clear, I would like to elaborate a bit so as to avoid having my characterization of 
Brakhage’s work as self-indulgent nonsense dismissed out of hand. Despite lacking Rand’s unique brand of vitriol 
(e.g. Rand [1969] 1975, 67-70), Kamhi’s rejection of such work from the realm of art follows the same logical track: 
In a discussion of how certain (pseudo-)artists aim to convey “their inmost feelings” above/in disregard of all else, 
she makes the point that just because a piece of work “might well feel deeply meaningful” to its creator during the 
creative process does not mean that that piece “can be similarly meaningful to anyone else” (Kamhi 2014: 61). In 
Brakhage’s case, he described his creative process for Mothlight in the following manner: “Here is a film that I 
made out of a deep grief. The grief is my business … but the grief was helpful in squeezing the little film out of me, 
that I said ‘these crazy moths are flying into the candlelight, and burning themselves to death, and that’s what’s 
happening to me. I don’t have enough money to make these films, and … I’m not feeding my children properly, 
because of these damn films, you know. And I’m burning up here … What can I do?’” (Brakhage 2003, my 
emphasis). Obviously, I do not know everybody who has ever watched Mothlight; still, I am confident enough to 
contend that nobody who has ever watched Mothlight has said upon finishing it, “Wow, what a powerful artistic 
rendering of the pain of being unable to support one’s family due to one’s commitment to one’s passion.” More 
often than not, I would wager that the response is more of the “What the hell was that?” variety. And rightly so; as 
Rand put it, works like Mothlight should be “of no interest to anyone outside a psychotherapist’s office” (Rand 
[1969] 1975: 70). If it is not possible to make heads or tails of something without the author explicitly laying 
everything out blow-by-blow, then it is aesthetically meaningless (see Kamhi 2014: 61-68). That is not to imply that 
Brakhage’s or his ilk’s feelings have no validity whatsoever. Nor is it to imply that expressing one’s feelings has no 
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not even on the periphery of art; it is outside the realm of art, perhaps as a challenge to art, but 
nevertheless not as art according to the nature and the function of art properly so called.154
It might appear, based on the preceding argument against anti-art, that the Objectivist conception 
of aesthetic value is essentially utilitarian, that the value of art is directly related to its utility in 
life. I would not feel compelled to reject such a characterization, as the Objectivist conception of 
art does, indeed, emphasize the importance of art in the life of individuals. However, if one were 
to attempt to take this argument a step further and say that the ethical foundation of the Objectivist 
aesthetics is therefore essentially utilitarian, that I would feel compelled to reject. On the contrary, 
the Objectivist aesthetics is inextricably linked with the Objectivist ethics, particularly the notion 
of the virtue of selfishness as I discussed it in the Introduction. The terms of the Objectivist 
rejection of utilitarianism were laid out by Peikoff: 
Utilitarians teach that an action is moral if its result is to maximize pleasure among men in general. 
This theory holds that man’s duty is to serve, according to a purely quantitative standard of value. 
He is to serve not the well-being of the nation or of the economic class, but “the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number,” regardless of who comprise it in any given issue. As to one’s own 
happiness … the individual must be “disinterested” and “strictly impartial”; he must remember that 
he is only one unit out of the dozens, or millions, of men affected by his actions (Peikoff 1982: 
119).  
artistic validity whatsoever. It is simply to say that the form that Brakhage’s and his ilk’s expressions of their 
feelings take is not art. 
154 The logical conclusion to this argument is that such experimental work, while potentially valuable, is ultimately 
less valuable than art properly so called, and, if valuable, then valuable in different ways and for different reasons. 
Kamhi makes a similar point in a discussion of what is commonly referred to as “abstract art”: “What’s wrong with 
‘abstract art’? My answer is: Nothing – if one is willing to regard it as merely decorative [as opposed to artistic]; that 
is, as having some visual interest or appeal owing merely to its color or design. But if one insists on claiming that it is 
an intelligible vehicle of meaning or emotional expression [which is to say, that it is art], I think it must be viewed as 
an essentially failed enterprise” (Kamhi 2014: 68). For greater elaboration on these and related issues, see Kamhi 
(2014: 50-96). And it is worth mentioning that Kamhi is by no means alone on this issue. As Cavell once related: “It 
is worth trying to go on with some thought[s] of [a different] kind for the value of [their] opposition to what is, I 
believe, the currently reigning view (among philosophers? among critics?) that everything and anything and nothing 
else but something that just about any ‘community’ calls (or institutes as) art (or rather an ‘artwork’) is art” (Cavell 
1989: 3). 
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Peikoff’s rejection of utilitarianism follows the contours of Rand’s initial rejection, in which she 
made clear that no conception of “the good” is achieved “by counting numbers” or “by the sacrifice 
of anyone to anyone” (Rand [1946] 1998). Moreover, she stressed that “art belongs to a non-
socializable aspect of reality which is universal (i.e. applicable to all men) but non-collective,” i.e.
“the nature of man’s consciousness” (Rand [1969] 1975: 4). That said, just as difficulty was 
encountered in trying to reconcile the concept of selfishness and the concept of objectivity in the 
realm of the Objectivist ethics, there is likewise great difficulty in trying to reconcile the concept 
of selfish, interested aesthetic judgments and objective evaluation in the realm of the Objectivist 
aesthetics. If I have established the nature, function, and value of art in general, I have yet to 
establish the grounds on which one might formulate an objective aesthetic judgment regarding the 
value of a given artwork. I will try to do so now. 
In the Introduction, my discussion of Rand’s position on aesthetic judgment was limited to 
debunking her oft-repeated and dubious epistemological surmise that “emotions are not tools of 
cognition” (Rand [1969] 1975: 32). I demonstrated on the contrary that emotions are tools of 
cognition, and valuable tools, at that. Moreover, I demonstrated that Rand herself recognized as 
much, and that her distinction between a sense of life and a philosophy of life did not serve the 
same purpose as the familiar distinction between (respectively) subjectivity and objectivity. 
Rather, it served to distinguish between a life lived on the basis primarily of emotions (but with 
reason as an ineliminable constituent) and a life lived on the basis primarily of reason (with 
emotions following from consciously held premises). I will now take the opportunity to expand on 
this discussion, particularly in relation to Rand’s concept of a sense of life and the role it plays in 
artistic production and reception. To do so, I would like to return to the passages in which Rand 
initially laid out the terms of a sense of life versus a philosophy of life and of their respective roles 
in artistic production and reception.  
The first passage that I quoted in the Introduction featured Rand’s explication of her concept of a 
sense of life. A sense of life is, according to her, an “implicit metaphysics,” it represents an 
“implicit view of life” formed after years of “habitual,” “automatic” responses to external stimuli. 
Every thought and every action taken, she maintains, implies an estimate about oneself and of the 
world. From the habits and automated responses that have generated an individual’s implicit 
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metaphysics over the course of the maturation process, she points out that any given individual 
“may draw conscious conclusions” from this implicit metaphysics, which would then set him on 
the path of defining an explicit philosophy of life, “or he may remain mentally passive,” which 
would keep him on the path of functioning according to an implicit, undefined “sense” of life 
(Rand [1969] 1975: 15). In Rand’s usage, a sense of life is not a pejorative. That said, it is clear 
that there is a developmental path from a sense of life to a philosophy of life that any individual 
committed to moral perfectionism must follow. She speaks of a sense of life as representing an 
individual’s “early” value judgments as he gathers knowledge and experience “to reach full 
conceptual control and thus to drive” his sense of life (Rand [1969] 1975: 18). 
I discussed in the Introduction, in relation to the concept of moral perfectionism, Rand’s 
conception of the hero who strives for more than merely continued existence. From a related 
vantage point, she acknowledges as heroic the “rare exception” for whom the shift from guidance 
by merely a sense of life to a fully-formed philosophy of life “is a natural, absorbing, if difficult, 
process” in which one is committed to “transforming [his] wordless feeling[s] into clearly 
verbalized knowledge and laying a firm foundation, an intellectual roadbed, for the course of his 
life,” ultimately “validating and, if necessary, correcting in conceptual terms what he had merely 
sensed about the nature of man’s existence” (Rand [1969] 1975: 18). It is a smooth transition from
this conception of moral perfectionism to what I will call, in the aesthetic register, aesthetic 
perfectionism. Aesthetic perfectionism obviously has two sides to it, one pertaining to artists and 
one pertaining to viewers. A perfectionist artist is an individual who has shaped his sense of life 
into an explicit and conscious philosophy of life and in whose work that philosophy is clearly 
manifest as the driving force of his art. A perfectionist artist must possess a fully-formed 
philosophy of life and be committed to exploring via his chosen artistic medium the elements of 
that philosophy. A perfectionist viewer, meanwhile, is similarly an individual who has shaped his 
sense of life into an explicit and conscious philosophy. Where the perfectionist viewer differs from 
the perfectionist artist is in the fact that, whereas the latter is committed to exploring the elements 
of his philosophy via his chosen artistic medium, the latter is committed to cultivating the elements 
of his philosophy by entering into what I will call, following Rodowick, “artful conversations” 
(Rodowick 2015).   
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According to the terms of Rodowick’s conceptualization, artful conversation encompasses both 
the mode of conversation that I discussed in the previous section, where one communes with an 
author in the experience of one of his artworks, as well as the mode of conversation that I have 
been discussing in this section, where one communes with another viewer regarding a given 
artwork. Rodowick stresses (and rightly so) that, in both modes of conversation, the point ought 
to be to come to a better understanding both of oneself and of those with whom one has chosen to 
commune (Rodowick 2015: 262-263). That Rodowick was led to this conceptualization of artful 
conversation by Cavell’s aesthetic writings is no surprise; even less surprising is the fact that, as 
Rodowick acknowledges, the concept of artful conversation is bound up with the concept of moral 
perfectionism (Rodowick 2015: 262). As Cavell once put it: 
In confronting another with whom your fate is, by your lights, bound up … you risk your 
understanding of the other as of yourself – it is part of the [artful conversation] you have initiated, 
or accepted the invitation to enter, to determine whether you have sufficiently appreciated the 
[artwork] from the other’s point of view, and whether you have articulated the ground of your own 
conviction (Cavell 2004: 235). 
The moral force of Cavell’s conception of artful conversation follows from his broader conception 
of conversation as such. Over the course of his articulation of the concept of a passionate utterance, 
which he was inspired to conceptualize following an explicitly Aristotelian “rehearsing” of the 
(neglected) place of passion in rhetoric, specifically in Austin’s work on performative utterances 
(Cavell 2005a: 178), Cavell profoundly retools the Austinian mode of ordinary language 
philosophy for use in ethics and aesthetics. In Austinian terms, “in the case of [a] performative 
utterance, failures to identify the correct procedures are characteristically reparable … Our future 
is at issue, but the way back, or forward, is not lost.” In Cavellian terms, however, in the case of a 
passionate utterance, “failure to have singled you out appropriately … characteristically puts the 
future of our relationship, as part of my sense of my identity, or of my existence, more radically at 
stake.” A performative utterance, on Cavell’s understanding, is “an offer of participation in the 
order of law”; a passionate utterance, in Cavell’s articulation, is “an invitation to improvisation in 
the disorders of desire”:
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From the root of speech, in each utterance of revelation and confrontation, two paths spring, that 
of the responsibilities of implication and that of the rights of desire. It will seem to some that the 
former is the path of philosophy, the latter that of something or other else … In an imperfect world, 
the paths will not reliably coincide, but to show them both open is something I want of philosophy. 
Then we shall stop not at what we should or ought to say, nor at what we may and do say, but take 
in what we must and dare not say, or have it at heart to say, or are too confused or too tame or wild 
or terrorized to say or to think to say. We do not know where the dream of harmony may take us, 
with others, with ourselves, nor when – so often – time or patience and talent or magnanimity and 
conscience or perception, in a word, our responsiveness, will run out on our efforts to make the 
dream practical. Philosophy must nevertheless not lose its thread … [which, for Cavell, is the 
perfectionist challenge of] acknowledging a mode of speech in or through which, by 
acknowledging my desire in confronting you, I declare my standing with you and single you out, 
demanding a response in kind from you, and a response now, so making myself vulnerable to your 
rebuke, thus staking our future (Cavell 2005a: 194-195). 
This leads Cavell to a conception of artful conversation “as confrontation, as demanding, as owed,” 
and “not only, but perhaps especially, when it is molded in the form of moral reasons,” for each 
artful conversation “directs, and risks, if not costs, blood” (Cavell 2005a: 196).155 As to the 
question of value, which Cavell identifies as “the heart of the aesthetic matter” (thus placing it at 
the heart of artful conversations), it is from this position that Cavell contends that no (form of) 
argument and no (kind or amount of) reason(s) can, in and of itself/themselves, convince an 
individual of the value of a given artwork (as opposed to the way counting easily dispels disputes 
in arithmetic, to borrow one of Plato’s examples from his Euthyphro dialogue). Instead, and much 
more difficultly, value is something that you discover “in your own experience, in the persistent 
155 This point seems to have developed out of Cavell’s longstanding fascination, whether in a moral or an aesthetic 
register, with the question put to Euthyphro by Socrates, the question which perhaps inaugurated the philosophical 
conviction in disagreement as invalidating the possibility of objectivity in the realms of ethics and aesthetics: “But 
what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? … If you and I were to disagree as to whether one 
number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we not settle such a dispute at once 
by counting? … And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an 
end to the disagreement at once, should we not? … Then what is the question which would make us angry and enemies 
if we disagreed about it and could not come to a settlement? … Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the 
honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which make you and 
me and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement?” 
(Plato 395 BCE: 12-13). Cavell’s interest in Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue dates back to the very beginning of his efforts 
in philosophy; he references it in the title essay of his first book (Cavell 1969a: 21). For his most salient 
citations/examinations of this particular moment from the dialogue as they pertain to the issues with which I am 
concerned in this thesis, see Cavell (1979: 45, 253-273; 2004: 12-18, 25-27). 
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exercise of your own [judgment], [a process which] hence [necessitates] the willingness to 
challenge your [judgment] as it stands, to form your own artistic conscience” (Cavell 1981b: 93). 
This rehearsal of Cavell’s Platonic slant on artful conversation will help to shed light on the most 
significant problem in Cavell’s philosophical position – a problem which Rodowick compounds 
over the course of his explication of Cavell’s aesthetic writings and his concomitant articulation 
of the concept of artful conversation. At a key moment in the formulation of his own position, 
Rodowick misconstrues Cavell’s most significant contribution to the philosophy of art vis-à-vis 
his attempt to “revisit Kant’s examination of the paradoxical quality of aesthetic conversation in 
the context of ordinary language philosophy”; after correctly identifying Cavell’s engagement with 
Kant as the lynchpin to his aesthetic philosophy, Rodowick proceeds to incorrectly identify as the 
purpose of Cavell’s engagement with Kant the remapping of “a series of relationships … wherein 
aesthetic and moral discussion[s] are investigated and revalued such that criteria of logic … 
[would] no longer dominate … the rational exercise of [aesthetic] thought” (Rodowick 2015: 192-
193).  
It must be stated very clearly that this was never, in any sense or in any context, Cavell’s aim in 
revisiting Kant’s critique. Perhaps this is Rodowick’s ideal destination for the philosophy of art –
a distinctly Kantian realm wherein something other than logic (such as?) determines what counts 
as rational thought (is this not concept stealing, or is there a way of conceiving of “rational thought” 
without relying on/stealing the concept of “logic”?) – but Cavell’s ideal destination for the 
philosophy of art was a realm wherein the logic of aesthetic judgment was properly understood as 
rational and, indeed, objective. In his most sustained engagement with Kant’s critique, Cavell starts 
by pointing out that, “catching the assumption that agreement provides the vindication of 
judgment, but no longer able to hope for either,” Kant proceeded in his critique as if aesthetic 
arguments “lack something” in light of the fact that “the arguments that support them are not 
conclusive the way arguments in logic are nor rational the way arguments in science are.” Indeed, 
he goes on to aver, “they are not, [for] if they were, there would be no such subject as art.” 
Having said this, the key point that Cavell makes is that, just because there are different 
argumentative protocols in artful conversation and just because those protocols extend beyond the 
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realm of science, “it does not follow, however, that [artful conversations] are not conclusive and 
rational” (Cavell 1965: 88). To support his argument, Cavell explicitly takes up the question of 
how and where concepts of logic and rationality are applicable in artful conversations. He contends 
that “those of us who keep finding ourselves wanting to call [differences in aesthetic judgments] 
‘logical’ are, I think, responding to a sense of necessity we feel in them, together with a sense that 
necessity is, partly, a matter of the ways a judgment is supported.” Additionally, he maintains that 
“it is only by virtue of these recurrent patterns of support that [an aesthetic judgment] will count” 
as logical, for, as he persuasively contends, being able to support an aesthetic judgment with 
reasons “is essential to making an aesthetic judgment” in the first place (Cavell 1965: 93). 
By contrast, he argues that scholars like Rodowick “who refuse the term ‘logic’” are responding 
to a sense “that ‘logic’ is a matter of arriving at conviction in such a way that anyone who can 
follow the argument must, unless he finds something definitely wrong with it, accept the 
conclusion, agree with it” (Cavell 1965: 94).156 They are responding, in other words, to the sense 
that if aesthetic judgments are objective then it is possible for an aesthetic judgment to be wrong 
– or, to put it more accurately (if more affrontingly) so as to explain the hostility shown towards 
this position, it is possible for a scholar making an aesthetic judgment to be wrong. And, to a 
certain scholarly sensibility, that is unacceptable.157 Throughout his (ostensibly Cavellian) 
articulation of the concept of artful conversation, Rodowick is obviously uncomfortable with and 
hence avoids taking the (properly Cavellian) step from arguing that “encounters with art and the 
artful conversations [artworks] inspire may lead to perfectionist moments of self-education in 
which I grant myself the possibility of change … or undergo transformation” (Rodowick 2015: 
263) to arguing that, in an artful conversation, an individual has the potential to educate another 
individual and inspire him to change or undergo a transformation. In other words, so long as 
156 Then again, as Charles Sanders Peirce once noted, “whether, when the premises are accepted by the mind, we feel 
an impulse to accept the conclusion also” is an issue neither of fact nor of knowledge – for “the true conclusion would 
remain true if we had no impulse to accept it” – but of belief (Peirce 1877: 1011). To this end, Peirce understood the 
impulse to “dismiss reason” in the interest of clinging to a particular belief or belief system – for example, with 
reference to religious people, “if it be true that death is annihilation then the man who believes that he will certainly 
go straight to heaven when he dies” enables himself, having dismissed reason, to enjoy a “cheap pleasure” – even if 
“we know how it must turn out at last” (Peirce 1877: 1018).  
157 As Thomas Hobbes observed in his Leviathan: “Such is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge 
many others to be more witty [sic] or more eloquent … they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves” 
(Hobbes [1651] 1996: 87). 
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scholars are educating themselves, everything is fine, but to even suggest, much less to explicitly 
argue, that all scholars do not already know everything that there is to know about everyone and 
everything is to allegedly commit the heinous academic crimes of moralism and dogmatism.
Moralism is a particularly irritating academic buzzword that serves most often as a smoke screen 
meant to afford scholars a “safe space” in which they may do and say anything they wish without 
having to worry about being held accountable much less being proven wrong. Cavell once 
lamented the “amnesia of the fact, or a wish to be free of the fact, that we have claims upon one 
another, count for one another, matter to one another” suffered by most philosophers of art, and he 
contrasted with this amnesia/apprehensiveness his conception of moral perfectionism, which he 
hoped would foreground “the demand to make ourselves, and to become, intelligible to one 
another.” Moralism only results if, upon entering into an artful conversation with another 
individual, one expects/demands their interlocutor to change without allowing for the possibility 
of having to change one’s own mind or reconsider one’s own judgments (which, ironically, is the 
bullying tactic of choice for those who most frequently and most forcefully level charges of 
moralism).158 As Cavell formulated it, “confronting another morally risks one’s identity; otherwise 
one risks moralism” (Cavell 2000b: 339).159
It should now be clear that to characterize Cavell’s aim in revisiting Kant’s critique as an attempt 
on his part to eliminate logic from the aesthetic realm is to commit an egregious error. How was 
158 Elaborating on this irony, Ben Shapiro contends that “buried beneath all of [this] supposed hatred for bullying is a 
passionate love for bullying – the use of power to force those who disagree to shut up, back down, or face crushing 
consequences [such as] loss of reputation [and] career destruction” (Shapiro 2013: 4).  
159 As for the charge of dogmatism, Cavell is equally eloquent: “The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the 
search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community … It may prove to be the 
case that I am wrong, that my conviction isolates me, from all others, from myself. That will not be the same as a 
discovery that I am dogmatic … [for] the wish and search for community is the wish and search for reason” (Cavell 
1979: 20). Once again corroborating Cavell’s claims, Peterson’s conception of conversation similarly turns on the 
notion of accepting the risk of suffering a Jungian “ego death” (Peterson 2017q): “If you’re having a good conversation 
... [then] you’re decomposing parts of yourself, your false presuppositions, you’re letting them die and you’re letting 
something new be born as an alternative. You’re participating in this process of death and rebirth constantly when 
you’re having a meaningful conversation. ‘Oh, that was wrong, I’m going to let that die. That’s a little painful, I was 
kind of attached to that concept, but I’ll let it go, I’ll let it burn off,’ and a new part of you will emerge. And then 
another part dies and the new part emerges. That’s this process of eternal death and rebirth” (Peterson 2017k; see also 
Peterson 2017g). In its perfectionist emphasis, Peterson’s conception of conversation attests to the truth in Cavell’s 
observation that “knowledge of the self as it is always takes place in the betrayal of the self as it was” and that the 
pain this process entails is the reason that the perfectionist path is “so rarely taken” (Cavell [1971] 1979: 160). For 
more on this dimension of perfectionism, see Barrowman (2019b, 2019c). 
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Rodowick led to such a misguided characterization of Cavell’s efforts? Not unlike the way I argued 
that Derrida’s confusion vis-à-vis Husserlian objectivity was ultimately attributable to Husserl’s 
own confusion, I would argue that, given his unfortunate tendency to equivocate, the fault is 
ultimately with Cavell. I do not think that it is a coincidence that one of the key passages from 
Cavell for Rodowick is the following, in which the seed for the concept of artful conversation was 
originally planted:  
The philosopher appealing to [artful conversation] turns to [his interlocutor] not to convince him 
without proof but to get him to prove something, test something, against himself. He is saying: 
Look and find out whether you can see what I see, wish to say what I wish to say … [the] 
implication [being] that [an individual engaged in an artful conversation is] … powerless to prove
[his aesthetic judgment] … All [he can do] … is to express, as fully as he can, his world, and attract 
our undivided attention to our own (Cavell 1965: 95-96).  
On the basis primarily of his confused conception of “proof,” this passage contradicts on several 
points Cavell’s most impassioned arguments relating to epistemology (inasmuch as it acquiesces 
to the anti-Wittgensteinian notion of a private language), ethics (inasmuch as it acquiesces to moral 
relativism), and aesthetics (inasmuch as it acquiesces to aesthetic subjectivism).160 Most pertinent 
to the present discussion is the fact that Cavell’s contention that individuals are powerless to prove 
the validity of their aesthetic judgments – contradictory with respect to the rest of his aesthetic 
writings though it may be – relies for its persuasiveness on the same implicit premise that Socrates’ 
question to Euthyphro relies on, viz. that there is no objective basis on which to ground an aesthetic 
(or, for that matter, an ethical) judgment. Trying to make the point that “confronting another 
morally risks one’s identity” while at the same time trying to argue that individuals are powerless 
to prove their judgments after having so confronted another is utter nonsense. On my reading, this 
is an example of even Cavell’s susceptibility to skepticism and, more specifically, to the fear that 
motivates acquiescence to aesthetic subjectivism. 
160 The source of this contradiction warrants investigation, as do the consequences of Cavell’s tendency to equivocate 
generally, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for a trenchant critique in this vein 
of what he refers to as Cavell’s problematic penchant for “esotericism,” see Bruce Krajewski (2016).
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This point of contradiction in Cavell’s oeuvre has interestingly brought the discussion back to the 
related issues of risk and fear in criticism. I have previously argued that there is epistemological
risk in the formulation of interpretations of artworks and that scholars have concocted all sorts of 
nonsensical philosophical tracts on the impossibility of objective interpretation in response to their 
fear of this risk. In a similar vein, I will argue that there is also ethical risk in the formulation of 
evaluations of artworks and that it is in response to an even greater fear that scholars automatically 
assume the impossibility of objective evaluation. Before mounting this argument, it will be useful 
to recall my proposed Objectivist model of aesthetic judgment, which I outlined in the Introduction 
as follows: I like (or dislike) an artwork; I must discover the reason(s). From this, I argued that the 
steps that a critic takes in coming to terms with the initial emotional response provoked by a given 
artwork are as follows: First, the critic interprets the artwork towards the goal of understanding 
what it is, how it works, and whether or not it succeeds on the terms established by the artist; 
second, the critic evaluates the artwork towards the goal of articulating why he likes it (or does 
not like it), i.e. articulating what it is about the artwork (if anything) that he values and why.  
As if criticism was not scary enough, in the event that a given artwork has been interpreted 
correctly – which is to say, in the event that the epistemological risk braved in the formulation of 
an interpretation has paid off – the next step (viz. evaluation) comes with not just more, but even 
greater, risk. According to Rand, when one pronounces judgment on a given artwork (likewise 
when one creates an artwork), one puts oneself, one’s very soul, on the line. As Rand once 
poignantly put it in a discussion of literary criticism: “An artist reveals his naked soul in his work 
– and so, gentle reader, do you when you respond to it” (Rand [1969] 1975: 34). Cavell’s 
realization of this fact inherent in artful conversation takes the following form:  
Whatever the difficulties will be in trying to characterize this procedure fully and clearly, this much 
can be said at once: If we find we disagree [in our respective aesthetic judgments, then] … what 
we should do is either (a) try to determine why we disagree (perhaps we are [interpreting] the 
[artwork] differently) – just as, if we agree in response, we will, when we start philosophizing about 
this fact, want to know why we agree, what it shows about our concepts; or (b) we will, if the 
disagreement cannot be explained, [try to] find some explanation for that … Disagreement is not 
disconfirming: It is as much a datum for philosophizing as agreement is. At this stage 
philosophizing has, hopefully, not yet begun (Cavell 1965: 95). 
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In the previous section, I mentioned that the phenomenon of disagreement vis-à-vis aesthetic 
judgments is often adduced as evidence of the impossibility of objective evaluation. Carroll 
observes that “the consideration often adduced is that our evaluations of works of art … are 
supposedly wildly divergent and obdurate” and that the conclusion scholars often reach (or, more 
accurately in my estimation, often start from) is that, “strong as they may be, [aesthetic judgments] 
are not reasoned” (Carroll 2009: 34). Taking the baton from Carroll on this front, I intend to 
demonstrate in what remains of this section that the preponderance of divergent/obdurate aesthetic 
judgments speaks not to the ontological impossibility of objectivity in aesthetics but rather to the 
preponderance of epistemologically/ethically dubious aesthetic judgments formulated with the 
ontological impossibility of objectivity as a tacit (illicit) presupposition. To do so, I will work 
through two exemplary artful conversations. My primary example will be an artful conversation 
between Robin Wood and V.F. Perkins, while my secondary example will be a prior artful 
conversation between Wood and Alan Lovell.  
Around the time of these artful conversations, Wood and Perkins were often linked for their shared 
commitment to close analyses of films and their shared belief that the question of value is, indeed, 
as Cavell put it, the heart of the aesthetic matter. However, Wood confessed that, despite his overall 
agreement with Perkins’ arguments with respect to film theory and film criticism, he nevertheless 
found that he would often “disagree with [Perkins] over details of evaluation” (Wood 1976: 30). 
In trying to “pinpoint the sources of [his] dissatisfaction” (Wood 1976: 30-31) – specifically with 
reference to Perkins’ considerations of certain dramatic effects used by Nicholas Ray and 
Michelangelo Antonioni in Bigger than Life (1956) and Red Desert (1964) respectively (Perkins 
1972: 84-86) – Wood admitted that “the precise evaluative status of many of Perkins’s examples
[was for him] rather difficult to determine” (Wood 1976: 32). This uncertainty prompted Wood to 
postulate that what was motivating Perkins’ responses to these film(makers)s – and, equally, what 
was motivating Wood’s own oppositional responses, as well as, by implication, what motivates 
any individual viewer’s response to any individual film(maker) – was something subjective and 
thus not “textually demonstrable” (Wood 1976: 32).161
161 The question of how to objectively compare different film(maker)s, while of crucial importance to understanding 
the objective foundation of aesthetic judgments, is regrettably beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I will only 
focus in what follows on the questions of, first, whether or not judgments of value pronounced on individual films can 
be made objectively, and, second, whether or not disagreements in judgments of value pertaining to individual films 
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The critique that Wood fashioned from this postulation, though neither accurate nor convincing, 
is nevertheless instructive. In order to grasp the terms and the stakes of this artful conversation, I 
want to explore a particular moment in Perkins’ consideration of Bigger than Life that Wood 
singles out and the counterargument by which he seeks to invalidate it: 
As [the protagonist of Bigger than Life] walks away from the school building, with its background 
of respectable greys and browns, the image dissolves into a general view of the cab-park 
photographed so that the screen is virtually covered with the garish yellow of the taxi-ranks. The 
transition thus handled gains an emotional coloring which conveys not only the physical strain 
under which the man lives but also his déclassé feeling of shame in his secondary occupation 
(Perkins 1972: 84-85). 
This complex significance seems to depend almost exclusively on our responding to the yellow 
cabs as “garish.” Substitute “bright and cheerful” and the significance vanishes, the transition then 
conveying (perhaps) a sense of release that is soon to be ironically contradicted, but no “physical 
strain,” let alone a “déclassé feeling of shame” (Wood 1976: 33). 
What is of interest here is the way that Wood’s point in his artful conversation with Perkins 
contradicts a point that he had made previously in an artful conversation with Alan Lovell in the 
pages of Screen. In that earlier artful conversation, which involved, among other issues, a quarrel 
over Alfred Hitchcock’s North by Northwest (1959), Lovell objected to Wood there in the same 
manner as Wood is objecting to Perkins here. 
Mr. Lovell quotes me at some length on North by Northwest and remarks: “I see no evidence in the 
film that Hitchcock invites us to make such a judgement of [Cary Grant’s character Roger O. 
Thornhill],” (i.e. that he is “immature” and “his life a chaos”), “and Wood quotes none.” Hitchcock 
presents a man who has got through two marriages, his attitude to which is extremely casual; who, 
in early middle age, is still dominated by his mother; who drinks heavily; who shows no attachment 
to other people (mother partly excepted) and uses them very irresponsibly. This, I think, establishes 
him as immature. Are “beliefs and values” so uncertain that there is really no agreement as to what 
constitutes immaturity? The movement of the film as a whole carries Thornhill (whose initials are 
can be resolved objectively. For further considerations of the issues surrounding the possibility of objectively pitting 
film(maker)s against one another, see Carroll (2008: 218-223; 2009: 35-37, 191-196). 
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R.O.T. – “O for nothing,” as he says) to the point where he is willing to risk his own life to save a 
woman and preserve his relationship with her. His success in doing these things is presented, I 
think, as a happy, rather than tragic, outcome. This, for me, is “evidence” (Wood 1969: 38-39). 
At the center of both of these disputes, between Lovell and Wood and between Wood and Perkins, 
is a dispute over (what counts as/the correct interpretation of) “evidence.” To Wood’s mind (and 
rightly so), for an evaluation to be valid, the interpretation of the film on which it is based must 
also be valid.162 Wood judges Grant’s character in North by Northwest to be immature, and he 
believes that this characterization was intentional on Hitchcock’s part for the sake of the character 
arc over the course of the ensuing narrative. Confronted with the evidence provided by Wood, 
Lovell expressed dismay at Wood’s arrogance and presumptuousness to have pronounced any 
moral judgment on Thornhill’s character, let alone the “severe” judgment of immaturity (Lovell 
1970: 82), and attempted to counter Wood’s example of Thornhill cheating two women out of a 
taxi as an indication of his immaturity and obliviousness by alleging that it could just as easily be 
interpreted as indicating his “ability for quick improvisation (getting the taxi by inventing an 
excuse on the spur of the moment) and witty rationalization (his claim that he has made the people 
he cheated out of the taxi feel like Good Samaritans)” (Lovell 1970: 82). 
Recalling David Kelley’s conception of ethical argumentation, over the course of an artful 
conversation, one must be committed to “observing how a person thinks,” to “attending to his 
reasoning rather than his conclusions in isolation” (Kelley [1990] 2000: 56). Above and beyond 
simply refuting Lovell’s counterargument, it is important to refute the position from which he 
mounted the counterargument. After his (in his mind successful) attempt to checkmate Wood, 
Lovell confessed that, where Wood felt invited by Hitchcock to pronounce a negative moral 
judgment on Grant’s character, he did not feel invited to make any such judgment (Lovell 1970: 
82). Having previously betrayed his Platonic presuppositions in his admitted confusion as to why 
Wood puts such stress on the “moral qualities” of films, filmmakers, and scholars in the first place, 
to say nothing of what he thinks “gives him the right to judge” anything or anyone at all (Lovell 
162 As he expressed himself in his artful conversation with Lovell: “One writes every time a sort of personal testament 
out of one’s sense of vital contact with a director’s work, one’s sympathy and recoil: This is what these films mean to 
me. At the same time, one tries to respond to the films as they are, avoiding temptations to produce one’s own versions” 
(Wood 1969: 44-45). 
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1970: 77), Lovell’s desire – full of contradictions to the point of being self-refuting, not to mention, 
as evidenced by the plethora of severe negative judgments that he pronounced on Wood over the 
course of their artful conversation, hypocritical and dishonest – to “shift the emphasis from the 
critic to criticism, from personal qualities to impersonal ones, from moral qualities to intellectual 
ones” (Lovell 1970: 77) makes it painfully obvious as to why he failed to recognize Hitchcock’s 
invitation to pronounce moral judgment: Because, in his mind, no one should ever make moral 
judgments of any kind for any reason. Thus, having blanketed Hitchcock’s film with his own 
(a/im)moral agenda, is it any surprise that Lovell’s interpretative and evaluative efforts never so 
much as touched the film?  
The fact that Wood was on the right side of this dispute in his artful conversation with Lovell 
makes it all the more ironic to see him on the wrong side of this dispute in his artful conversation 
with Perkins. As an early (and, to my mind, still the most exemplary) herald of the kind of moral 
criticism for which I have been arguing in this thesis, Wood, to his eternal credit, rejected as 
patently ludicrous any such desire for the separation of “intelligence” and “morality,” of morality 
and art, or of art and life as was expressed by Lovell.163 However, Wood endlessly waffled on the 
issue of critical objectivity. In his debate with Lovell, he very clearly (and, as I indicated, correctly) 
asserted as objectively true the nature of Grant’s character and the function of that character within 
Hitchcock’s larger narrative. Yet, in his engagement with Perkins, he objects to Perkins’ 
interpretation of the nature of James Mason’s character and the function of that character within 
Ray’s larger narrative by implying that Ray’s reason for including the yellow cabs at that point in 
his film is not objectively knowable.  
Wood’s claim that the substitution of “bright and cheerful” for “garish” would invalidate Perkins’ 
interpretation and subsequent evaluation of the taxi scene in Bigger than Life is equally as 
misguided (hence as vacuous) as Lovell’s claim was that the substitution of “witty” for “immature” 
would invalidate Wood’s interpretation and subsequent evaluation of the taxi scene in North by 
163 In fact, Wood closed his response to Lovell by quoting a remark made by F.R. Leavis over the course of his 
(in)famous critique of C.P. Snow: “Criticism must begin and end with a sense of value, whatever comes in between. 
If the purpose of criticism is not a discussion of values, then I don’t see what it is. To indicate briefly what I mean by 
‘values,’ let me quote from … [Leavis’] answer to C. P. Snow: ‘I don’t believe in any “literary values,” and you won’t 
find me talking about them; the judgements the literary critic is concerned with are judgements about life’” (Wood 
1969: 48; see also Leavis [1962] 2013).  
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Northwest.164 Lovell’s reasoning is the far more dangerous for its perversion of morality, but in 
both instances, the presupposition is that such meanings can be arbitrarily mixed and matched at 
will based on nothing more (and requiring nothing more, for there allegedly is nothing more) than 
critical whim.165 On the contrary, it must be stated that Perkins’ interpretation of the scene and his 
evaluation of Ray’s skill in executing it is valid not because yellow is garish as such, nor because 
yellow cabs are garish as such, but because, in this case, based on the “textually demonstrable” 
evidence adduced and analyzed, the yellow cabs are being used by Ray, and used efficiently and 
eloquently, to conjure up garishness. Hence, Perkins’ judgment of value was objective and correct.
Of course, the points on which the artful conversations between Wood and Perkins and Wood and 
Lovell turned were relatively minor points. All the same, the fact that I was able to produce two 
different cases in which disagreements over judgments of value were objectively resolved should 
contribute to the overall effect of this section to the end of dissolving a number of additional 
Kantian worries vis-à-vis objective evaluation, as well as providing a lever with which to open up 
a space for precisely these types of artful conversations in which the concept of objectivity is 
preserved rather than eliminated. If scholars are committed to engaging each other in passionate 
and perfectionist artful conversations, then, in Cavellian terms, disagreement should no longer be 
viewed as a “Do Not Enter” sign for the philosophy of art. On the contrary, disagreement should 
represent an opportunity for perfectionist viewers to cultivate their powers of reason, clarify their 
moral and aesthetic premises, and arrive at better understandings – of themselves, of each other, 
and of the artists and artworks under consideration.  
In response to those scholars for whom none of what I have said has appeared to have so much as 
touched the questions that pertain to the problems and possibilities of objective evaluation, let 
alone to have provided answers or a playbook for how to go about always ensuring the objectivity 
164 As Perkins himself noted, as if in response to Lovell and Wood: “A failure to discern quality is not a demonstration 
of its absence … If we fail to perceive functions and qualities, it may [simply] be because we are looking for them in 
inappropriate ways” (Perkins 1972: 190). 
165 To add a final bit of irony, the objection that I am raising here against Lovell and Wood was raised by Wood 
himself against Penelope Houston and her treatment of Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963): “‘Why not try the birds as the 
Bomb; or as creatures from the subconscious; or start from the other end with Tippi Hedren as a witch?...’ Why not, 
indeed? Go ahead, Miss Houston! ‘…One could work up a pretty theory on any of these lines…’ (except that a 
minute’s consideration of the film would be enough to show that one couldn’t)” (Wood 1965: 60; cf. Houston 1963).
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of one’s evaluations, I am reminded of one of Perkins’ most perspicacious observations. As if 
anticipating the objections to his work of scholars in the Kantian aesthetic tradition – viz. that his 
arguments for the possibility of objective evaluation do not provide a list of rules to determine how 
each judgment of value is to be made so as to be a priori correct in every instance – Perkins averred 
that “a theory of judgment cannot remove the necessity for judgment” (Perkins 1972: 193), which 
is to say that determining the objective validity of particular judgments of value can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.166 Or, to put it another way, given that artful conversations 
demand every part of a person’s constitution – reason and emotion, intellect and desire – each 
artful conversation is no better or worse than its participants.  
To this point, I have been vociferously making the case that, before artful conversations can yield 
the greatest profit, the philosophy of art requires considerable philosophical overhaul. And I do, 
indeed, mean for my vociferation to take the form of a rebuke, for it is my sincere hope that 
inspiring scholars to check their premises will ensure that we are in the best possible position to 
overhaul the philosophy of art and thereby increase the profitability of our artful conversations. 
Cavell once remarked that, short of such an overhaul, we will not be able “to make our desires, 
hence our actions, intelligible (and to ourselves)”; that, instead, we will find ourselves “hampered 
in our demand and right to be found intelligible” as well as in our ambition “to ask residence in 
the shared realm of reason” (Cavell 2005a: 196-197). To reconceive artful conversation along 
these lines, as a mode of conversation on the basis of which each participant asks the other for 
residence in the shared realm of reason, is to bring artful conversation into an Objectivist realm 
wherein, as Rand framed the ideal exchange of ideas: “When I disagree with a rational man, I let 
reality be our final arbiter. If I am right, he will learn; if I am wrong, I will. One of us will win, but 
both will profit” (Rand 1957: 1023). This is the aesthetic Atlantis that awaits the discipline of film 
studies. 
166 Similarly, Wittgenstein once expressed the following: “Can’t it be described how we satisfy ourselves of [e.g. the 
validity of an aesthetic judgment]? Oh, yes! Yet, no rule emerges when we do so. But, the most important thing is: 
The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking … [if we could only] forget this transcendent certainty” (Wittgenstein 
[1951] 1969: 8e; see also Sokal and Bricmont [1997] 1999: 49-95, esp. 56-58). 
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Conclusion – Approaching Atlantis 
Observe the persistence, in mankind’s mythologies, of the legend about a paradise that men had once 
possessed, the city of Atlantis or the Garden of Eden or some kingdom of perfection, always behind us. The 
root of that legend exists, not in the past of the race, but in the past of every man. You still retain a sense –
not as firm as a memory, but diffused like the pain of hopeless longing – that somewhere in the starting 
years of your childhood, before you had learned to submit, to absorb the terror of unreason and to doubt the 
value of your mind, you had known a radiant state of existence, you had known the independence of a 
rational consciousness facing an open universe. That is the paradise which you have lost, which you seek –
which is yours for the taking.  
– Ayn Rand (1957: 1057-1058) 
In 1996, David Bordwell and Noël Carroll famously declared that the discipline of film studies 
had entered the “post-Theory” age (Bordwell and Carroll 1996). This declaration was the 
culmination of two decades of intellectual combat within film studies centering on what was often 
referred to as “Grand Theory” (or, more pejoratively, “SLAB Theory,” for Saussure, Lacan, 
Althusser, and Barthes [Bordwell 1989b]) and which Bordwell and Carroll defined as that 
“aggregate of doctrines derived from Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralist semiotics, 
poststructuralist literary theory, and variants of Althusserian Marxism” (Bordwell and Carroll 
1996: xiii). Surveying the last two decades of film studies scholarship, it seems to be true that film 
studies is by and large post-Theory. And, with the current popularity of film-philosophy, most 
contemporary film scholars seem eager to chart new territory and to leave to the past the battles 
over Grand Theory. However, I think that it would be prudent to conclude my efforts in this thesis 
– so much of which has been geared towards clearing the philosophical path for the sake of those 
eager to chart new disciplinary territory – by issuing a word of warning. I think that it would 
behoove scholars to remember Carroll’s insistence that, “however the demise of Theory came 
about,” the fact that film studies had entered the post-Theory age did not mean that there were not 
still “major obstacles” in its path. In fact, Carroll warned that, “as long as these obstacles continue 
to grip the imaginations of scholars,” it is “unlikely” that film studies will be able to escape the 
“legacies” of Grand Theory and truly thrive (Carroll 1996b: 38).  
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For as much as the philosophical sophistication of film studies has increased since Bordwell and 
Carroll inaugurated the age of post-Theory, I have had the sinking suspicion that this is precisely 
the disciplinary drama that is currently being played out. The legacies of Grand Theory still seem 
to have a firm grip on the imaginations of contemporary film scholars, as evidenced by the lasting 
influence of the paradigm subjectivity argument and the zombie-like persistence of 
poststructuralism. Carroll once remarked (indicating his preference for “robust pluralism” as 
opposed to “coexistence pluralism” [Carroll 1996b: 62-67]) that, in the history of the still 
comparatively young and immature field of film studies, orientations and methodologies have been 
embraced and disavowed (with a randomness that I think is more befitting the world of fashion), 
yet, amidst this flurry of scholarly activity, “what may be of use and what is plainly wrong has not 
been sorted out properly” (Carroll 1996a: 291).
On this point, regarding the necessity to properly sort out what may be of use and what is plainly 
wrong, I think that it is safe to say that film studies has its work cut out. I think that there is an 
untold number of conversations that need to be started/resumed in film studies. And some 
conversations will invariably be politer than others. Some conversations may be downright 
polemical. But I do not think that scholars should shy away from future battles in the spirit of the 
old “Theory Wars.” After all, as Cavell once quipped: “Lines are to be drawn, or what’s a 
conversation for?” (Cavell 1981a: 227; see also Barrowman 2018c). For my part, I have in recent 
years been striving to clarify the stakes of the present disciplinary situation for film studies, identify 
persistent problem areas, and offer potential solutions (see Barrowman 2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 
2014a, 2015, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a). Having done that, I have more recently focused 
my attention on the flip side to that disciplinary coin and have been striving to identify alternative 
routes open for the future of film studies (see Barrowman 2018a, 2018c, 2019a). In particular, I 
have been keen to find a place for Objectivism in the contemporary film studies landscape with 
respect to current disciplinary activity. It is my hope that this thesis has served as an important first 
step in that direction. 
In the Introduction, I began by explicating the major ideas, terms, and arguments that constituted 
Objectivism for Rand as she was developing and articulating her philosophy. From her 
metaphysical axiom of the primacy of existence (as opposed to the dominant axiom of modern 
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philosophy, which she termed the primacy of consciousness), to her epistemological clarifications 
regarding concept formation and her critique of the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy for its distortion 
of objectivity, to her ethical reconceptualization of the virtue of selfishness and the sovereignty of 
the individual over and against altruism, to her political championing of capitalism and 
individualism over and against socialism and collectivism, to her aesthetic musings on artistic 
production and reception and the means by which artists create artworks and critics analyze 
artworks, I worked my way through the major premises of Objectivism explicating, clarifying, 
and, where necessary, challenging them for the purpose of establishing the context for an 
Objectivist intervention into the philosophy of art generally and the discipline of film studies 
specifically. 
From there, I moved on in Chapter 1 to bring the analytical tools provided by Objectivism to bear 
on the philosophical school of poststructuralism. With reference to Rand’s critiques of the logical 
fallacies of concept stealing, package dealing, and context dropping as well as her moral critiques 
of hedonism, nihilism, and subjectivism, I critiqued the work of Roland Barthes and Jacques 
Derrida and demonstrated the extent to which their work relied on such fallacies and denounced 
the moral presuppositions which subtends them. I then considered the work of Peter Wollen, who 
was responsible for providing the then-nascent discipline of film studies with a poststructuralist 
foundation, and I explored the extent to which his work suffered from the same epistemological 
and ethical errors as the work of Barthes and Derrida and lamented the consequences of his 
incorporation into film studies of poststructuralism. 
Finally, in the hopes of ridding film studies of the specious specters of Barthes and Derrida and 
charting a fruitful path for the future of film studies away from poststructuralism, I considered 
myriad alternative options with reference to tenets of the Objectivist aesthetics. First, in the realm 
of film interpretation, I clarified the terms of the intentionalist philosophy of art presupposed by 
the Objectivist aesthetics and in the process dissolved a number of additional philosophical worries 
in relation to authorship in film, focusing in particular on refuting the Kantian sense of artworks 
as being purposive without purpose. Second, in the realm of film evaluation, I clarified the sense 
in which aesthetic judgments are judgments of value, not judgments of taste, and, on the basis of 
a reconceptualization of D.N. Rodowick’s conception of artful conversation, I challenged the 
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Kantian premise that an objective aesthetic judgment is a contradiction in terms and explained the 
means by which scholars can pursue objectivity in criticism. 
If this has been the first step in the direction of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema, the most 
obvious question to consider here in the Conclusion is: What is the next step? In the previous 
chapter, I claimed that contemporary film scholars had in recent years been showing signs of a 
desire to (re)turn to the question of value. It is my contention that this (re)turn is the perfect 
entryway into film studies for Objectivism. This (re)turn to value has two component parts, a 
quality component and a function component, both of which would benefit from ideas and 
arguments prevalent in Objectivism. The quality component is best exemplified by the MOVIE 
tradition of “close reading” (Cameron 1972), which has reemerged as a fertile disciplinary activity 
courtesy of scholars affiliated with the MOVIE journal such as Douglas Pye, John Gibbs, Andrew 
Klevan, Alex Clayton, and James MacDowell. In addition to the MOVIE journal itself – which, in 
recent years, has emphasized the centrality of intention in filmmaking and the importance of 
evaluation in criticism by publishing work on “choices” in films167 – the work of the 
aforementioned scholars has done much to draw attention (back) to the work not merely of 
understanding what filmmakers are doing and why but of judging whether what filmmakers are 
doing is good or bad and why. On this front, one of the most important examples is Clayton and 
Klevan’s 2011 anthology The Language and Style of Film Criticism. In addition to featuring 
important contributions from some of the most influential contemporary film scholars, Clayton 
and Klevan also provide with their anthology a provocative argument for a mode of critical 
engagement with the cinema that is in step with the Objectivist aesthetics – an argument which 
even calls for and requires an Objectivist anchor.   
As the very first sentence of their introduction makes clear, film criticism as characterized by 
Clayton and Klevan is “a form of writing which addresses films as potential achievements and 
wishes to convey their distinctiveness and quality (or lack of it)” (Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 1). 
167 For examples of such work on filmmakers’ choices – importantly inspired by V.F. Perkins’ emphasis on 
“moments of choice” (Perkins 1981) – see, among the many possible examples, MOVIE 7 (2017), which features an 
entire section on “Opening Choices” in which the contributors devote their attention to the opening scenes of films 
from Rio Bravo (1952) and Bunny Lake is Missing (1965) to Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (2011) and Zero Dark Thirty 
(2012). 
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This is the quality component of the value turn in a nutshell. As Clayton and Klevan rightly observe 
– in line with my observations in the previous chapter vis-à-vis the jettisoning of value from the 
institution of film studies – “most academic writing aims for a prose that is neutral” and most 
academics are “suspicious of personal involvement with films and apprehensive of value 
judgments, except for ideological critique (for instance, where a film is implied to be 
‘transgressive’ in some way, or its representation of a social group ‘positive’)” (Clayton and 
Klevan 2011b: 2); as they expound: 
It is felt, perhaps, that serious academic analysis should differentiate itself from the evaluative 
reactions of the ordinary film viewer – ‘he’s really good in this’, ‘this is definitely her best film’ … 
For the most part, films are used illustratively (valued primarily for their usefulness) rather than 
engaged with critically (valued for their achievements). Despite this, much film writing, of 
whatever hue, in its choice of films and examples, and in its assumptions, either contains remnants 
of film criticism, or is haunted by its absence (Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 2). 
The significance of this argument is manifold. First, it connects up with the observation made by 
Peter Wollen which I quoted to close Chapter 1 with respect to “ordinary” aesthetics and his 
postulation that scholars “shouldn’t try to insulate themselves” from such ordinary aesthetic 
discourses, since, “after all, our natural response after seeing a film at the cinema is to talk about 
whether it was good or bad” (Wollen 1997: 245).168 Second, it unites interpretation and evaluation 
within an intentionalist philosophy of film, for the notion of a particular film being, in whole or in 
part, either an achievement or a failure presupposes (the ability to acquire) knowledge of what that 
particular film was intended to achieve.169 Third, and most importantly, it calls out scholars on 
their hypocrisy and disingenuousness in light of the fact that, as Andrew Britton similarly argued, 
168 As Clayton and Klevan themselves elaborate: “Evaluation is not simply something one might do, something 
optional; it is intrinsic to the viewing experience. This is how the text makes sense to us: what it means to us. 
Viewers feel a work to be deft, tender, or delicate, or perhaps condescending, smug, or arch, as much as they feel for 
characters or their situations (indeed, whether the fiction affects them or communicates to them at all will depend on 
the quality of the expression)” (Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 5).
169 As Clayton and Klevan themselves elaborate: “One might argue that most, if not all, films are made to be good 
and this objective is an integral part of their presentation and address. For film criticism, the tension between a 
film’s aspiration or potential and its actual achievement is as palpable to a viewer as that generated by plot or 
character or composition. The viewer monitors the success with which the film handles its elements; and this is not 
of supplementary interest, but of pressing importance every step of the way. It affects the moment-by-moment 
viewing of the film” (Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 5).
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critical inquiry “is already implicitly evaluative”; there is no such thing as an “impartial discourse” 
and scholars “should be aware of this fact and should write accordingly,” for “if readers do not 
know where the critic stands in relation to the work, they have no means of defining or assessing 
the critic’s judgments – which may, of course, be found seriously to misrepresent the work” 
(Britton 1986: 435).170
From this point, Clayton and Klevan make an argument that is very similar to my argument in this 
thesis against what I have termed, following Rand, the intrinsic/subjective dichotomy. 
Unfortunately, Clayton and Klevan refer to it as the “subjective-objective” dichotomy, and, while 
they usefully clarify the sense in which criticism can be said to be “subjective,” they leave 
“objective” to get crushed under the bus. This is the point where their argument requires an 
Objectivist anchor. As they argue, “faced with suspicion of the ‘subjective’ in criticism, [the key] 
is to point out that subjectivity is not an asocial, nebulous entity turned in on its own haphazard 
feelings, but is already related to the world, shaped by it and participating within it” (Clayton and 
Klevan 2011b: 4). As I have argued repeatedly throughout this thesis, this is the very definition of 
the objective; to recall Rand’s critique of the false intrinsic/subjective dichotomy, intrinsicism 
alleges that there are “‘universals’ inherent in things … [which are] perceived by man directly, 
like any other kind of concrete existent, but perceived by some non-sensory or extra-sensory 
means,” while subjectivism alleges that, far from any “things” with any inherent “essences,” there 
are “mere ‘names’ or notions arbitrarily assigned to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the ground 
of vague, inexplicable resemblances … unrelated to the facts of reality” (Rand [1966-1967] 1990: 
53). Objectivism, by contrast, maintains that concepts are “neither revealed nor invented”; rather, 
they are “mental integrations of factual data,” or “products of a cognitive method of classification 
whose processes must be performed by man but whose content is dictated by reality” (Rand [1966-
1967] 1990: 54). Applied to film criticism, intrinsicism would allege that the meaning and the 
value of films are inherent in the films and are (somehow via some non-sensory or extra-sensory 
process) “revealed” to scholars, while subjectivism would allege that the meaning and the value 
of films are arbitrarily “constructed” by scholars unrelated to the particular films to which 
170 As Clayton and Klevan themselves elaborate, such a consciously (self-)critical (i.e., such an objective and 
introspective) mode of engagement with film is “essential for the understanding and appreciation of [the] art form. 
Without it we are far more isolated and insecure in our individual tastes and deprived of the encouragements of 
others to grasp works in ways we would not have foreseen” (Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 24).
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meanings and values are arbitrarily assigned. Objectivism, by contrast, would – and does – allege 
that the meaning and the value of films are determined by individuals on the basis of the “factual 
data” provided by the films.
Clayton and Klevan are both rightly opposed to this false dichotomy. However, they conflate 
“intrinsic” and “objective,” pit them both against “subjective,” and reconceptualize “subjective” 
to mean “objective.” Given this terminological confusion, it would be unfair to be too harsh on 
Warren Buckland, who took issue with The Language and Style of Film Criticism and charged 
Clayton and Klevan with, among other things, “slid[ing] towards a solipsistic form of film 
criticism” (Buckland 2012: 288-289). Granted, Buckland’s operating procedure in his critique –
charging an entire book made up of contributions from myriad scholars with sliding towards 
solipsism and alleging that the book as a whole was “let down by the editors” (Buckland 2012: 
289) yet barely even acknowledging the ideas and arguments presented by the editors in their 
extensive joint introduction – is odd and misleading to say the least, but the impetus to his critique 
is understandable. And, as I have indicated, Objectivism can provide the necessary shoring-up of 
the concept of objectivity with respect to critical practice, thereby avoiding the confusion of 
Clayton and Klevan’s argument and refuting the charges in Buckland’s critique. Added to which, 
the emphasis on conceptual clarification and introspection, which, as I have discussed at length 
throughout this thesis, are crucial in Objectivism, can aid in equipping and preparing contemporary 
film scholars to appraise the qualities of films and to assess and elucidate how and why they do or 
do not work. If this is the goal of film criticism as well as the objective of the Objectivist aesthetics, 
then why not pursue the possibilities of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema?171
In addition to the quality component as discussed above, there is also, as I mentioned, a function 
component. The function component is best exemplified by the work of contemporary scholars in 
171 This question takes as its reference point the closing question of Clayton and Klevan’s introduction: “As 
academics, teachers, students, journalists – writers – we are relatively ill equipped and unprepared to appraise the 
qualities of a film or to assess and elucidate whether and why we think it works. What language should we use?” 
(Clayton and Klevan 2011b: 24). Sadly, film scholars are ill equipped and unprepared because there is not a long 
disciplinary history of conversations involving such questions. Save for a couple of film scholars here and there (e.g. 
Jarvie 1961, 1987; Perkins 1972; Carroll 2009), there is a disconcerting dearth of considerations of how scholars 
should equip and prepare themselves to objectively appraise the qualities of films. Interestingly, recent efforts in the 
related discipline of television studies have focused considerable attention on such considerations and are worth 
exploration (see, among others, McKee 2001, Jacobs 2001, Geraghty 2003, Butler 2009, Hills 2011, Mittell 2015, 
Nannicelli 2016). 
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the new tradition of film-philosophy. Closely related to traditional inquiries in philosophical ethics, 
that which is investigated by scholars interested in function rather than quality is less about whether 
or not a particular film is good (in the sense of well-made) and more about “the good of film.” In 
his canonical Theory of Film, Siegfried Kracauer considered the question “What is the good of 
film experience?” to be “the most central of all,” the issue which it is “possible and indeed 
necessary to come to grips with” (Kracauer [1960] 1997: 285). Nearly half a century later, Cavell 
took up this central question and gave it a perfectionist twist (Cavell 2000b). More recently, 
scholars such as William Rothman, D.N. Rodowick, and Robert Sinnerbrink have pushed film 
studies further along this track in their investigations of the good of film, and Rothman and 
Rodowick’s emphasis on perfectionism (see Rothman 2014 and Rodowick 2015) and 
Sinnerbrink’s emphasis on romanticism (see Sinnerbrink 2011b, 2012, 2013) provide unique and 
fruitful entryways for Objectivism into current discussions in film studies. 
More often than not, when Rand concerned herself with aesthetic matters, she limited her focus to 
the world that she knew best, that meant the most to her, and of which she was a member, i.e. the 
world of literature. On occasion, though, she did consider alternative media, including film. As 
she saw it, film, by its very nature, was “suited exclusively to romanticism”; however, she believed 
that the emergence of film as an art form “came too late: The great day of romanticism was gone, 
and only its sunset rays reached a few exceptional movies” (Rand [1969] 1975: 104). Interestingly, 
while Rand’s “romantic manifesto” offers a cohesive reconceptualization of romanticism whereas 
Sinnerbrink largely accepts uncritically the tenets of late-18th/early-19th Century German 
Romanticism, the extent of Sinnerbrink’s engagement with film as a romantic art form reveals 
Rand’s eulogy to have been premature. Deeper probing of these points of concordance and 
discordance between Rand and contemporary film scholars with respect to romanticism and film-
philosophy promise myriad insights regarding, as well as challenges to, prevailing assumptions 
about cinematic romanticism. 
Rothman and Rodowick, meanwhile, amplify arguments about conceiving of films as, in the 
Wittgensteinian register in which Cavell frequently wrote, “scenes of instruction” (Cavell 2000a: 
320). Not only does this conception of film unite the Cavellian strands of perfectionism and 
romanticism that have come to prominence in recent film-philosophy efforts, it also speaks to the 
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possibilities of the Objectivist aesthetics vis-à-vis what I discussed in the previous chapter under 
the heading of aesthetic perfectionism. In the previous chapter, in the course of specifying the 
terms of what I conceived of as aesthetic perfectionism, I defined a perfectionist artist as an 
individual who has shaped his sense of life into an explicit and conscious philosophy of life and in 
whose work that philosophy is clearly manifest as the driving force of his art. However, in 
explicating the Objectivist ethics in the Introduction, I made the point that, while a baseline value 
for continued existence is a prerequisite for humanity, it is not the height to which a human can, 
or should, aspire. In a similar vein, while the possession and articulation of an explicit and 
conscious philosophy of life is a prerequisite for artistic perfectionism, it is not the height to which 
a perfectionist artist can, or should, aspire. For Rand, the height of aesthetic perfectionism 
necessarily brings one into the realm of romanticism, for it is only in romantic art that artists can 
offer “the emotional experience of looking up to a hero – a view of life motivated and dominated 
by values” (Rand [1969] 1975: 140). 
The importance of having such aesthetic experiences in childhood cannot be overstated. Nor 
should it be overlooked that, given the lack of sophistication in the intellectual and moral 
frameworks of children, “what romantic art offers [children] is not moral rules, not an explicit 
didactic message, but the image of a moral person – i.e. the concretized abstraction of a moral 
ideal”; romantic art “offers a concrete, directly perceivable answer to the very abstract question 
which a child senses but cannot yet conceptualize: What kind of person is moral and what kind of 
life does he lead?” (Rand [1969] 1975: 139-140). It is in this sense that perfectionist artists “are 
moralists in the most profound sense of the word: Their concern is not merely with values, but 
specifically with moral values and with the power of moral values in shaping human character” 
(Rand [1969] 1975: 99). In Rand’s estimation, there is for perfectionist artists an inextricable link 
between ethics and aesthetics; in what I have characterized in this thesis as an Aesthetics of Life, 
ethics represents “the engineering that provides the principles and blueprints” to a moral life while 
“art creates the final product. It builds the model” (Rand [1969] 1975: 163). As she elaborates: 
The motive and purpose of my [fiction] is the projection of an ideal man. The portrayal of a moral 
ideal, as my ultimate literary goal, as an end in itself – to which any didactic, intellectual, or 
philosophical values contained in a novel are only the means. Let me stress this: My purpose is not 
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the philosophical enlightenment of my readers, it is not the beneficial influence which my novels 
may have on people, it is not the fact that my novels may help a reader’s intellectual development. 
All these matters are important, but they are secondary considerations, they are merely 
consequences and effects, not first causes or prime movers … Art does not teach – it shows, it 
displays the full, concretized reality of the final goal … Teaching is not the purpose of an artwork 
any more than it is the purpose of an airplane. Just as one can learn a great deal from an airplane 
by studying it or taking it apart, so one can learn a great deal from an artwork – about the nature of 
man, of his soul, of his existence. But these are merely fringe benefits. The primary purpose of an 
airplane is not to teach man how to fly but to give him the actual experience of flying. So is the 
primary purpose of an artwork (Rand [1969] 1975: 155, 163). 
Given her love of literature and her stake in literature as a novelist, Rand may have bridled at this, 
but Rothman teases out the implication of Rand’s emphasis on the intrinsic visual power of film 
vis-à-vis its suitedness to romanticism and asks, “if novels can teach … then how much better 
equipped to do so are films”? As Rothman argues, novels can describe perfectionist heroes – and 
none have done so more famously or explicitly than Rand’s – but they cannot show them; “a novel 
can assert that a character is a hero … but when in North by Northwest Hitchcock’s camera ‘shines 
a lantern’ on Cary Grant’s face at the moment of his moral awakening, we see, and know, that this 
man is such a hero” (Rothman 2014: 284).172 In a similar vein, Rodowick conceives of films (in 
step with Rand) not as opportunities for the dissemination of didactic messages, but rather, as 
opportunities for the assembling of reminders. As Rodowick usefully explains, assembling 
reminders à la Wittgenstein demonstrates a prudential wisdom with respect to perfectionism:
[Given] a certain philosophical absentmindedness that in every one of us provokes misfires of 
reason … [such as] to have overlooked, to be unaware, to be subject to misdirected “perceptions” 
or perspectives, to look in the wrong place, to be distracted, to have insufficiently accounted for 
conceptual connections, to have insufficiently valued or valued for the wrong reasons, to have 
insufficiently accounted for what one values, to have insufficiently thought through consequences, 
172 To corroborate this argument, I offer the observation (in the spirit of the notion that “a picture is worth a thousand 
words”) that, over and above the extraordinarily brilliant and insightful passages and pages written by Rand in her 
novel The Fountainhead, nothing in it is nearly as effective/affective in projecting her hero, Howard Roark, as the 
shot in King Vidor’s film adaptation of The Fountainhead of Gary Cooper as Roark – following a cut on a line from 
Patricia Neal’s character Dominique Francon to the effect that Roark “doesn’t stand a chance” of successfully bringing 
his artistic/philosophical vision into the world – seated serenely, legs outstretched, dismissing as not even the measliest 
threat the portended apocalypse (cf. Rand [1943] 2007: 263-280, esp. 278). 
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to misunderstand or be misunderstood, to be confused or distracted, to have misapplied context or 
not found the right context for interpretation … [assembling reminders] is something like the 
making of [cognitive] maps … reminding us of expected and unexpected pathways of meaning, 
keeping us going in the right direction and avoiding navigational mishaps, and reminding us not to 
stray too far from an intended route (Rodowick 2015: 60-61).173
Of course, as is always the case in the realm of perfectionism, there is nothing automatic in this 
relationship between the perfectionist viewer and the perfectionist artist nor are there any 
“imperatives” or “commandments” according to which one must be a perfectionist viewer, must 
seek instruction from perfectionist art, must set out on a perfectionist journey at all. As Rand herself 
acknowledged: 
A given individual may choose to move forward, to translate the meaning of [his experience of a 
perfectionist artwork] into the actual course of his own life; or he may fail to live up to it and spend 
the rest of his life betraying it. But whatever the case may be, the artwork remains intact, an entity 
complete in itself, an achieved, realized, immovable fact of reality – like a beacon raised over the 
dark crossroads of the world, saying: “This is possible” (Rand [1969] 1975: 163-164). 
173 As for what can happen when, in the absence of such reminders, one strays from or is knocked off of one’s intended 
route, both Emerson and Rand have lamented the potentially fatal consequences. After explaining that the timeless 
and universal interest in romantic stories featuring heroic protagonists comes from the realization that “all [of the 
hero’s] great and transcendent properties are ours” – that, “if we dilate in beholding the Greek energy, the Roman 
pride, it is [because] we are already domesticating the same sentiment” – and encouraging people to “find room for 
this great guest in our small houses” (Emerson 1841c: 256, my emphasis), Emerson laments: “We have seen or heard 
of many extraordinary young men who never ripened, or whose performance in actual life was not extraordinary. 
When we see their air and mien, when we hear them speak of society, of books, of religion, we admire their superiority; 
they seem to throw contempt on our entire polity and social state. Theirs is the tone of a youthful giant who is sent to 
work revolutions. But they enter an active profession and the forming Colossus shrinks to the common size of man. 
The magic they used was the ideal tendencies, which always make the Actual ridiculous; but the tough world had its 
revenge the moment they put their horses of the sun to plough in its furrow. They found no example and no companion, 
and their heart fainted” (Emerson 1841c: 257). For her part, Rand illustrates the context in which one’s heart may be
made to faint: “It is easy to convince a child, and particularly an adolescent, that his desire to emulate Buck Rogers is 
ridiculous. He knows it isn’t exactly Buck Rogers he has in mind, and yet, simultaneously, it is – he feels caught in 
an inner contradiction – and this confirms his desolately embarrassing feeling that he is being ridiculous. Thus, the 
adults – whose foremost moral obligation toward a child, at this stage of his development, is to help him understand 
that what he loves is an abstraction, to help him break through into the conceptual realm – accomplish the exact 
opposite. They stunt his conceptual capacity, they cripple his normative abstractions, they stifle his moral ambition, 
i.e. his desire for virtue … Of the many sins of adults toward children, this is the one for which they would deserve to 
burn in hell if such a place existed” (Rand [1969] 1975: 142, 141).
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These points of intersection between Objectivism and contemporary film studies with respect to 
the (re)turn to the question of aesthetic value are merely choice examples. There are far more 
places where film scholars could/should incorporate Objectivist ideas and arguments than I could 
possibly list here in this Conclusion. However, as a final word with regards to the future of film 
studies and the possibilities of an Objectivist aesthetics of cinema, I think that it is interesting to 
note – recalling the point of Rand’s that I brought up at the close of Chapter 1, that “it is impossible 
to predict the time of a philosophical Renaissance” (Rand [1969] 1975: 115) – the recent 
emergence in contemporary discussions of cinema not merely ideas and arguments consistent with 
or with relevance for Objectivism, but, more specifically, of ideas and arguments from Rand 
herself. From the efforts of Lisa Downing (2014, 2015), who has focused in her work on “selfish 
women” such as Rand and in particular on questions that arise from cinematic representations of 
gender in Rand’s work, to those of Daniel Shaw (2017), who has studied Rand avec Nietzsche in 
an effort to delineate the (in)compatibilities between Rand and existentialism,174 it would appear 
that Rand’s prognosis for academia was, indeed, as I postulated, unduly pessimistic. In fact, this 
recent interest in Rand combined with the disciplinary shifts that I have discussed throughout this 
thesis and chronicled in detail in this Conclusion would seem to corroborate further my claims that 
there is a widespread and growing desire on the part of film scholars to overhaul the philosophical 
foundation on which film studies was originally built and to seek out new directions for the 
discipline. Perhaps the philosophical Renaissance is already underway and we are already 
approaching Atlantis. 
174 Additionally, leading film-philosophy scholar David Sorfa this year opted to include King Vidor’s adaptation of 
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